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Abstract 
This dissertation reviews the theory and practice of Regulation and its application to 
professional football. The exploration uses the legal pivot of the 1986 Insolvency Act 
with subsequent amendments and consolidations to analyse the activities of regulatory 
agents (Insolvency Practitioners), industry bodies (the Football League) and directors 
(owners of football clubs) in the context and conduct of affairs relating to Corporate 
Insolvency. The operation of The Football CreditorsÕ Rule receives specific scrutiny. At 
the heart of this investigation lies ÔThe PuzzleÕ in that, historically, firms in this industry 
seem exceptionally likely to suffer an insolvency event yet appear exceptionally 
unlikely to be wound-up. The causes and consequences of this paradox are probed via a 
journey from theory to practice in the development of the study.  
Whilst Ôunexpected consequencesÕ attend many human activities, this thesis is novel in 
its examination of phenomena in which many taken for granted assumptions are not 
wholly delivered as expected. The ideas driving the review are obtained from extensive 
reading of published material and the data are obtained from on-line published sources 
and are often couched in systems terms. In the main, the data refer to the period 
1986-2016 and relate to the full-time English Football industry. The discussion and 
analysis of data within the thesis are categorised in the manner of MertonÕs Law of 
Unintended Consequences. The results of the enquiry pay special heed to issues relating 
to the accountability of key actors for both the manner and the outcome of their actions; 
to the need for greater energy to be devoted to how understanding of the complexities 
surrounding insolvency might be achieved by more effective communication styles/
methods; and to the suggestion that regulation of insolvency and the practice of 
insolvency law may be better accomplished via an approach which is both fine-tuned 
and industry-specific.  
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Prologue 
ÔYe donÕt know what youÕre doing, Referee!Õ  This abusive yet plaintive cry hurled by a 1
spectator was the authorÕs introduction, as a young boy watching his first ÔbigÕ football 
match with his grandfather, to an adult world. This was a world  in which the spectacle 
was conditioned by ÔrulersÕ controlling the behaviour of the ÔruledÕ via the device of 
ÔrulesÔ. That the application of these rules was inconsistent and not wholly understood 
by those to whom they applied merely added to the delicious unpredictability of the 
occasion for the author. 
In the best Proustian  sense, this recollection sowed the seed from which this 2
dissertation has developed into an academic examination of Regulation as applied to the 
world of football. 
 Motherwell v Rangers : Fir Park Stadium, Motherwell  October 1952.1
 Marcel ProustÕs ÔA la recherche du temps perduÕ .. but with Scotch Pies substituting for the madeleines !2
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Chapter 1: An Introduction 
This dissertation can be seen to be about THE law and about A law. Although primarily 
socio-legal in perspective, it freely borrows concepts from other intellectual fields in 
order to provide a cross-disciplinary view and examines an area harking back to Roman 
times   É  that of Õpanem et circensesÕ ... the games designed for mass popular appeal, 
in this instance, professional football.  The work is constructed in a style not unlike the 
tartan design on a Scottish kilt. There are dominant colourways such as Regulatory 
theory, Regulatory practice and the Insolvency Act 1986 which interweave with 
subdominant themes such as the profession of Insolvency Practitioners and the world of 
English professional football. In the kilt, these combine in a complex, yet ultimately 
logical manner, to determine the end product. The discussion produced here follows this 
kilt design style in its development. 
What follows explores a relatively obscure area of organised human behaviour; the 
activities of financially distressed football clubs. What is of interest is the way in which 
matters are not entirely as they may seem at casual glance ... nor do they quite conform 
to openly declared rules of intention and causation. In short, the exploration is of a 
Wonderland in which Alice might have been comfortable. 
The Puzzle: 
Central to our discussions is the Puzzle which initiates the enquiry. Baldly stated, this is 
ÒWhy do so few English football clubs Õgo bustÕ ?Ò  The pursuit of an answer to this 
question leads the discussion in unexpected ways. 
Scoping of the Topic: 
It is usual in commentaries such as this to offer some words on framing the field but 
even at this early stage, a little of the out of focus character of the ensuing investigation 
begins to become apparent.  
Here, one might easily set a temporal scope; events from 1986 till the present day. The 
enactment of the Insolvency Act in 1986 provides one convenient bookend to this 
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dimension ... but the placing of the other bookend is less felicitous. Most of the 
empirical work in the literature in this area runs till around 2012-13 as do the 
observations on European Law  However, that admirable source of football economic 3
and legal data, Deloittes,  continues to be published annually and underpins general 4
thinking throughout.  
A working geographical scope has been established in the title as being England. But 
even allowing for the ellipsis into England and Wales, some celebrated cases  from 5
Scotland have been mentioned in reports relating to cases involving English football 
clubs. The law on corporate insolvency in Scotland is not materially different from that 
in English Law. Additionally, top-level football clubs who compete in international 
competition render themselves subject to European legislation. 
The study will, naturally, concern itself with the quest for success of professional 
football clubs. The notion of ÔsuccessÕ (or being successful) might therefore be put 
forward as a scoping criterion ... but closer consideration leads to the observation that 
this might be a fruitless avenue to follow. It seems clear that economic success is neither 
sought nor achieved  by football clubs ... strategically, survival may be the principal 6
economic objective in most instances. Other dimensions of success may be, at least in 
part, be more significant. There is, quite probably, significant personal status (hence 
social success) to be gained by owning a football club which has achieved/is achieving 
competitive superiority against its rivals ... one notes the (increasing ?) numbers of club 
owners who have difficulties with the footballing authorities in regard of meeting the 
ÕFit and Proper PersonsÕ  test before acquiring the club. In passing, it might also be 7
appreciated that even the idea of ÕownershipÕ is not without controversy ... owners may 
 Possibly the moves towards Brexit have dulled an enthusiasm to publish in this field  .. or perhaps there 3
has just been little of interest to report?
 DeloitteÕs Annual Review of Football Finance: Deloitte UK.4
 Perhaps that involving Glasgow Rangers is the most recent (2012)  .. and certainly the most prominent; 5
others include Heart of Midlothian (2012) and Gretna (2008).
 Notwithstanding this point football clubs in this study rarely make much money on a year by year basis 6
such is the competitive intensity which provokes extraordinary expenditure in acquiring superior playing 
talent.
 See Chapter 7 later.7
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have economic and legal title to the club  but fans may feel they have an enduring 8
ownership of a social type; a communal right akin to Ôthe CommonsÕ. 
 The descriptor ÔprofessionalÕ football club is, thankfully, lucid and used as a shorthand 
for teams in the top four leagues in England ... where all players receive taxable 
payment. In contradistinction, teams in lower leagues who may well have players 
signed as amateurs (no taxable payment).   9 10
However imprecise these frames seem, they do have a fair degree of functionality in 
that they help both reader and writer make sense of the chosen topic. So, the 
investigation will go forward to review matters which mainly took place over the 30 
years from 1986, which mainly involve the top 90 or so English professional football 
clubs and which relate to situations in which some of these clubs have found themselves 
in Ôfinancial distressÕ. The level of English football studied here is organised into four 
divisions. The top division which includes the elite clubs has a membership of 20 clubs 
whereas the remaining three (Championship, Leagues 1 and 2) each have 24 
participating clubs. The practice of promotion and relegation between all four leagues 
gives a substantial spur to playing performance with exceedingly large economic 
consequences for both success and failure on the pitch. 
Regulation clarified: 
ÔRegulationÕ is also a term which encourages unpacking with its implications for clarity 
as to regulator/ruler as compared with regulatee/rule-follower. Immediately, there arise 
questions as to who fills what role ... and what ÕqualificationÕ is needed for the role. 
Consequential questions as to why regulation is required at all, what the purpose of the 
regulation may be perceived to be and what style/mode the regulation might best exhibit 
do need to be addressed. Regulations are seen as being Ôrules of order having the force 
 Although not always to the clubÕs ground and other facilities.8
 Such players, of course, no longer receive banknotes in their football boots for travel expenses as did the 9
author as an undergraduate.
 This matter is highly significant and was a major feature in the HMRCÕs action against Glasgow 10
Rangers ... and, presumably, was the principal motive force in the landmark Football CreditorsÕ Case (see 
Chapter 6 later.)
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of law, prescribed by a superior or competent authority, relating to the actions of those 
under the authority's control.Õ  These would be issued to carry out the intent of the 11
regulator. Conventionally, the regulator would be the state but an expanded view of 
regulation will be taken in what follows.  The treatment of regulation for the purposes 
of this dissertation will lean towards the conceptualisation in the sociological and/or 
business fields. 
In the wake of such consequential questions lie deeper considerations of the part to be 
played by communication as an aid to rule-conformance, by sanctions as 
encouragement by actors to conform, by agents who may act as delegated/proxy 
regulators on behalf of rule-makers or by adjudicators /facilitators who bring 
enlightenment and/or realistic solution-building to complex situations. 
Systems terms in precis: 
This exploration will often use a systems approach as an analytical device. This 
approach is commonly used in Engineering and in Medicine and it has an across-
discipline perspective which will be useful in this study. It will allow legal ideas to be 
framed and fruitfully developed in relation to an environment which is evolving and in 
which resources available to interacting actors cannot be taken as given. Whilst no deep 
understanding of systems theory is utilised, some key ideas are used to marshal the 
discussion. Accordingly, a very brief outline of terms is now offered. Systems are 
collections of elements (sub-systems) which are inter-connected and which often are 
designed to deliver some objective. These elements are inter-related and inter-
dependent; if such relationships fail, then the original objective will not be reached É 
which is not at all to say that no outcome results. They may work together (coupled) or, 
for a variety of reasons, may not.  
Systems theory frequently asserts that the aims of the overall system ought to have 
priority over that of any element. The word ought carries significance ... connoting a 
duty. In what follows, this will be seen to be problematic. There is the assumption that 
systems are ordered which in some way delivers the (larger) systemÕs aim and that the 
Taken from legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com / regulation 11
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elements are able to interact one with another. We will examine whether ability to 
interact equates to capacity to interact during our discussion. The concept of 
interdependence  implies a degree of co-ordination between elements/subsystems for 12
the effective delivery of an aim (or, indeed, of multiple aims) and raises the question of 
the degree of integration/ cohesiveness of the overall system. The aims may be real or 
stated É  the reality is that social systems (the type we discuss) may frequently overtly 
aver one aim and covertly pursue another ... a result which we will note later. 
From this can be derived four potential assessment measures for the operation of such a 
system as will be examined in later discussion É 
➢ System purpose    É  what is the desired aim and what benefits are expected 13
(and to whom)? 
➢ Accountability  É  who is responsible for achieving the aim(s) (stated or 14
otherwise) of the system É and how might success be measured? 
➢ Clarity É how understandable is the functioning of the system É  to what 15
extent is misinterpretation of written material/legal instruments a handicap to 
delivering aims? 
➢ Repeatability  É how consistent (and predictable) is the operation of the 16
system? 
These will all be used to estimate the way in which the Corporate Insolvency system 
operates.  
Also of relevance are the thoughts that systems have boundaries which may or not be 
permeable to pressures (inputs) from the outside environment. These inputs may/may 
not be deliberate (ie. intentional) and so their results (outputs) may/ may not be as 
planned. The extent of permeability is often, simplistically, labelled as open or closed in 
relation to the amount of external influence on the system. Here we see such matters as 
 Here understood as a relationship implying some mutuality which need not be symmetric.12
 Who gets to articulate this can be of especial interest.13
 Accountability to whom ... and what sanctions come with failure?14
 Questions of different ÔlanguagesÕ spoken by different actors become relevant.15
 Chaos ensues when the system delivers different outcomes to a series of similar inputs.16
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being on a continuum  rather than being polar extremes. Finally, and crucially, regard 17
needs to be paid to the constraints to which actors in the sub-systems are subject É  
being always aware that these constraints will vary over time for multiple reasons. 
Unintended Consequences introduced: 
The analysis of material brought forward in each of the main chapters will, inter alia, 
employ a somewhat crude usage of the eponymous Law of Unintended Consequences. 
Principally  associated with work of Robert Merton,  this ÕLawÕ suggests that there are 18 19
three main possible outcomes which may be caused by one or other of five main 
causes.  These outcomes are, in turn, ÔAn Unexpected BenefitÕ;  ÔAn Unexpected 20 21
DrawbackÕ  and ÔA Perverse ResultÕ.  The causes are listed below ...  22 23
1. Ignorance, making it impossible to anticipate everything, thereby leading to 
incomplete analysis. 
2. Errors in analysis of the problem or following habits that worked in the past but 
may not apply to the current situation. 
3. Immediate interests overriding long-term interests. 
4. Basic values which may require or prohibit certain actions even if the long-term 
result might be unfavourable (these long-term consequences may eventually 
cause changes in basic values). 
 Which provokes consideration of Òto what extent?Ó type questions.17
 Although economist Adam Smith with his Ôinvisible handÕ quite possibly has an earlier input to the 18
notion. He (and much later, Bastiat in ÔWhat is Seen and What is not SeenÕ) analyse events in a manner 
redolent of systems theory.
 In "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action" (1936).19
 MertonÕs ÔcausesÕ will be returned to the concluding chapter (Chapter 8).20
 A positive yet unanticipated benefit is made available to one or more of the principal actors in the 21
system.
 An unanticipated detriment which accompanies the wished-for effect of the regulation.22
 An outcome quite contrary to the original aim of the regulation.23
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5. Self-defeating prophecy, being the fear of some consequence which drives 
people to find solutions before the problem occurs, thus the non-occurrence of 
the problem is not anticipated.  24
The discussion of each chapter analysis will then be synthesised into the overall 
conclusions in Chapter 8. 
Reader signposts: 
This thesis develops beyond a scene-setting introductory chapter  by engaging firstly 25
with the central concern of the thesis, that of regulation. In this chapter  a bewildering 26
variety of perspectives along with multiple approaches are articulated and a tentative 
chapter summary is offered. It is no real surprise to note that the literature in this field is 
extensive yet consensus as to the most effective approach(es) is/are not easy to find. The 
next chapter  attends to Ôthe real worldÕ of regulation by exploring regulatory strategy 27
and examines causes of regulatory failure, considers some aspects of regulatory 
weakness and comments upon areas of regulatory deficit. This leads naturally to 
probing concerns held by some as to the nature, style and extent of communication 
between the regulator (and agent) and the regulatee before deriving further reflections.  
The ensuing chapter  presents a provisional look at the notion of ÔaccountabilityÕ ... 28
after all, if matters do not go entirely to plan, then someone may/should be held to 
account? It returns to the issue of accountability raised in the second chapter and 
examines both accountability principles in addition to a review of accountability issues 
before yielding a further short set of conclusions.  
 This list is acknowledged as being from Wikipedia.24
 Chapter 1: Introduction.25
 Chapter 2: Regulation ... as an Idea.26
 Chapter 3: Regulation ... in Practice.27
 Chapter 4: Accountability.28
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Given that a continuing theme throughout the piece is one of uncertainty in many 
aspects, it was felt that the metaphor of The Casino,  where rules, actions and outcomes 29
are affected to some extent by chance or ambiguity, might be a suitable device by which 
to unroll the basic legal platform of this discussion. In turn, the roots of the key 
legislation, the principal ÔplayersÕ in the Casino, the major Ôset-playsÕ or choreographed 
legal manoeuvres and those instances which may be difficult to deal with for cross-
cultural or for moral reasons also receive attention.  Some fundamental ideas in respect 
of the English law on Corporate Insolvency are established as are outlines of the 
enforcement strategies associated with corporate insolvency.  
The transit in the discussion from theory to practice moves further in the real world to a 
contemplation of the practical detail surrounding insolvency in English professional 
football. This review  commences by looking at the landmark case in which HMRC 30
sought  to overturn the effects of the notorious ÔFootball CreditorsÕ Rule.Õ Related 31
material on Financial Fair Play and on the notion of ÔThe Sporting InterestÕ is also 
surveyed;  the latter being a notion that AliceÕs Queen of Hearts would have certainly 32
warmed to ... briefly, Ôthe law does not apply to me!Õ  Finally, a Concluding Discussion  33
is offered. 
Method: 
This thesis was developed around a methodical review of current and significant 
literature. In the first instance, the original research puzzle  was the starting point for 34
the construction of a series of mind maps. A consolidated version of the map was then 
used as a basis for Google Scholar Ôanchor pointsÕ É  which, in turn, allowed a search 
for suitable books and articles. Notes taken from these sources form the basis of the 
 Chapter 5: The Insolvency Casino.29
 Chapter 6: The Football CreditorsÕ Rule.30
 HMRC v The Football League and FA/Premier League [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch)31
 In Chapter 7: Pan European Developments in the Sporting Field.32
 Chapter 8: Concluding Discussion.33
 Subsequently amended in the light of developments.34
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thesis. These notes were supplemented by electronic material obtained from more 
popular sources such as major consultancies,  reputable newspapers  and sector-35 36
specific magazines.  This latter material, although not peer-reviewed, was deemed 37
essential to flesh out the academic literature and to provide some topicality. The 
approach is, in turn descriptive, interpretive and analytical with insertions of critique 
both in the body of the development of the various sections and as crucial components 
of the chapter conclusions and the concluding synthesis.   38
 Such as Deloittes.35
 Such as The Guardian.36
 Such as Recovery, the monthly magazine of R3, the group representing Insolvency Professionals.37
 Whilst the core writing was carried out in 2016-17, the remarks are believed to be up-to-date as at 38
August 2018.
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Chapter 2: Regulation  
2.1 Preliminary Thoughts: 
As a re-iteration of The Puzzle at the heart of the thesis, it is useful to highlight the 
domain of interest (corporate insolvency in professional football); to note some 
unexpected recent outcomes; and to raise the question of whether key actors regard 
these outcomes as being Ôsatisfactory.Õ 
  
That there are likely to be a variety of causes for the existence of The Puzzle is taken as 
given; some speculation as where these causes might lie are explored in the discussion 
to follow. 
There are factors in play in this discussion which may be uncommon. There exist two 
levels of regulatory authority between the legislature and those whose behaviour is to be 
regulated. These Ômeta-regulatoryÕ regulators are firstly, the football authorities (whose 
Football CreditorsÕ Rule stands in defiant and continuing opposition to stated law) and 
secondly, the various Recognised Professional Bodies (RPBs) who regulate the 
professional conduct of such groups as the Insolvency Practitioners. 
The system of regulation being scrutinised is complex and comprises different actors 
each in their own sub-system which interacts with other sub-systems in unpredictable 
and in unproductive ways. These actors include Football Clubs and their owner-
directors; the football authorities and the RPBs; the Insolvency Professionals whose job 
it is both to help financially distressed clubs and, potentially, to investigate the conduct 
of directors of clubs; the Insolvency Service and at, one remove, the Courts and the 
Secretary of State. There also exist diffuse interest groups such as football supporters; 
TV companies; and local authorities (who in some instances are also the Landlords of 
the football clubs). These actor-groups have connections, one with another, which are at 
times defined by the law ... and at times governed by relations of a different nature. In 
what follows, mention will frequently made of ÒThe Football Authorities.Ó In England, 
these comprise of The Premier League (PL), The Football League (FL) and The 
Football Association (FA)  .. all of which adds to complexity! The FA have oversight of 
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Òthe rules of the gameÓ (ie soccer); the PL is the principal beneficiary of TV broadcast 
money and is the top tier in the sport. The FL collectively looks after the other three 
tiers in the English game. 
Perhaps the most obvious tension between the Insolvency Act and the private rules of 
football is revealed  by The Football CreditorsÕ Rule which inserts a form of super-39
creditor above the claims of preferential, secured and unsecured creditors. In the event 
of a professional football club entering administration, by the private rules of the 
football authorities such a club may only continue as a member of the appropriate 
league if it exits Administration via a CVA  and by paying football debts  in full. 40 41 42
Thus, on exiting Administration, the clubÕs ÔoldÕ debts to non-football actors are not a 
responsibility of the new club and its owners: to continue participation in league 
football all that is required is payment of football debts.  
It is unsurprising that the differing ÔworldsÕ constituting these interacting sub-systems 
experience communications difficulties; language, meaning and motives for 
communication are candidates for the cause of confusion. Additionally, there are 
differences in perspective; differences in cultural history; and differences in arena and 
focus. Taken together, these factors point to abnormal communication challenges. 
The football world is one experiencing substantial change owing to the increasing 
financial rewards available to successful clubs and the attendant social esteem which 
concomitantly falls upon the increasingly foreign owners of such clubs. The penalties 
for failure on the pitch are severe ... financially, socially ... and if the worst happens and 
the club is insolvent, legally also. The extent to which a resource-poor set of regulators 
 eg Ward 2002 É The State of the Game: The corporate governance of football clubs (pp53-56) 39
Football Governance Research Centre.
 But also note the update at Chapter 5 section 340
 Needs approval of 75% creditors voting and is binding on all.41
 See Chapter 6 for detail .. players, clubs and footballing bodies but NOT others even ticket sellers or 42
HMRC. (the landmark case involved HMRC vs Wimbledon FC IRC v Wimbledon Football Club 
Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 655) 
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(of any description) can hope to regulate activity in such a sector will inevitably evolve 
in response to new environmental conditions ... but how quickly and how? 
The thesis discussion on regulation will follow two distinct lines of exploration. One 
line will be plainly legal in approach ... and will focus on the instruments used in 
regulation, whereas the other will be rather more abstract dealing, as in does, with 
principles. We start with the latter line and move to the former in the next chapter. 
Hamil et al (2004),  articulated concerns that football club boards typically had no 43
internal audit committee nor did they commonly undertake regular reviews of risk 
assessment reports. These comments were made in the wake of a collapsed agreement 
with a TV company  which had significantly reduced revenue for clubs and the entry of 44
some into Administration; the response  then by clubs was that Òthey would find advice 45
on Company Law usefulÓ.  
Dimitropoulos (2014),  focusing on the slightly different field of European football, 46
found evidence that efficient mechanisms of corporate governance, such as the 
increased board size and independence of directors, result in a reduction in the level of 
leverage and debt, thus lessening the risk of financial instability. This study provides an 
additional insight for the importance of establishing sound governance principles in 
European soccer so as to enhance the effectiveness of the ÔFinancial Fair PlayÕ  47
regulations as well as to improve the financial status of the clubs and sustain their future 
viability.  
 Hamil S. ; M. Holt ; J. Michie ; C. Oughton ; L. Shailer . The corporate governance of professional 43
football clubs Corporate Governance, 2004, Vol.4(2), p.44-51 
 ITV Digital 200244
 A figure of 78% of ALL clubs was reported by Hamil!45
 Dimitropoulos, P.  Capital structure and corporate governance of soccer clubs Management Research 46
Review, 2014, Vol.37(7), pp.678-658 
 Discussed in Section 7.1 later.47
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In a Scottish context, Kolyperas et al (2015)  also examine the way in which Corporate 48
Social Responsibility (CSR) develops within professional football clubs, along with its 
organizational implications, phases, drivers and barriers for corporate governance. They 
emphasise that professional clubs have become particularly strong socio-political 
business institutions, home to numerous social and business relationships.  
Perhaps the key paper examining corporate governance of English football clubs is that 
by Michie and Oughton (2005)  in which they claim that good corporate governance is 49
essential if such clubs are to be managed effectively and to survive in the difficult 
economic circumstances surrounding the football sector. They contend that many 
existing clubs would benefit from following sundry best practice guidelines and make 
suggestions on information disclosure, the appointment of directors, board composition, 
induction and training of directors, risk management and consultation with stakeholders. 
They found that, despite improvement in some areas over the previous three years, 
standards of corporate governance in football clubs were significantly below those of 
listed companies as a whole and there thus was considerable need for improvement. 
Corporate Governance in the UK is regulated by Company Law and by codes of 
corporate governance such as the Combined Code (CC)  and Michie and Oughton urge 50
that a code of corporate governance for professional football clubs be developed. 
Whereas compliance with company law is obligatory, compliance with best practice 
codes of corporate governance, such as the CC, is voluntary. Companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange must either comply with the code or else explain any instance 
of non!compliance in their Annual Report. The rationale for this self!regulatory process 
is that good corporate governance brings benefits to companies by engendering the trust 
of investors and improving corporate performance. Firms will therefore find it in their 
 Kolyperas, D ; S. Morrow ; L. Sparks,   Developing CSR in professional football clubs  Corporate 48
Governance, 2015, Vol.15(2), pp.177-195. 
 Michie, J ; C. Oughton,  The Corporate Governance of Professional Football Clubs in England ; 49
Corporate Governance : An International Review, July 2005, Vol.13(4), pp.517-531. 
 The Combined Code (CC) sets out principles of good governance and a code of best practice for 50
companies (Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998).  
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own interests to comply with the code absent a good reason not to É  which should 
then be explained to shareholders in the company's statement of compliance. 
However, it is emphasised that this will be reviewed in a chapter different to this one ... 
which, instead, will look at issues relating to the design and structuring of regulation. 
Here the attempt is to review an extensive literature on Regulation and it is that to 
which we now turn. 
                   
2.2 Perspectives on Regulation: 
We start our exploration of regulatory concerns with the behaviour of professional 
football clubs by considering what regulation connotes and how this varies according to 
the approach taken. Three different approaches are considered (traditional; modern and 
self-regulation) and rather different emphases are uncovered. 
Traditional Approaches to Regulation: 
Here, and in what follows, regulation is used as a portmanteau term encompassing laws, 
rules, restrictions and, often, codes. The premise that regulation takes place within the 
confines of the apparatus of the nation-state is not supported in what follows which 
asserts that regulation occurs in several subÐstate levels.  Given that regulations may 
derive from multiple sources, we may have to consider multiple regulators. By 
extension, it may be unwise to perceive the regulated as being homogeneous. Instead, 
they comprise a myriad of sub-groups, sometimes all subject to the same regulations, 
sometimes subject to regulations of a particular nature and applicable to only one or a 
few of these potential subgroups.   51
Regulation is thus seen as an activity exhibited within a network of relations between 
identifiable groups of regulators and regulatees. Later, when BlackÕs (2001) decentred 
approach  is explored, this network relationship will indicate a different perspective to 52
the conventional hierarchical command and control conception of the regulator/
 Much in the way that the criminal law applies to all but the rules governing the activity of a golf club 51
apply only to the membership.
 Black, J. 2001. ÔDecentring regulation; the role of regulation and self-regulation in a ÒPost RegulatoryÓ 52
worldÕ, Current Legal Problems  54: 103-146 
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regulatee relationship. This is the ÒtraditionalÕ perspective of ruling whereby laws/rules 
proscribing / prescribing behaviour of the ruled are promulgated by rulers and criminal / 
civil sanctions are applied after due investigation to rule violators.  However, the 
approach taken here develops the communications emphasis of Black by entertaining 
the possibility of conflict not just between regulator and regulatee but also between 
groups of the regulators themselves. Conflict can thus be seen as being both 
horizontally as well as vertically expressed in hierarchical terms. This decentred 
approach also enables consideration of Ôsoft lawÕ  methods of control of the ruled. Soft 53
control measures may range from inter-group co-operation  to the production of codes 54
of behaviour  by regulators, (although it is entirely possible that regulatees may 55
participate in the production of codes affecting them ), echoing Michie and Oughton 56
above. Although frequently not legally binding in the first instance, these controls still 
retain much practical value.  57
Establishing the meaning of ÔregulationÕ is difficult ... and opinions vary. Standard 
texts  see regulation as having a trio of meanings. These are firstly,  as a set of focused 58
rules usually exercised by the state; secondly,  as social control of behaviour by state 
and non-state actors alike; and thirdly, as direct intervention by the state in aspects of 
the economy.  However, these meanings may not be shared between sub-system actors. 59
We start by examining the first of the meanings, the stateÕs use of rules. Selznick 
(1985)  sees Regulation as a sustained and focused control exercised by a public 60
agency over activities that are valued by a community . This introduces the concept of 
 ÔSoft lawÕ refers to rules with less than or without legally binding force.53
 eg Football Association and Football League.54
 eg Codes produced by IP RPBs.55
 For instance, between IPs and RPBs É or between clubs and football authorities.56
 eg The ghost of The London Agreement still lingers (involving the leading banks)57
 For instance, Baldwin, Cave, Hood, Lodge, Morgan and Yeung who have all published various 58
standard texts on Regulation.
 This last meaning appears tangential to this thesis and thus will lie in the background. 59
 Selznick, P ÔFocusing Operational Research on RegulationÕ, in R.Noll ( ed ), Regulatory Policy and the 60
Social Sciences ( Berkeley, C,A, 1985 ), p363
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control  by a regulator and the associated idea of regulatee(s). Also notable is the 
emphasis on time (in sustained ) which distinguishes from the one-off . The introduction 
of focus however omits to clarify on what such focus might be. This ambiguity extends 
to community (which community is in play?) and to values (again, which ones?). 
Regulatory discussion is a field in which a multiplicity of views and approaches can be 
found; it is not just ambiguity which leads to argument, it can also be differences in 
principle. Consequently the regulation field is one which carries a noticeable degree of 
contestation either in the foreground or in the background ... but inevitably it is there. 
The emphasis on public agency above implies a state-centred perspective on regulation 
which is not shared by all writers. Significantly, Selznick omits mention of exactly how 
the promulgated regulation will achieve compliance by regulatees, either directly or 
indirectly ... a question which certainly gets ample coverage in the literature, nor does 
he draw attention to any monitoring required in order to establish instances of rule-
breaking; again, a question of importance. Nevertheless, it seems accepted that 
regulation in most forms is an attempt to deal with the relationship between both state 
and societal actors and between these societal actors. 
The second approach to regulation (social control of behaviour), relates regulation to 
communication  or to regulation being a deliberate attempt at state influence which 61
may be based on command and control but which might encompass other methods. 
Baldwin et al (1998)  expand on Selznick to go beyond a state-centred approach and 62
suggest that all forms of social and economic influence on behaviour might be seen as 
being regulatory. Indeed, regulation may be attempted by bodies other than the state.  63
This approach also acknowledges that regulatory outcomes can be deliberate or 
accidental and can be enabling or restrictive in aim. It can be useful to deconstruct the 
 of rules/laws applicable by some duly-established body.61
 Baldwin, R. Scott, C and Hood, C.  ÔA Reader on RegulationÕ, Oxford University Press 1998 p3.62
 Such as professions, trade bodies and, even, by self-regulation.63
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term further to clarify thinking. Thus, ideas like regulator,  target,  command  and 64 65 66
consequences are all in common usage  in the field.  67
Outcomes of the regulatory action which may be expected or otherwise and desirable or 
otherwise will be discussed in different terms in Chapter 8 when The Law of 
Unintended Consequences is in view. Interestingly, these terms also reflect usage in 
marketing circles, yet this author has not as yet come across any explicitly marketing 
perspectives on Regulation. 
Given that the burden of conforming to regulation can be substantial both in economic 
terms and in attention/energy/time terms for the actors concerned, it is unsurprising that 
that there have been calls for deregulation   É  exemplified in the UK Government of 
1993 urging a Ôbonfire of red tapeÕ and establishing both new laws  and new 68
mechanisms  to propel the deregulation cause forward. These manoeuvres aimed to 69
give ministers powers to use statutory instruments to deal with the regulatory load on 
organisations. The success of such initiatives seems difficult to measure practically and 
the returning of state-owned organisations to private ownership may have had the 
unintended consequence of increasing rather than decreasing regulatory activity. This 
may not be pressing on the actors being studied here ... but the Ôgeneral moodÕ may 
offer some explanation for a reluctance to introduce further regulation in this area. 
 ÔModernÕ Approaches to Regulation: 
Black offers a useful fine-grained analysis of Regulation and these are taken forward in 
amended fashion here. After defining Regulation  as   É 70
 The person or body who creates, promulgates and enforces the regulation.64
 The person or group whose behaviour requires influencing and from compliance is expected.65
 The instruction with which compliance is wished; it can be either means or ends.66
 eg Coglianese, C. in ÔEngaging Business in the Regulation of NanotechnologyÕ in C.Busso (ed) 67
Environmental Regulation in the Shadow of Technology  John Hopkins University, Baltimore 2009
 The Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 199368
 The Enterprise and Deregulation Unit.69
 Black, J.   É  see Fn 51 above 70
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Òthe sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to defined 
standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or 
outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering 
and behaviour-modificationÓÉ she proceeds by way of four questions which help 
structure our following discussion : 
➢ Who regulates ? É  In this thesis, regulators are variously the state; non-state 
actors such as the football authorities and the RPBs. Economic forces and social 
forces might also be seen as a form of regulator as both forces influence 
behaviour in diffuse ways such as the sales of assets in distressed clubs and in 
the social esteem which accrues to owners of successful teams whereas non-state 
actors have committees and review bodies.   
➢ What is the form of the regulation? É  Here, the State uses the courts and the 
agency of The Insolvency Service. The market is the principal economic form of 
regulation and social forces take form in culture, systems and language.   
➢ What is being regulated?  É The state is interested in regulating the behaviour 
of directors of football clubs especially at times immediately proximate to an 
insolvency event. It is also interested in regulating the behaviour of IPs but has 
delegated this to the relevant professional bodies and, ultimately, to the courts. 
The football authorities wish to control actions and responses within the football 
system in order to ensure the ongoing health of this professional sport in 
England. Both economic and social forces are ÔblindÕ as to intention and both 
interact both with each other and with other systems.  
➢ What techniques are principally used?  É Both state and non-state actors use a 
compendium of techniques which are broadly similar eg rules, information 
gathered, monitoring and sanctioning. The state has its monopoly on the use of 
legitimate force whereas non-state actors may use trust. The market is an arena 
laying stress on rationality and often on repeated interactions whilst social forces 
use framing, enabling and self-referential reproduction as some of their 
techniques.    
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This view of regulation explicitly removes the state from being the focus of regulatory 
initiatives, being described as ÔdecentredÕ ie not state-centred. This conception of 
regulation points to five main and distinct strands within the approach. Each is regarded 
as being significant in its own right yet having an effect on each of the others. These 
five strands are complexity, fragmentation, ungovernability, interdependency and an 
acceptance of a diffuse boundary between public and private spheres. The multiple 
interactions between the actors mentioned above lead to complexity with regard to 
causality ...  some factors are known and some are not; some factors change and some 
do not; some consequences are predictable and some are not.  Complexity may be 71
noted in the interactions between actors  and Black quotes Koimann   ...ÒThese 72 73
interactions are themselves complex and intricate and actors are diverse in their goals, 
intentions, purposes, norms and powersÒ  
Such a view sets up consideration of regulation in systems terms.  
 A second key strand is what Black calls fragmentation and is applicable both to power 
and control as well as to knowledge. The fragmentation of power and control takes 
analysis away from more traditional state-centred approaches in that, whilst not refuting 
the stateÕs monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion as a force implementing a 
command and control approach to regulation, it does however accept that power (and 
the ability to control) is diffused between the state and the various social actors which 
are to be  the target of regulatory influence. Thus are outlined potential fault lines 
between the legal system with its state-induced formal ordering and the social system(s) 
in which other actors exist which perhaps pay more heed to their own social ordering. 
For instance, IPs may have regard to their seniority within the profession as a whole and 
owners may value the reflected glory from a successful football team.  
 Again, see musings on Unintended Consequences in Chapter 8.71
 For instance, at one point the football club owner may see the IP as ÔfriendÕ when a solution to pressing 72
financial problems are being sought ( eg at ÔPre-packÕ stage ) but may later regard the IP as ÔenemyÕ if the 
IP investigates the ownerÕs conduct.
 Kooiman. J (ed), Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions (Sage, London, 1993) 73
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So, ÒRegulation occurs in many locations, in many fora: there is Òregulation in many 
rooms.Ó  The fragmentation of knowledge is portrayed as being more than the 74
traditional acceptance of asymmetric knowledge distribution;  it is rather that no one 75
actor possesses the knowledge required to deal with the complexity involved. This 
paucity of information available to regulators has implications for their power to 
sanction. If the regulator is not completely aware of the facts, it will be difficult to bring 
forward sanctions ... owners may have experience in making information hard to 
obtain.   Arguably, knowledge is socially constructed with the consequence that 76
different social groups are likely to construct knowledge in their own terms  ... which 
may differ from that constructed by those in different groups. This line of thought is 
most prominently developed in writings on autopoeisis which take up the theme of 
interacting systems (or not) touched upon above. Perhaps the key insight from this type 
of analysis is that each interacting subsystem constructs its view of the other systems in 
its own language and terms with each system having its own way of engaging with and 
making sense of the environment. Understanding by interacting groups of the act, 
communication or influence attempt of one group towards another can thus not be taken 
for granted. The idea of sub-systems being reflexively open yet epistemically closed 
with reference to inter-sub-system connections  is significant.  77
The third decentring strand is ungovernability.  The actor-systems are both self-78
regulating and in constant movement resulting in regulation of a systemÕs behaviour 
producing both intended and unintended results. These unintended consequences need 
not always be harmful to the regulatory initiative. The restrictions on the knowledge 
available to any one actor may also combine with the actorsÕ autonomies to substantially 
 Nader, L. and Nader, (1985) C.'A Wide Angle on Regulation: An Anthropological PerspectiveÕ in R.G. 
74
Noll (ed), ÔRegulatory Policy and the Social SciencesÕ  
University of California Press, Berkeley, US
 in the form of regulatees having the information that government needs in order to effectively regulate.75
 Owners may have experience in making information hard to obtain  ... vide the FAÕs ÒFit and Proper 76
TestÓ for owners. (see later at Section 7.1)
 See Teubner quoted in Morgan and Yeung ? p 70-7277
 In BlackÕs occasionally strained lexicon, this means autonomy, not quite in the limited sense of freedom 78
from state engagement but rather that actor-systems will develop along their own path in the absence of 
intervention.
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deny the opportunity either to the state or to any alliance of actor-systems to impose 
their will on the others. In short, each actor-system may have the capacity to regulate 
itself but is unlikely to be able to successfully influence the behaviour of any other 
actor-system in a direct way, a point articulated in some detail in TeubnerÕs  conception 79
of Ôthe Regulatory Trilemma.Õ Recall that a trilemma implies a choice being made 
between three equally undesirable outcomes. In this instance, Teubner foresees three 
somewhat undesirable potential consequences of regulatory activity ... firstly, that 
regulatory initiatives will be ignored; or secondly, that the continued existence of the 
sub-system being regulated will be threatened; or finally, that the integrity and 
autonomy of the legal system itself will be seriously compromised. 
The fourth strand, interdependency, points up the notion that regulation may be co-
produced in the sense that all actor-systems have problems and solutions, needs and 
capacities. Thus each actor needs one or more of the others if matters are to be 
resolved ... eg the contractual nature of relations between football clubs and the football 
authorities. 
The final aspect of decentring is the dissolution of any boundary between public and 
private in terms of the social and political realms. This has substantial implications for 
the way in which regulation can be conceived and allows regulation to become seen as 
the outcome of the interactions between networks of actors and not just as the desired 
product of governing hierarchies nor of the blind operation of the market. As Black  80
puts it,ÒIn a decentred understanding of regulation, therefore, formal de lege authority 
plays an ambiguous role, and regulation is not so much an activity as a product of 
activityÓ.  
The consequences of such an approach imply that any analysis of regulatory failure  81
which is even partly based on decentring should look closely at the configurations of 
interaction between actor-systems to assess the extent to which they enable or hinder 
 Teubner, G. (Ed) Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (de Gruyter Inc, Berlin, 1986);79
 Black, J. (2002) ÔRegulationÕ Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 27 p8.80
 See later ... section 3.2 Regulatory Failure81
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regulatory objectives. How these patterns of interaction may be adjusted and/or 
exploited is considered later. 
 Self-regulation: 
Another important aspect of the control function in regulation lies with self-
regulation ... here, not seen as the ability of an individual to rein in behaviour deemed 
unhelpful or injurious but more as actor-systems regulating their own affairs. The 
person doing the ÔdeemingÕ can, of course, be the self or some significant other. 
Potentially, there are benefits to be gained by all parties involved in such arrangements. 
The state may be able to displace the costs of rule determination, compliance 
monitoring and sanctioning to others. It may also believe that actor-systems are better 
placed  than it to understand both the complexity of the environment in which that 82
actor-system exists and the inducements required to ensure adequate compliance by 
actor-elements within that sub-system. Similarly, the actor-system may be more inclined 
to sense a self-regulated regime as being somewhat more legitimate than an externally 
imposed one and certainly to calculate that such a regime would be much more 
susceptible to capture by the regulated actor-system. Thus, the interests of the sub-
system would perhaps be likely to be put ahead of that of others, including that of the 
state. The internal view of legitimacy, however, is liable to be contested by external 
actor-systems. 
That self-regulation occurs at all can be a consequence of a rational state decision 
delegating some bundle of powers  to regulate intra-group  83
behaviour ... or it may transpire because the interest group seizes the initiative and takes 
on the mantle of self-regulator. The state may connive at this or have other more 
pressing issues requiring attention. After all, the State can always legislate such 
regulation away, should it wish to. The way in which activities of Insolvency 
Practitioners are regulated by their set of Recognised Professional Bodies exemplifies 
the former (state-delegated self-regulation) whereas the regulations established by the 
 This remark links to the more extensive discussion of the point in The Sporting Interest (section 7.2) in 82
later discussion.
 Often with some oversight powers and with some form of backstop in extremis.83
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set of football authorities represent the latter (interest group initiated self-regulation.) 
Commentators on historical professional practice  see self-regulation as the hallmark of 84
organised professional activity over the years allowing as it does here, the authority of 
RPBs  to establish entry qualifications, to impose rules of conduct and perhaps most 85
importantly, to mark out a specific area of expertise as their own ... thereby establishing 
the boundaries of their actor-system.  This boundary may shield against unwanted 86
external influences; it also provides a space within which specialised expertise coupled 
with discretion can flourish. This specialism leads to the development of culture and 
communications particular to that actor-system and may be, in part or in whole, 
unintelligible to those rooted in a different sub-system. Specialism, discretion and 
oblique communications coupled with predominantly internal accountability may well 
be seen as being a recipe for an actor-system with an external PR problem  at best and 87
a focus for accusations of self-serving  at worst. 88
Coglianese and Mendelson  make a distinction between meta-regulation and self-89
regulation where they stress intentionality as the essence of meta-regulation. In this 
sense the State, with prior consideration, attempts to influence targets to establish their 
own internal responses to what are perceived to be pressing public issues. Thus, 
Coglianese and Mendelson would characterise the Insolvency Practitioner example 
above as being meta-regulation. Their central point about self-regulation, however, is 
that the target of the influence attempt is the regulator of that attempt. In other words, 
the target issues commands which apply only to itself. This more closely describes the 
activities of the football authorities which issue rules which apply only to the members 
such as Rostain :  Rostain, T. Ò Self-regulatory authority, markets and the ideology of professionalismÓ  84
in The Oxford Handbook of Regulation eds Baldwin, R. Cave, M and Lodge M. Oxford Univ. Press 2012  
p169-171
 Recognised Professional Bodies.85
 There is the suggestion that the State was pushing on an open-door in the case of IPs.  See .. Rescuing 86
business: The making of corporate bankruptcy law in England and the United States Carruthers, B.G and 
T.C. Halliday  - 1998 - Oxford University Press
 For dubious external legitimacy.87
 Criminal charges against IPs are not unknown ... see the Collyer, Bristow case of 2012 which was a 88
consequence of Glasgow RangersÕ financial difficulties.
 Coglianese, C. and Mendelson, E. ÒMeta-Regulation and Self-RegulationÓ in The Oxford Handbook  89
ibid p146-151
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of these authorities and which rules have no particular nor explicitly discernible root in 
the stateÕs perception of the public good.  90
2.3 Regulatory Systems, Regulatory Outlooks and Regulatory Arenas: 
Aside from contemplation of networks of regulators and an acknowledgement of the 
existence of multiple perspectives, a further fundamental issue requires examination; 
that of ... 
Òwhat aims and purposes are expected to be furthered when regulators make their 
regulations?Ó.  
The best start to analysis is to contrast regulations which have at heart some conception 
of public interest to be achieved with those which may be understood as attempts to 
serve the private interests of one or more groups of regulators. 
Public Interest Approaches: 
Public interest approaches attempt to put first the interests of specific or all members of 
a community as a goal of any regulation; a general welfare aim. Sub-varieties may 
emphasise an economic, market-oriented perspective ... or may focus on different 
aspects of a more social type.  In the economic variation, the regulator responds to 91
some perceived weakness in the operation of the market. Any resultant correction of so-
called Ômarket failuresÕ is then an increase in general welfare ... and hence in the public 
interest. The advocacy of the European football authorities (UEFA) in 2009 of measures 
such as the Financial Fair Play Regulations  exemplifies this approach. The aim was to 92
prevent professional football teams over-extending themselves by purchasing players 
who were expensive to buy and to pay; a type of prophylactic against insolvency. 
Ogus (2004)  sees this as É 93
 Which is EXACTLY the situation to be analysed later re The Football CreditorsÕ Rule or The Fit and 90
Proper Persons rule.
 eg. enabling the fans of a particular football club to have cross-generational continuation of their 91
interest over time; grandfather, father and son united in their support for a (once-) local team.
 Similar measures were instituted in England.92
 Ogus. A. 2004. Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Oxford: Hart Publishing93
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Òthe necessary exercise of collective power in order to cure Ômarket failuresÕ to protect 
the public from such evils as monopoly behaviour, Ôdestructive competitionÕ, the abuse 
of private economic power, or the effects of externalities.Ó  94
 Ogus proceeds to add a cautionary note urging a reluctance to disturb a satisfactorily 
functioning relationship between regulator and regulatee(s) before conceding, almost 
dissonantly, that what constitutes the public interest is likely to change over time and 
place. 
However, this may be seen as a narrow economic approach. Other opinions as to the 
public interest stress matters with a social and/or political nature. These opinions might 
include, in turn, a need to redistribute asymmetrically held powers;  an aspiration to 95
move towards some socially just end ( in a sense, supporters of football clubs ÔownÕ 
their club yet they rarely have an input into the clubÕs affairs ... especially in times of 
financial distress); or even forward-looking to serve some purpose  in respect of future 96
generations.  This public interest focused approach may progress relations between 97
regulator and regulatee in a more participative and dialogue exchanging mode than the 
command and control approach mentioned above É perhaps heralding the possibility of 
negotiations between regulator and regulatee ?  Arguably, the activities performed by 
The Insolvency Service conform to this approach. 
Private Interest Approaches: 
A contra-distinction to public interest theories of regulation, are private interest 
theories. These assume that the aims/purposes of regulations derive from the actions of 
those eager to maximise their own interests via the following of the regulation by the 
regulated. Such actions may arise directly from the regulators themselves or 
 AuthorÕs emphasis ... to establish links elsewhere in this discussion.94
 Most obviously in expertise? eg Insolvency Practitioners compared with Directors of distressed football 95
clubs.
 For instance, see the notion of Football Trusts as explained in ÒIn Football We TrustÓ, Kelly. K, Lewis. 96
R, and Mortimer. T  International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 8 [Special Issue - 
April 2012]
 The question of Òto what extent is the social fabric of a locality rendered the poorer if its local 97
traditions in sport in general (or football in particular) are not preserved?Ó, although of considerable 
background interest, is not developed further here.
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potentially, from indirect influence by others upon the regulators  at the stage of 98
formation of any specific regulation. Consequently, any connection between the effect 
of the regulation and the serving of a public interest is accidental.  99
Discussion of private interest approaches may reveal possibilities not just of market 
failure but of regulatory failure. Regulatory failure can result from Ôregulatory capture Ô 
whereby officials whose job is directed towards the increase of collective welfare 
develop such close relations with groups within the ruled so that it is the interests of 
those groups  rather than the generality of the community that are promoted.   100 101
Variants on the private interest perspective can, as before, be seen in economic and in 
socio-political terms. The well-known concerns about the Principal and Agent 
relationship exemplify the economic strand of private interest thinking viz. In 
circumstances where the Principal delegates to the Agent the power to take decisions on 
the PrincipalÕs behalf. Here, where the Principal creates the rule and the Agent is 
expected to apply that rule, either to the AgentÕs own behaviour or to that of others. 
Some suggest that Agents may fail to follow the rules as determined by the ruler and 
seek to manipulate context and interpretation of the rule to the advantage of the Agent 
establishing the concepts of conflicts of interest and of moral hazard. That there is likely 
to be an asymmetrical access to relevant information accentuates possible difficulties.  
Conversely, the political strand points to a view of competition between interest groups 
for influence and power in relation to the ruled often found in accounts of a pluralist 
society. Pluralism is seen as a state of diversity (in groups) where there is a degree of 
tolerance for the holding of different views or beliefs and the pursuit of differing 
agendas. There is no requirement for the groups to have equivalent power ... this would 
be somewhat of the exception. 
eg, the Committee of the Football Association is extensively lobbied by informal groups of their 98
membership eg Òthe London CabalÓ  .. directors of London-located clubs.
 Although entirely possible.99
 One might see the relationship between IP and regular corporate insolvency players such as Banks 100
being explainable by this approach ?
 See Croley, for a MUCH more extensive treatment of this. Croley, S. 1998  ÔTheories of regulation ; 101
Incorporating the administrative processÕ Columbia Law ReviewÕ 1: 56-65
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Accordingly, it might be said that public interest approaches to regulation are prone to 
focus on the propensities of markets to fail ... and thus are sensitised to the capability of 
regulation to redeem these failures. In contrast, private interest approaches focus on 
regulatory failure and the probability that special interests of competitively successful 
or favoured groups may be promoted ahead of any conception of collective welfare. 
Institutional Dynamics Approaches: 
Aside from the bi-polar constructs of public and private interest perspectives on the 
regulator-regulatee relationship is a group of theories about regulation labelled the 
Òinstitutional dynamicsÓ approach.  This stresses the Ôlife of its ownÕ nature of the 
various actor groups in the sundry relationships between regulators and regulatees.  102
The institutional dynamics approach stresses firstly that regulatory outcomes may be 
difficult to predict as these outcomes reflect the interplay  of interests and manoeuvres 103
by participants and, secondly, sees little of importance in the public / private actor 
typology.  
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992)  take a view blending the public/private duality in an 104
approach which sees relations between actors in terms of gaming by the groups 
concerned of the rational calculation of cost-benefit Ôpay-offsÕ. Thus, Ayers and 
Braithwaite move the analysis onwards from mere inter-group competition and allow 
the actors to consider the consequences of cooperative behaviour. In turn, this permits 
contemplation of corrupt practices  between actors and introduces the notion of the 105
evolution of Ôregulatory captureÕ.  The enduring issue of ÔQuis custodiet ipsos 106
 As outlined in brief in The Prologue102
 Consistent with the moving relationships between sub-systems discussed elsewhere in this chapter.103
 Ayres, I and Braithwaite, J. 1992 Responsive Regulation : Transcending the regulation debate, New 104
York : Oxford University Press, 19-53
  Hancher, L and Moran. M. 1989. ÔOrganising regulatory spaceÕ cited in Morgan, B and Yeung, K. 105
2007 An Introduction to Law and Regulation, Cambridge. CUP p61
 bid p63106
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custodes?Õ  is addressed in their theory of Tripartism in which Public Interest Groups 107
are charged with overseeing  Ôthe guardsÕ in their monitoring and investigatory roles.  108
A different approach even more firmly grounded in institutional dynamics is offered by 
Hancher and Moran (1989)  as ÔRegulatory spaceÕ  ...  a concept which emphasizes 109
the arena in which behaviour takes place and which influences the practices that occur 
therein.  According to Hancher and Moran,  a regulatory space is composed of a range 110
of regulatory issues subject to public decision. Three main consequences follow from 
this definition  ... which this author shows below. 
Table A : Consequences of Hancher and MoranÕs thinking on Regulatory Space 
Such a space might allow for interactions between actors in a more subtle and dynamic 
nature manner than other rather static or linear views of regulation would allow. This 
Aspects of Hancher and Moran Consequences
Occupiable space a space which can be rationally allocated 
among several actors but is also available 
for occupation.
Relative nature of space regulatory space may be general in 
relation to the general economic 
regulation or may be specific, referring to 
specific sectors of regulation.
The character of space the concept of regulatory space can be 
expressed using other metaphors. This 
accommodates this authorÕs suggestion 
that both intra- and inter- regulatory space 
may be the scene for negotiation, for co-
operation and for conflict.
 Attributed to Juvenal and often mis-translated as ÒWho guards the guards ?Ò107
 A check and balance of the ÔJeffersonian democracyÔ type  associated with the US approach to rule-108
making .
 Hancher and Moran op cit. p59109
 In Zanettini, L. in ÔThe Regulatory Space of Public ProcurementÕ.(n.d.).110
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idea might be deepened in a related but different way by extending the consideration of 
interactal space to include the idea of Ba.   111
It is worth noting the complexity of the relations taking place between the interactants 
in the regulatory space and, unsurprisingly, Hansher and MoranÕs scepticism regarding 
the predictability of the expected behaviour of the regulated. Additionally, their 
perspective gives substantial attention to the contingencies of history; of institutional 
development;  and of the changing balance of power between actor groups.  All of 112 113
these elements appear germane in the context of the historical development of football 
clubs, their development into elite and non-elite but professional leagues and the 
nuanced power changes actuated by the unexpectedly high sums of ÔTV moneyÕ now 
available to successful clubs. 
2.4 In summary: 
Much of the discussion above revolves around the establishing of ideal types ... but, as 
management theorist Henry Mintzberg correctly observed, Ôwe donÕt live in an ideal 
world!Õ. Thus, reality may consist of a mixture of types ... and there seems little reason 
why one type may not morph into another over time or as the context changes. One 
could conceive of a cycle of change eg. from wholly public interest, through partly 
public interest/partly private interest, to wholly private interest ... and even a return 
journey back to public interest as a consequence of changing contextual pressure. 
Review of the foregoing discussion indicates that little prominence has been given there 
to the notions of values and beliefs. Arguably, these are to the fore in public interest 
accounts ... and also arguably in the background when considering the regulations of 
professionals ... but what values might spur the regulation of football clubs by the 
football authorities (solidarity?) or what might motivate the actions of a director of a 
 ÔBaÕ (Japanese) can loosely be conceived of as a shared space (real or virtual) in which interactants 111
feels safe and consequently exchange insights; often associated with Nonaka in the mid 1990s; the 
concept also resonates with BourdieuÕs habitus (or field).
 With quite a focus on organisational size and structure.112
 These groups might equally be the regulator; the regulatee(s); or the agents of the regulator.113
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football club (civic pride? self-importance? profit?). And, after all, the idea of private 
interest (and capture) also raises similar questions of ethics and values. 
The thread of sub-system difference may also be important. Teubner seems to suggest 
that autopoietic systems are epistemically closed ... which is consistent with each 
system having different values and languages. But does this necessarily result in 
boundary closure in epistemic terms ... after all contiguous countries may speak 
differing languages but be perfectly capable of understanding each other.  May there 114
be some form of permeability between some ÔneighbouringÕ sub-systems such as those 
populated by Insolvency Professionals and their counter-parts at The Insolvency Service 
? That interactive understanding between directors and professionals may be difficult to 
achieve is, however, acknowledged. 
The theme of contestation is likewise subdued in the above treatment. Perhaps it might 
be prudent to bring this more centre-stage in that suggestions, initiatives and sanctions 
in this field are all very likely to induce a Newtonian opposite and equal effect  with 115
the result that regulation and conflict are frequently inhabitants of Ôthe same roomÕ 
outlined  earlier. The forms of these contestations and conflicts, perhaps, might require 116
deeper study ? 
Thus, we may see the simple distinction of Ôregulator and regulatedÕ as one which 
merely introduces a much more complex regulatory landscape than at first imagined. 
Perhaps the adage  ÒPeople  obey rules when it is more in their interest to obey than 117 118
to disobeyÓ is a useful concluding dictum? 
 eg, The Netherlands and Germany; Spain and Portugal;114
 Notwithstanding the stateÕs alleged monopoly of legal coercion ... which may not be q the case in 115
reality.
 See Fn73 above.116
 Perhaps from Weber? (nd)117
 In our context, we might substitute the term ÔactorsÕ in order to encompass organisational entities also.118
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Chapter 3 : Regulation in Practice  
3.1 Regulatory Enforcement Strategies:  
A continuing theme in our discussion has been the clear tension between deterrence and 
persuasion in relation to enforcement. Thus, some form of plan as to how behaviour is 
to be influenced requires to be implicitly or explicitly developed and a need for some 
form of regulatory strategy seems clear. 
The Responsive Regulation School: 
Taking thinking on regulatory strategies beyond Ôeither/orÕ  is an approach 119
characterised by ÔbothÕ. Leading in this perspective are Ayres and Braithwaite who 
introduce ÔResponsive RegulationÕ as ... 
 Ôrejecting punitive regulation is nave, to be totally committed to it is to lead a charge 
of the light brigade. The trick of successful regulation is to establish a synergy between 
punishment and regulation.Õ  120
This is enduringly associated with the notion of enforcement pyramids. The pyramids 
represent an escalating series of regulatory actions which usually commence at the 
bottom and advance in severity of regulatory response up the pyramid as appropriate.  121
In this way, a more punitive response is offered when persuasion has failed to induce 
compliance.This attempts to introduce an explicit Tit-for-Tat  approach to regulatory 122
strategy and they envisage its utility as much in the regulation of industries as in the 
regulation of specific firms.  123
 That is ... either deterrence or persuasion.119
 Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. Responsive Regulation (Oxford,1992)120
 Appendix 1 is an example of a developed pyramid.121
 Tit for tat; Robert Axelrod, a rational strategy where each participant in a series of interactions follows 122




Like many novel approaches, ÔResponsive RegulationÕ has become both the basis from 
which other proposals  are developed and the target of detailed criticism and 124
objection.  The first comment is the most obvious one ... there will surely be instances 125
where a measured (slow?) escalation will be Ôtoo little, too lateÕ. Events in an 
insolvency context may take place extremely quickly; the idea of ÔPre-packÕ (see later) 
is often justified by saying Ôspeed is of the essenceÕ. This is also especially relevant if 
non-compliance in a high-risk context  is suspected. Secondly, an issue for any stages 126
concept, is the difficulty in reversing back one or more stages.  The third objection is 127
trenchant; there is a supposition that regulatees will respond to the regulatory action. 
This may not be well-founded. Surely regulatees, as actors, will Ômarch to their own 
drum Ô? Consequently, some regulatees will attend to other pressures  than those of 128
the responsive pyramid.  So, Responsive Regulation is vulnerable to suggestions that 129
it is poorly targeting those on which certain regulatory measures are pressed.  
A fourth caveat is a subtle one; there is a presumption that the regulator has the ability/
freedom to escalate enforcement as required. This may not obtain. Resource and/or 
competence gaps will possibly exist and  information on non-compliance may be 
unreliable/unavailable A feature of recent economic times has been the mandatory 
reduction in resource made available by the state for regulatory purposes and action. 
This results in a reduction in proceeding with small scale infractions of regulations ... 
such as those involved in corporate insolvency. Crucial, in some circumstances, the will 
of the regulatorÕs political masters may be subject to rapid change in the face of a new 
Ôcause celebreÕ with the necessary support for enforcement escalation evaporating.  
 Later we look in turn at Smart Regulation; Regulatory Craft; and at Really Responsive Regulation.124
 Many of these critiques apply to the further theory developments also but for clarity of exposition are 125
dealt with here.
 eg The Nuclear Power generation industry.126
 eg escalation up a level may engender an experience or psychological response in the regulatee which 127
may damage the relationships between regulator and regulatee on which success at a lower level rests.
 Competition, history and cold-blooded calculation are all potential pressures in this regard?128
 Intuitively, this Òmarching to their own drumsÓ seems credible vis--vis the owners of football clubs.129
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Finally, the discretionary actions implemented by individual regulators  may be 130
labelled as non-transparent and it may be difficult to hold the regulator to account for 
their decision-making. So, suspicions of regulatory capture whereby the regulator may 
be perceived to be in some way ÔcontrolledÕ by the firm/industry concerned, may not be 
far behind? It is acknowledged that the pyramid enforcement approach is suggestive 
rather than conclusive ... thus signalling the consideration of other regulatory tools and 
strategies. Perhaps there are several routes to successfully climbing this pyramid? 
Building on the central ideas of Responsive Regulation is the notion of ÔSmart 
RegulationÕ. Again, there is escalation up a pyramid but here the scope is broadened  131
by introducing a third dimension ... regulation by businesses themselves or by quasi-132
regulators.  Thus, the regulatory pyramid in Smart Regulation becomes triple-sided 133
and opens up the possibility for the regulator of moving sideways as well as upwards  134
in determining response. Whilst offering a wider range of potential responses which 
may be rather more creatively applied than in the Ayres and Braithwaite approach, many 
of the criticisms expressed above in respect of Responsive Regulation still obtain but 
the approach potentially may be more successful in influencing regulatees compared 
with more traditional methods.  
Conceivably, owners of football clubs are accustomed to examining the rules of which 
they know in order to exploit these rules; so Ôcommand and controlÕ might not be the 
most productive path in their instance. This might encourage their would-be regulators 
to consider the alternative, Responsive Regulation approach. The additional 
complexities may heighten the burden on individual regulators. However, proponents of 
the Smart Regulation approach are quick to assert that it may be less costly and easier to 
apply in many contexts. 
 eg The tailored response to an individual firmÕs non-compliance.130
 from the consideration of just two actors (state and organisation/ industry)131
 See Appendix 1.132
 eg industry associations or professional bodies.133
 See earlier caveats re backward movement.134
!  40
The Crafting of Regulatory Strategy School : 
A somewhat different approach to the regulatory puzzle is offered by Sparrow. His 
Regulatory Craft  approach  puts the solving of problems at the heart of devising 135 136
effective regulatory strategies. For Sparrow,Ô ... the need is to pick the most important 
tasks and then decide on the important tools  ... rather than decide on the important 
tools and pick the tasks to fitÕ.  137
This alerts regulators to the need to prioritise the tasks (problem areas) needing attention 
in relation to the performance AND the evaluation of regulatory activity. In turn, this 
drives the focus on dealing with key  regulatory challenges and, even more tellingly, 138
obliges attention to be given to the way in which these challenges evolve over time.  
The Regulatory Craft approach has its links to Risk-based Regulation ... and endures 139
similar drawbacks in that there is an uncritical assumption that issues CAN be 
packaged/problematized ... and that there is no direct consideration given to the 
possibility of the solution to one problem having a knock-on effect on another problem 
or its ÔsolutionÕ. However, it does have the immense appeal of being an action-driven/
solutions-oriented way of engaging with regulatory strategy. This will likely win 
approval from those whose disposition is avowedly pro-active and practical. 
The ÔUltimateÕ in Regulatory Strategy?: 
Baldwin and BlackÕs Really Responsive Regulation paper  takes the debate even 140
further. Their comprehensive approach suggests that successful 
 Sparrow, M.K The Regulatory Craft (Washington DC 2000 ) ch 10135
 Said by some to be a broader approach than Responsive or Smart Regulation but, in actuality, rather 136
more focused than either.
 Sparrow, M.K. The Character of Harms (Cambridge 2008 ) ch 1137
 As compared with ÔmereÕ compliance?138
 As in Black, J. ÒThe Emergence of Risk-based RegulationÓ (2005) Public Law 512139
 Baldwin, R. and Black, J. ÔReally Responsive RegulationÕ (2008) 71 MLR 59-94 from which many of 140
the ideas in this section were taken.
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regulatory systems need to advert to five key elements ... which they offer as being 
attitudes (and culture and behaviour) shaping the regulateeÕs disposition to the 
regulatory activity;  institutional setting, especially matters of formal and informal 141
control of the regulator in regard of actions and resources;  interactivity of the logics of 
regulatory tools and strategies;  the performance of the regulatory regime over time;  142 143
and the way in which each element changes through time.  Responsiveness to the 144
interplay of these five factors is said to lie at the heart of the regulatorÕs challenge. They, 
somewhat exotically, outline the core tasks of regulation for the regulator in The Dream 
Sequence outlined below. 
Detection of undesired behaviour: Key here is the difference between 
ensuring compliance (a la Tit -for-Tat 
based schemes) and gaining an insight 
into the real level of compliant behaviour. 
The latter focuses upon the real 
performance of the enforcement system 
and may encourages consideration of 
uncontrolled, non-compliant behaviour.
Response by the development of more 
appropriate regulatory tools: 
An assumption made by advocates of 
responsive based regulatory frameworks 
is that regulators will have access to and 
the skills to use the Ôfull regulatory 
toolkit.Õ As this is unlikely it becomes 
important to have the capacity to develop 
more focused tools and to augment 
deficient skills.
 These may change over time and are contextually dependent.141
 Essentially this is about coherence; it is an attempt to consider the extent to which various regulatory 142
rules or tools harmonise or conflict in their operation.
 This element focuses on task achievement; the performance of the regulator in achieving the 143
regulatory objectives over time. 
 This links to change and to novelty; the appearance of new challenges for the regulator in the face of 144
some shift in the systemic environment.
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There may be significant issues in making the Really Responsive Regulation 
suggestions workable in real life. As ever, resource deficiencies may render the 
collection of necessary information problematic. The exercise of regulator discretion 
may hinder accountability and transparency and prove politically embarrassing. The 
development of new tools may well be constrained by the institutional context in which 
the regulator must operate.  
There may be significant difficulties for the Really Responsive approach when 
regulatory power is fragmented ... as in de-centred systems.  There are complexities 145
involved in gaining relevant information. There are communication nuances involved in 
moving that information back and forward to system elements which will hold different 
values and have different capacities and motivations for dealing with such 
communication. Above all, there are extraordinary resource demands  involved on all 146
sides.  
Enforcement by application of coherent 
regulatory strategies: 
The use of tools delivering a regulatory 
strategy forces deliberation of their 
interaction. Adverse consequences hinder 
and unexpected benefits help the 
achievement of objectives. Establishing 
fit between tools is desirable.
Assessment processes: Attention is needed to making clear 
statements of essential actions for 
removing possible sources of tension. 
This will also help with performance 
assessment.
Modification: This activity builds on the previous four 
points to possible adjustments to existing 
regulations; much easier than embarking 
on new proposals!
 As explored in this study.145
 Appendix 2 gives a good idea of the complexity involved!146
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3.2 Regulatory Failure: 
We turn now to instances where the regulatory regime is thought NOT to be delivering 
its original objectives É ÔRegulatory FailureÔ. We look at a continuum from Regulatory 
Success to Regulatory Failure rather than simplistically looking at the polar extremes. 
Instances of Regulatory Failure are commonplace  ...  but what constitutes a failure 147
needs consideration as do the causes of these failures.  
Some causes of Regulatory Failure: 
Failure may be foreseeable for some and come as a shock to others; it may result in 
undesired outcomes or may not follow recommended processes. As examples of 
outcome failure, three issues are observed.  
The first underlines the importance of detection of inappropriate behaviour.  Detection 148
difficulties may arise from under-regulation owing to insufficient relevant information 
being gathered. This raises issues of under or overinclusivity of the rule to be followed. 
Under-inclusivity gives rise to conduct which ought to be controlled being overlooked 
É whereas over-inclusivity generates excessively strict controls on behaviour which 
ought not to be controlled (by that rule). Over-regulation may also lead to over-
zealously punitive approaches from regulators and, consequently, to withdrawal of 
cooperation and communication by regulatees. 
The second difficulty relates to regulatory failings due to enforcement problems. 
Arguably, most pervasive difficulty facing regulatory enforcers Ôcreative complianceÕ 
wherein the regulatee goes through the motions of conforming  in order to evade 149
detection. A more subtle difficulty connected with enforcement may surround an over-
emphasis on information transparency provoking risk-averse actors to reduce 
information given to that regulatory process. Reputational inadequacy can have damage 
 The BHS Pension Fund affair being a topical example.147
 However defined.148
 The practice known as tick-boxing relates to this side stepping of the spirit of the regulation and leads 149
to regulation becoming a sham.
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successful enforcement. Regulators lacking in credibility  are poorly placed to take 150
enforcement activity forward. This credibility shortfall could be perceived or real; could 
be as a consequence of direct or indirect experience  .. and could be a consequence of 
past or present circumstance. That the credibility gap could be based on for all kinds of 
criteria ... eg. capacity/inclination/knowledge-expertise É serves to highlight the nature 
and magnitude of the enforcerÕs challenge. 
The final difficulty centres on the regulatorÕs inability to assess and then modify the 
operation of the regulatory regime. Without relevant data and effective feedback 
systems it is difficult for regulators to assess their actions and, hence, may find 
adjustment of their regulatory strategies difficult. It is noteworthy that regulatory failure 
becomes even more complex as the responsibility for success or failure may be difficult 
to allocate ...  thus driving the thought that regulatory failure may be linked with 
organisational failure. Indeed, the lines between the various systems in our analysis may 
be blurred in reality. This will be so both at the ÒhigherÓ level of legal vs economic vs 
social systems or at the ÒactorÓ level of Insolvency Practitioner vs Director vs 
Insolvency Service. 
Failure may also be a consequence of procedural shortcomings. Commentworthy in this 
regard would be the manner in which the Leeds Utd administration of 2007 struggled 
with issues relating to mysterious loans from off-shore entities enabled the then 
directors of the club to use the votes from the providers of these loans to push through a 
CVA accepting a payment of 2p/£ at the appropriate CreditorsÕ Meeting. The affair of 
Glasgow Rangers administration in 2012 also faced procedural difficulty when the IPÕs 
favoured buyer  turned out himself to be insolvent. 151
The multi-faceted approach advocated by the decentred view implies that different 
actors will have different assumptions as to how regulatory procedures ought to be 
conducted. Whether these expectations are to do with transparency, accountability or 
consistency matters little; what does matter is that different constituencies may have 
 As current (Aug 2018) events in relation to the regulatorÕs (FCA) inability to act against RBS BankÕs 150
GRG for several corporate insolvency misdemeanours.
 Mr Craig Whyte151
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really quite different views as to what constitutes regulatory success or regulatory 
failure. 
Further Causes of Failure?: 
Explanations of regulatory failures point to matters such as the disinclination of 
regulatees to conform or to the lack of resource accessible to regulatory agents. 
However, a different perspective is offered by Hirschman  who sees failure as ensuing 152
from one or other of a set of resistor strategies by sceptics of regulatory intervention. 
These are the futility, jeopardy and perversity positions which may be used to dispute 
the effectiveness of current or proposed regulations. The futility proposition suggests 
that people do not change their behaviour just because of a regulation ... and that is even 
more likely where complexities of problems or systems exist. The jeopardy position 
indicates that whilst any single regulatory manoeuvre may be well-intended and useful, 
the implementation of that measure would prejudice successes already achieved 
elsewhere or yield side-effects of an unwanted type; narrow ÔwinsÕ being outweighed by 
broader ÔlossesÕ. The ÔperversityÕ view claims that actions often have outcomes which 
are quite the reverse of their original intentions. Hirschman is, in his way, prefiguring 
the use of MertonÕs Unexpected Consequences ideas which we will turn to in later 
discussion. 
Following earlier commentary here, other potential causes of regulatory failure might be 
conceived, to wit:  public interest perspectives on regulation stress the notion of the 
public interest ... but different groups may hold different views of what this term 
connotes ... and how the public interest is best obtained may also be disputed. This 
position, much advanced by advocates of Public Interest regulation, is inherently 
challengeable ... and thus Ôsuccess/failureÕ will be a function of individual stance as 
much as of objective review. Contrastingly, commentaries based on interest group 
theories emphasise the self-interested behaviour of groups in the regulation arena. That 
this self-interest may be economic, political or even symbolic in nature has already been 
discussed and such groups will be inclined to assess failure in a predictable way. 
 Hirschman. A. The Rhetoric of Reaction ( Cambridge 1991)152
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However, that the consequences of regulatory failure may be perceived in terms of 
financial loss, of risk avoidance or of blame shifting is worth re-stating here.   153
Recalling the systems perspective on regulation prompts comment on the Teubnerian  154
notion of the self-referential system closing itself off from external influence thus 
failing to adapt to new contexts and/or rejecting information which appears to threaten 
its existence ...  accordingly condemning attempts to regulate that (sub)system to 
failure. Baldwin et al  point to a further aspect of regulatory failure by asserting that 155
the inevitable informational asymmetries  between key system actors generate drift. 156
Drift is defined to be Òa tendency of a regulatory system to lose focus and directionÓ  ... 
ie. a tendency to fail. They conceive drift to be due to governments changing their 
regulation preferences over time;  to regulatory agents being unable      (for multiple 157
reasons) to deliver on their regulatory objectives;  and to regulated industries not 158
conforming to their regulatory obligations.  159
Regulatory Weaknesses: 
One regulatory weakness in a variety of areas may not cause a regulatory strategy to fail 
of its own accord ... but may well combine with other weaknesses to irretrievably 
damage the strategy. These weaknesses may involve one or more of the following ... 
ineffective co-ordination; poor organisational learning; and simplistic thinking. 
Examples from the world of football are easy to find; Wimbledon (2003-4) contrived to 
lose their ground because of co-ordination issues between their landlord ( the council ) 
and a developer. They survived only by moving to Milton Keynes.  Arguably, 160
Portsmouth demonstrated poor organisational learning by entering administration 
 Freud, Jung and Klein all have commentary on blameshifting  .. aka ÔprojectionÕ.153
 See earlier.154
 Ibid p250155




 Hence their current name of MK Dons.160
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twice. . Bradford City are celebrated for their Ôsix weeks of madnessÕ ( profligate 161
spending on expensive new players ) which took them into administration in 2004  É 
simplistic thinking at its most striking wherein it was believed that sporting success 
would inevitably follow this expenditure. 
Co-ordination weaknesses have already been highlighted in the discussion of over/
under-regulation. This may occur in contexts in which different regulators have an 
interest in the same field and even in the same activities. Problems occur when methods, 
sanctions and even time-scales differ. Baldwin et al  note the vulnerability of complex 162
organisations to the Õnormalisation of devianceÕ whereby small deviations from the rule 
at one stage, perhaps at the exercise of discretion, can be compounded by similarly 
small and acceptable deviations at subsequent stages and eventually result in regulatory 
failure. Contrary to intention (echoing the perversity point above), attempts to improve 
co-ordination via the Ômore regulationÕ route may increase cost and delay action due to 
time-lagging or may reduce regular endeavours, so achieving the perverse result. 
That poor organisational learning may be a cause of regulatory failure may not surprise. 
Like humans, organisations endure bounded rationality which propels the search for 
solutions which satisfice  and the acceptance of results which are sub-optimal. The 163
notion of bounded rationality is often attributed to Simon; it suggests that decisions 
made by humans are limited by the information available, the individualÕs thinking 
ability ... and the time available to make the decision. Notably, no mention is made of 
motivation!  
The complexity of the dimensions of decision-making on non-trivial matters is 
recognised, at least implicitly, and so exhaustive efforts are not always attendant on 
taking decisions ... even those in relation to the implementation of regulations.   
 In 1998-89 and again in 2010.161
 Baldwin (ibid) p248162
  I define ÔsatisficeÕ as being equivalent to Ôgood enough to get an acceptable result in the prevailing 163
circumstancesÕ.
!  48
A related aspect of organisational learning is rooted in the notion of the organisational 
paradigm.  The consequence of the paradigm is both information-filtering and 164
direction-setting. Thus, the organisation may attend only to whom it trusts and to what it 
wishes ... thus discarding perturbing information. The organisation may also have a 
propensity to conduct its affairs in a manner which has given comfort to the 
organisation (and its directors) hitherto ... thus driving the organisation along a familiar 
and supposedly safe route. The consequence of ignoring environmental signals and the 
refusing to update behaviour patterns can lead to regulatory failure. 
The final item of regulatory weakness to be explored here may attract a description 
ÔsimplisticÕ. It is acknowledged that such positions may not be frequently encountered 
in pure form and are included here as ideal types only. Within this set are the notions 
that Ôone straightforward rule is bestÕ; that Ôrules can last for everÕ; and that Ôrule-
makers have a monopoly on wisdomÕ. Taking these in order, the one rule is best notion 
invites failure because its inherent susceptibility to regulatee exploitation by gaming and 
is thus subject to an array of unexpected side-effects. The last for ever point implies that 
social change does not occur. When it does occur, often bewilderingly quickly, ...  the 
regulation fails. The monopoly of wisdom position relates to the propensity of rulers to 
believe that their dominant view of appropriateness is unchallengeable   ... an 165
affliction which in yesteryear was said to offer employment to Court Jesters. That 
groupthink has led to regulatory failure in military circles has been well documented 
elsewhere.  166
Regulatory Deficits: 
The idea of regulatory failure has a historical tang to the term as compared to regulatory 
condition ... which focuses more on the present. Contemporary regulatory efforts have 
 An organizational paradigm is a collective mindset/mental model held by the strategic elite driving 164
their strategic decision-making.
 See Janis on invulnerability and groupthink eg Janis, I.L. (1982) Groupthink: psychological studies of 165
policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
 Bay of Pigs, Cuba 1961 166
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to guard against failure in four areas, suggest Lodge and Wegrich (2012).  The 167
language here uses ÔdeficitÕ as an umbrella term interpreted as implying a shortfall of 
some kind. The thrust of their discussion is suggestive and draws attention to a series of 
areas in which regulation might be deliberated. 
The first potential deficit is oversight. A lack of oversight may be held to be responsible 
for inconsistent decision making, especially in conformance activity. It may also lead to 
insufficient resource allocation for investigation and data collection É  and for 
initiatives aimed at the modification of regulatee behaviour. Black  also engages with 168
this point suggesting that centralised oversight mechanisms might be appropriate to 
combat inconsistency. She speculates that a better resourced regulatory infrastructure 
might require deeper consideration of issues relating to the recruitment and 
development of regulators with enhanced and relevant expertise to achieve this 
oversight. Both Black and Lodge and Wegrich are alive to the possibility of regulators 
becoming too close to the parties whom they oversee, the Ôrevolving doorÕ problem 
whereby senior civil servants, when they retire, regularly move into senior positions 
within the industry which they recently regulated. In general, such centralising 
tendencies may be expected to engender any of the types of resistance suggested above. 
Another different, potential deficit is that of participation. Here the fear is some 
regulatory relations are conducted too directly between the regulator and regulatee and 
may eliminate interaction with interested third parties.  This exclusionary process may 169
damage both efficiency and social acceptability outcomes unnecessarily. The obvious 
remedy is to construct a participatory apparatus which enables others who are not 
directly in the Ôline of regulationÕ to play their part according to their abilities and 
inclinations. The proposals made by Ayers and Braithwaite  and others of the Smart/170
Responsive Regulation schools clearly address this point. Participation deficits may also 
be encountered when self-regulation is a feature and thus some external validation of 
 Lodge, M. and Wegrich, K. 2012 Managing Regulation : Regulatory Analysis, Politics and Policy  167
Palgrave MacMillan, London p246-251
 Black, J. (2007) ÔTensions in the regulatory state, Public Law,  58-73168
 As may happen in a Pre-pack.169
 See the idea of ÔPublic Interest GroupsÕ in Responsive Regulation (ibid) ch 2170
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the self-regulation may be required. A similar planned intrusion into decision-making 
habits may also help to minimise  the blinkering effects of strongly held organisational 171
paradigms.    172
A further regulatory shortfall relates to over-predictability; an adaptability deficit 
occurs. In this, regulators lack the imagination to see potential types of failure and their 
causes and begin to exhibit ÔcomfortableÕ  action plans revolving around Ôgoing by 173
the bookÕ and consequently protecting themselves against allegations of arbitrariness. 
The regulatorsÕ views are thus dulled as to potential problems ahead ... particularly 
regarding threats to the system itself. Haldane and May (2011) note the slightly counter-
intuitive point that diversity in regulatory activity may lead to stability in the regulatory 
system. Thus, regulators who insert some method of challenge vis-a-vis their regulatory 
arrangements and who act in an unpredictable way with regard to regulatees may be 
consuming an antidote to over-routinisation. 
The final deficit strikes a substantial chord; the concern here is that those involved in a 
regulatory system may gain insufficient reward for their participation and thus they 
deliver performance which is sub-optimal. Thus, there may exist an incentive deficit. 
The notion of the benchmarking of regulator performance is powerful although the 
criteria for this remain unexplored in much detail, as does consideration of who would 
benchmark the regulators. The idea of incentivising regulatees is consistent with the 
tenets of behavioural economics  and the practice of ÔnudgingÕ has been widely 174
reported elsewhere. In the context of exploring regulation, it is of interest to note that 
there is little in the literature which explicitly looks at how intra-organisational 
behaviour in respect of regulation-following might be encouraged/rewarded/nudged. 
 eg The Court Jester mentioned above.171
 Where strongly held views are not necessarily correct and might benefit from being contested.172
 For the regulator concerned.173
 See, for example, Thaler and SunsteinÕs many writings É such as ÔNudgeÕ.174
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3.3 Communication Concerns: 
Communication underpins many aspects of regulation. Concerns abound in areas such 
as the cost of gaining information and of promulgating regulations. Drafting problems 
beset the content of regulation and the language in the regulatory instrument may be 
obscure. Views differ as to who should take action to ensure that understanding IS 
achieved. Acquiring data on mischief perpetration involves non-negligible expense for a 
resource-poor regulator. The difficulties here are exacerbated by the hiding of non-
compliance by individuals and firms and there may be over-reliance on informal/
unreliable data collection.   175
Causes of Communication Concerns: 
Rule promulgation is no guarantee that that the associated regulatory objective will be 
achieved. Hence it is useful to outline potential causes of possible failure to achieve. 
These lie under three heads viz. creative compliance, inclusivity problems and 
communication failures.  
Creative compliance is the hall-mark of a regulatee who adheres to the letter of the law 
but contrives to subvert the spirit of the law.  This may occur as a by-product of cries 176
for more precise law  and thus the removal of uncertainty in application ... the greater 177
the rule precision, the greater the potential for creative side-stepping of that rule ; 
particularly so, if the rule has not been updated in the face of environmental shifts. 
The inclusivity problems lie with inadequate drafting of regulatory instruments. These 
may be over or under-inclusive in effect and may discourage behaviour which is 
consistent with the rule in question.  Bardach and Kagan (1982)  assert that 178 179
 eg.Ôwhistle-blowingÕ  .. the Ôtelling of internal and prejudicial talesÕ to external sources.175
 The tax-avoidance industry exemplifies this.176
 eg. McBarnet, D. ÔLaw, Policy and Legal AvoidanceÕ (1988) Journal of Law and Society p113.177
 Or, conversely, may encourage undesirable behaviour.178
 Bardach, E. and Kagan, R. (1982 ) ÔGoing by the BookÕ Philadelphia, pp66-77179
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regulators tend to over-regulate with over-inclusive rules because rules can frequently 
be made in haste; or because regulators are uneasy about displaying discretion; or 
because regulators wish to avoid the high cost of informationÐgathering associated with 
administering well-targeted regulations. Under-inclusiveness will occur if the regulator 
is unable to accurately establish the cause of the presenting mischief ... with some non-
compliers being over-looked. However, Diver (1998)  contends that under/over-180
inclusiveness may indicate other problems equally caused by informational difficulties 
which are difficult to apply without costly expert assistance.  It can be recalled that 181
transparent and accessible rules surface substantial inclusivity problems whereas 
detailed, precise and up-to-date rules do score well on inclusivity. The question of over/
under-inclusiveness obliges consideration of which inclusiveness approach is the more 
desirable for a regulator to follow? ... leading to the review of Shrader-FrechetteÕs 
(1991)  Type 1/ Type 2 risks. Shrader-Frachette suggests that although regulators are 182
more inclined to avoid Type 1(producer) risk than they are to avoid Type 2 (consumer) 
risk, The Type 1 risk is a rule prohibiting the use of technology (and by extension 
behaviour) which is falsely seen too be dangerous but is in fact safe whereas a Type 2 
rule is one which allows the use of technology which is falsely seen as being safe but is 
in fact risky. In situations of uncertainty, the suggestion is that regulators ought to err in 
the opposite direction.  
Blume (1990)  asserts that the situation is further complicated by a series of indirect 183
communication mechanisms whereby the targets of one message receive the message, 
perhaps in one code via one medium, and then, in their turn, relay this message onwards 
towards the ultimate target of the regulation using a different code and medium 
 Diver, C.S. (1998) Ô The Optimal Precision of Administrative RulesÕ, cited in a Reader  on Regulation  180
eds Baldwin, R., Scott,C. and Hood C.
 A simplified example of DiverÕs thinking is whether a rule might be passed prohibiting the use of 181
electric hedge-clippers by anyone over 65 years (clear, accessible .. and easy to enforce assuming birth 
certificate availability). But there are many over 65s able to cut hedges on their own. However, setting a 
rule in reliance on a set of variables such as levels of experience, eyesight, upper-body strength and 
participation in an accredited training course may effectively target those able to use the cutter ... but at a 
hugely inconvenient cost; an open invitation to those tempted to be creative compliers ??
 Shrader-Frechette, K.S.(1991) Risk and Rationality, Berkeley, 1991.182
 Blume, P. (1990) The Communication of Legal Rules 11 Statute Law Review. 189 183
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combination and possibly with an altered degree of formality. Professional advisors  184
commonly play a significant part in such indirect communication lines ...  but the 
observation is made that the more extended the communication chain becomes, the 
more likely it is that problems and issues may arise relating to desired regulatee 
behaviour.  
One reason for the use of indirect communication chains is the probability that encoders 
of original rules may, in reality, speak a rather different language from those whose 
behaviour is in question. This is not about intelligence nor of literacy in the 
conventional sense, it is a matter of functional illiteracy whereby the ruled do not 
understand the terms of the rule ... and thus are unlikely to conform adequately to the 
expected behavioural requirements. This is often wrongly termed Ômis-understandingÕ 
whereas Ônon-understandingÕ would be more accurate. Translation is required; hence the 
existence  of the intermediary professional advisor acting to remove the drawback of 185
this type of problem. This problem will be particularly in the foreground when the rule 
in question is legal in origin and when that law is complex and multi-faceted (as is the 
case in this inquiry). 
Some reasons for Regulatory Communication Misunderstanding :  
The promulgation of rules and the expectation that these rules will be understood is 
problematic. The reasons driving rule promulgation are several and mixed. 
Communication aims might be to inform; to educate; to influence  ... or even to protect 
the ruler against potential adverse circumstances.  Consideration of both 186
communications outcomes and how these might be reached follows briefly É 
 Possibly but not exclusively IPs?184
 Perhaps this is a major justification for the existence of company doctors/turn-round specialists?185
 In popular parlance, Ôthe protect your backsideÕ approach.186
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The lack of understanding of rules by the ruled: 
The much-quoted maxim ÔIgnorantia leges non excusatÕ is used to prevent  rule-187
breakers in all legal systems from offering a ÔI didnÕt know I was breaking the law Ô 
defence. There is a resultant tension in the rule-communication process; regulatees are 
expected to obey rules devised by regulators  but which they may not always be aware 188
of, far less be able to comprehend.  A further, practical, tension ensues when rules, 189
especially legal rules, are changed moderately frequently over the life of a regulatee.  190
Rule obsolescence, whether a consequence of political or environmental change, thus 
carries the capacity for confusion in the mind of the ruled which the advice of advisors 
may not eliminate. Unlearning  is difficult ... and the potential for ill-informed 191
behaviour is significant when the field covered by the rule is unfamiliar to the regulate. 
Arguably, the suggestion that regulatees have the right to be cognizant of rules does not 
always imply  a duty to be cognizant of these rules. 192
The presence or absence of Positive Action to achieve understanding: 
The distinction between making rules known in contrast to taking positive action to 
influence behaviour is a troubling one. The Hansard Society was sufficiently concerned 
in 2008 to make a series of recommendations  on how the UK Parliament might 193
improve its ability to promulgate legal rules as follows ...  
ÒIn order to enhance ParliamentÕs ability to communicate with members of the public, 
the Hansard Society recommends that:  
 However, this principle has its roots in 2,000 year old Roman law and in a context then of many fewer 187
and simpler laws being promulgated by rulers in a rather different manner to relatively few members of 
the ruled class
 eg.foreign owners of English football clubs ?188
 The European Convention on Human Rights Art 7.1 is relevant?189
 Arguably the case in this thesis.190
 The activity of dispensing with ÔoldÕ knowledge.191
 In todayÕs different circumstances (from ancient Rome) ... see Introduction ( Chap.1) above.192
 Hansard Society Briefing ÒEnhancing ParliamentÕs Ability to Communicate with Members of the 193
PublicÓ.  House of Lords Debate , Thursday 18 December 2008
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A Communications Service should be established for Parliament;  
ParliamentÕs communications strategy should be subject to regular consultation, review 
and evaluation in relation to optimum principles of accessibility and transparency, 
participation and responsiveness, accountability and inclusiveness; É Ò (further detail 
re drafting practice followed) 
Note this advice was offered a generation after the modern laws governing corporate 
insolvency  were passed and that the Hansard Society was sufficiently concerned to 194
further comment (as excerpted )  ... 
ÒThe language, terminology and rules that govern how Parliament works are often 
complex and anachronistic É 
Parliament as an institution is often too risk averse in relation to both the concept of 
change and to communicating É 
The lessons learnt from previous initiatives are yet to be applied consistently 
Parliament has to compete with other changing patterns of cultural consumption, an 
ever-expanding media base, particularly online, and with other institutions that people 
look to first as exercising more influence on their lives  É 
People will only switch on to those issues that interest them  
Democracy does not come cheap. But ...  the public (do) not think that initiatives to 
improve communication would be a waste of public money.Ó 
As a consequence of the above, BlumeÕs  comments appear apposite ..  195
ÒToday many legal rules are in reality hidden and such rules are oppressive. The legal 
system should not be an exclusive domain for jurists. The gap between 'know and know-
nots' is not acceptable in a democratic society.Ó 
 The backdrop to this thesis.194
 Blume, P. 1990. Op. cit.195
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This state of affairs possibly helps the cause of the professional  with the aptitude and 196
inclination to acquire the knowledge/expertise connected with these rules? 
Legitimacy and Regulatory Obedience:  
If regulated actors are to obey the regulations communicated to them by regulators, then 
some acceptance of the regulatorÕs right to regulate seems required. This acceptance 
may be as a calculation of coercive power ... or rather itÕs imbalance. But the acceptance 
may also be brought by a belief that the regulator should be able to develop rules 
requiring obedience: it is legitimate to expect compliance. So, there exists the 
possibility of a normative foundation for legitimacy in that regulator and regulatee share 
certain values. Whilst Scott  typifies values of three sorts  .. economic, social/197
procedural and security/continuity, he indicates these types may mix together and the 
ensuing blends may characteristic of particular sub-sets (social groups) within society. 
This echoes the earlier discussion re Teubner  and re Black.  198 199
Regulators may be pro-active in developing their claims to obedience and Baldwin  200
suggests five possible ways in which they might so do. The more each claim is accepted 
individually and collectively, the more the regulatorÕs claim to legitimacy is increased. 
The entire list of ways is relevant to our discussion here although some claims are more 
relevant  to one or other of the sub-systems being explored, for instance, football 201
creditors may well perceive the due process claim to be fair in their context and IPs will 
equally deem the expertise claim to be fair in their context.  
Again ... the Insolvency Practitioner ?196
 Scott, C. in Handbook of Regulation (op. cit) p104-118 197
 Teubner (op.cit.)198
 Black (op.cit.)199
 Baldwin ( p238 , Morgan & Yeung  Introduction to Law and Regulation. op.cit  )200
 eg. ÔFootball creditorsÕ may well perceive the due process claim to be fair in their context and IPs will 201
equally deem the expertise claim to be fair in their context.
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BaldwinÕs list is ... 
Whilst retaining the focus on values in legitimation in rule-following, Mashaw  202
emphasises the requirement for rules to be administered justly to retain their legitimacy. 
He offers a three-fold set of perspectives or ÒdimensionsÓ for such administrative justice 
which all add something to ScottÕs analysis above. His dimension of ÔMoral JudgementÕ 
reflects the due process claim to fairness; the ÔProfessional TreatmentÕ dimension is 
clearly linked to the expertise claim; and the ÔBureaucratic RationalityÕ is another way 
of looking at the efficiency claim. But Mashaw is going beyond a typology in his 
thinking ... for him, the key point is that each dimension has a fundamental goal which 
differs between the dimensions in a way consistent again with the Teubnerian approach. 
For instance, the moral judgement perspective attempts to deliver conflict resolution 
and will thus be appropriate when sub-systems of roughly equal power are in 
disagreement; the bureaucratic rationality perspective will deliver results where 
Claim for Regulator Obedience Basis for Development of RegulatorÕs 
claim
The legislative mandate claim .. where the rule is based on a clear order 
by the state.
The accountability or control claim  ..  where the operation of the rule has 
unequivocal lines of accountability.
The due process claim  ..  where the rule is perceived to be fair by 
those to whom it refers.
The expertise claim  .. where the rule is developed and 
operated by those with appropriate 
technical expertise.
The efficiency claim  ..  where the rule produces results at 
acceptable economic and social cost.
 Mashaw, J.L.1983 cited on p252 of Morgan and Yeung, An introduction to Law and Regulation (op. 202
cit.)
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programme delivery of rules is of prime importance and the professional treatment view 
will become paramount when client satisfaction is required. 
3.4 Concluding Thoughts: 
In a thesis populated by sundry acronyms, the author offers his own acronym to finish 
the chapter. So, we organise the Ôconcluding thoughtsÕ with the aid of MURDER.  203
M, here, calls attention to the centrality of Movement in enforcing regulation. The 
context changes, yet the rule may not; the tool may change, but the behaviour may not; 
the mischief maker may change but the mischief may not. Any analysis of regulatory 
enforcement which does not account for movement will be inadequate. 
U points to Understanding ... specifically to understanding the causes of non-compliant 
behaviour. There seems more to gaining compliance than mere rule promulgation. 
Thoughtful targeting of potential non-compliers, nuanced matching of message to 
mischief and awareness of how to negate  potential harms resulting from 204
disinclination to comply all appear to be areas which need scrutiny if enforcement is to 
be meaningful. 
R is for Roles ... which the various parties play. These roles may be formally 
conditioned ... or informally derived. But roles are executed in different styles, to 
different levels of ability and with different enthusiasms over time. Consideration of 
roles guides the analysis in the direction of the standards of performance of rule 
enforcement and also to the connections between role-actors. 
D indicates Deficits. Deficits, gaps and failures featured prominently towards the end of 
the chapter. They seem important not just as shortfalls and thus instances of the 
inconvenient and uncomfortable knowledge of non-achievement of objectives but also 
 A Crime of Intent!203
 From The Character of Harms above. Sparrow, M.K. (2008) The Character of Harms  Ch1 204
Cambridge .  
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areas worthy of investigation as to cause and to consequence. The possibility of 
differential perception by the various parties to regulation and its enforcement is real 
and significant. 
Moving to E ... signifying Enablers. There is frequent mention in the previous 
discussion, obliquely or otherwise, of the difficulties caused by lack of resource.  The 205
absence of appropriate resource is held to commonly disable enforcement. However, it 
could be pertinent to also highlight that the presence of certain competences can enable 
regulatory enforcement initiatives to be more successful. At times, this is the focus of 
the ÒBetter RegulationÓ movement ... examples addressed might be flexibility, 
experience and empathy as competences which enable a regulator to function more 
effectively. 
Finally, there is R standing for Responsivity ; thus emphasising the continuing nature of 
enforcement yet recognising that actions have their consequences. In an area which 
revolves round continuing attempts by one or more parties to influence the behaviour of 
others in a particular direction, it surely makes a great deal of sense to model continuing 
interactions in a nuanced way? Perhaps there is a time and place when deterrence ought 
to be favoured and another when persuasion will seem a better way forward?  
 Often financial ... or perhaps also related to time?205
!  60
Chapter 4 : Accountability 
4.1 Accountability Principles 
Exploration of regulatory activity is incomplete without considering which actor(s) 
should be responsible for the success/failure of any particular regulation. This also 
prompts consideration of how actors might be held responsible ... and of who could/
should do this. 
Clarifying the Term:  
Accountability has elusive and elastic meaning; dependent on both user and context. A 
preliminary distinction is between internal and external accountability. Internal 
(inward?) accountability refers to a moral obligation to oneÕs conscience for the 
consequences of actions taken. Actors may feel responsible for what they do. Arguably, 
this is brought on by personal values or societal norms ... or perhaps, if the actor is a 
professional, driven by some set of internalised professional standards. In either 
instance, this involves self-evaluation of personal behaviour by the actor concerned. 
Conversely, accountability can be seen as being external in character and, for Mulgan 
(2000) ... 206
Òit comprises a number of core elements, namely that an actor is called to account and 
obliged to explain and justify their conduct to a third party who can ask questions and 
pass judgment.Ò 
 Mulgan, R.ÔÒAccountabilityÓ: An Ever Expanding Concept?Õ (2000)  206
78 Public Administration 555, 556.  
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The literature  points to different shades of accountability such as legal, professional 207
and moral accountability ... to which this author adds accountability to clients and to 
organizational superiors. All five types of accountability are relevant to this thesis. 
Concomitant with the external focus of accountability is the notion that there may be 
delivery of external consequences  on actors. Rhode (2001)  emphasizes the difficult 208 209
to predict nature of future consequences as a useful control on actor behaviour. The 
external interpretation leads naturally to the external setting of ÔacceptableÕ standards of 
behaviour. This rather begs the question, though, of the norms driving those who set 
these standards ... and the perceived legitimacy of the standard-setting activity.  
Echoing the earlier theme of potential and future aspects of accountability is the idea of 
accountability having a responsiveness dimension with actors anticipating the needs/
responses of those with whom they interact and then acting accordingly. This 
encompasses a spectrum of actor-actions from advising clients in Pre-packs  to 210
responding to Regulators operating a Tit-for-Tat regime.  211
Attention will mainly be paid below to external features of accountability  .. but the 
existence of differing norms in the various sub-systems in the investigation and the 
communication difficulties relating to these different norms will inevitably throw up 
aspects of internal accountability of interest. 
 eg Schwartz, M. ÔThe Professionalism and Accountability of LawyersÕ (1978) California Law Review 207
669, 673.  
 Either desirable or otherwise.208
 Rhode, D. ÔOpening Remarks: ProfessionalismÕ (2001) 52 South Carolina Law Review 458, 467Ð470. 209
 Whereby IPs may advise the Banks or other secured creditors on plans ahead of a formal entry to 210
Administration.
 As in Ayres and BraithwaiteÕs Responsive Regulation approach.211
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Why Should Actors be held to Account?: 
Perhaps the principal reason for holding to account is the deterrent effect of a detected 
breach of rules. The deterrent effect is likely related to the expectation (or otherwise) of 
the infarction ... and possibly also to the degree of sanction commonly attendant on 
discovery of the breach. It is the fear of consequent sanctions which may encourage 
rule-following. Deterrence and the responsibility felt by an actor for rule observance are 
intermingled ...  rules which are perceived as being illegitimate may not trigger any 
sense of personal responsibility in the actor for rule-breaking nor might stretching of a 
rule beyond its accepted compass  engender feelings of responsibility for any breach. 212
A further reason for holding to account is that external commentary is essential to cope 
with actorsÕ tendencies to rationalise decisions which are self-serving with protestations 
to the contrary ...  accompanied, perhaps, by a disregard of unfavourable information. 
Without such outside accountability, a risk obtains of actors displaying unethical 
conduct.  213
Accountability may be used to deal with inadequate/defective decision-making by 
actors/firms. This may be the case where the actor/firm operates in a context where 
regulations have been externally set, yet discretion has been allowed as to how these are 
to be accomplished.  Here, there is opportunity to go through the motions of rule 214
compliance with a preference for minimal disruption to existing practice and a tendency 
to attend to the actorÕs own objectives being a likely result.  This may be worsened 215
where there exists a Òladder of communicationÓ where information flows up and down 
through multiple levels ... the reality of not passing on information likely to throw one 
 eg a lawyer insisting that their responsibility was to draw up a contract rather than to have cognizance 212
of wider implications.
 As in relations between professional and client; and in relations between professional/ client and 213
others, including the state and society in general.
 As is certainly the case for IPs undertaking an appointment  .. or for directors running a football club.214
Bamberger, K. (2006) ÔRegulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decision-making, and Accountability 215
in the Administrative StateÕ 56 Duke Law Journal 377, pp427Ð429.  
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actor in a poor light to another is substantial and contributory to inadequate decisions 
being made. 
Accountability may be used to establish/maintain the legitimacy of not just the rule and 
the rule-maker but of those who have the power to use the rule. This is a question of 
both ensuring that the power to make decisions has been used in a fairly/ openly and 
then that any abuses of these powers have/will be held to account. The reputational 
issues deriving from this are non-trivial   viz; the Ôrotten applesÕ label as applied to the 216
rogue IPs prosecuted after the insolvency of Glasgow Rangers FC.   For some, the 
suspicion remains that actors of substance and consequence may receive favourable 
treatment when held to account. In turn, this may need to be addressed. The markets in 
some senses provide a form of accountability between actors of broadly similar 
financial or expertise power  but are less able to restrain undesirable behaviour 217
between powerful and powerless when the power gradient is steep.  218
Lastly, accountability can function as a vehicle for the delivery of corrective justice, in 
that it may be a route to establishing that the harm caused by one actor to another is 
suitably compensated. Conversely, it may be the spur to retributive justice enabling the 
punishment of the actor who has done wrong. 
Codes of Conduct and Accountability: 
In a regulatory context, actors contribute to two main forms of problem. These are 
Agency problems and Externality problems. Agency problems arise when harm is done 
to one actor by a second by behaving in a way against the interests of the first whilst 
purporting be acting on their behalf. In distinction, externality problems arise when both 
(first and second) actors behave in such a way as to burden third parties (and Society?) 
 See, for instance, the 2012 case of Collyer, Bristow solicitors. 216
 eg as when the Banks and IPs regularly interact.217
 eg as when deep-pocketed secured creditors manipulate IPs to favour their interests against small, 218
inexperienced unsecured creditors in insolvency proceedings.
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with unnecessary cost. Loughrey (2011)  comments presciently, that large, well-219
resourced and experienced actors  are unlikely to suffer Agency problems at the hands 220
of, say, IPs as they are repeat players with the power of repeat business. On the other 
hand, she warns that ... ÒHowever, as externalities serve clientsÕ interests, clients may 
not restrain them.Ó 
Codes of conduct  are germane in that their contents are relevant to the actions to be 221
controlled. This dissertation is not the place for detailed study of Corporate Governance; 
nevertheless some mention of the contents of the work of the Financial Reporting 
Council  may be apposite. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) published a 222
revised Corporate Governance Code (Code), applicable from October 2014. The 
selected excerpts from their guidance on Risk Management that follow below have 
relevance to the discussion in both this and the previous chapter ... 
Exercising Responsibilities: 
Ò  É The board should establish the tone for risk management and internal control and 
put in place appropriate systems to enable it to meet its responsibilities effectively É 
  É But in deciding what arrangements are appropriate the board should consider, 
amongst other things:  
➢ How to ensure there is adequate discussion at the board.  
➢ The skills, knowledge and experience of the board and management.  
➢ The flow of information to and from the board, and the quality of that 
information. É Ò 
Establishing the Risk Management and Internal Control Systems:  
Ò É Risks will differ between companies but may include financial, operational, 
reputational, behavioural, organisational, third party, or external risks, such as market 
or regulatory risk, over which the board may have little or no direct control ÉÓ 
 Loughrey, J. Large law firms, sophisticated clients, and the regulation of conflicts of interest in 219
England and Wales Legal ethics, Dec 2011, Vol.14(2), pp.215-238.
 Loughrey clearly envisages the Banks as an exemplar here.220
 Several are relevant to this thesis ... eg the Code governing the Conduct of Insolvency Practitioners.221
 FRC Guidance on Risk Management, Internal Control and Related Financial and Business Reporting 222
(September 2014)
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Ò   É  Training and communication assist in embedding the desired culture and 
behaviours in the company. To build a company culture that recognises and deals with 
risk, it is important that the risk management and internal control systems consider how 
the expectations of the board are to be communicated to staff and what training may be 
required  ÉÓ 
A possible reason for corporate failure may lie with the personality characteristics of the 
key directors concerned. Despite the well-meaning endeavours of many committees 
over the years , none of the codes to date have explored this prospect. Corporate 223
failure may be due to many causes but a possible origin of inappropriate behaviour as 
having been brought on by enduring personality characteristics has scarcely been 
considered. 
However, Okoye  points out ... 224
ÒBehavioural issues can, therefore, be viewed as risks to the corporate governance 
process, and these risks are significant because they have the potential to result in 
corporate failures. Questions then arise as to whether existing corporate governance 
mechanisms have taken cognisance of the significance of behavioural risks; if there are 
processes in place to manage such risks, how effective these mechanisms are in relation 
to these risks.Ò 
Okoye goes on to cite two instances from fairly recent corporate life to illustrate his 
concern. One instance is that of Robert Maxwell (of Maxwell Publishing fame.) and the 
other being Fred Goodwin of RBS Group.  225





 Greenbury in 1995; Hampel in 1998, Turnbull in 1999 É  all following in the footsteps of Cadbury in 223
1992.
 Okoye, N. (2013)ÔThe personality of company directors and behavioural risks in corporate 224
governance: Bridging the unidentified gapÕ  International Journal of Disclosure and Governance Vol. 10, 
3, 261Ð286 
 Very sadly, this author has to confess the doubtful privilege of having performed management 225




On Goodwin, Okoye cites the FSA Board as claiming in 2011 that 
É Òthe FSA had identified a risk created by the perceived domineering behaviour of the 
CEO at RBSÓ É 









The principles enshrined in codes should be unambiguous in language and in 
application. There should also be clarity as to which principle has primacy if the two 
conflict. Distinctions could be made between principles which relate to conduct 
between actors;  to conduct within an actor entity  (such as a professional firm or a 228 229
football club); and to conduct having implications for Society.  Often, the issue is not 230
one of principle its absence; the issue is one of interpretation and application. 
Regulators and regulatees can have different views on the meanings and implications 
for action linked to any one principle ... and any actor adversely affected may plead 
special/mitigating circumstances as to why that principle should not apply to them. 
 See section 7.2 ... particularly the footnote on Mr Marinakis.226
 See section 2.2 generally for linkage to these points.227
 Such as between IP and client.228
 Such as between IP and an employer who is an accounting firm.229
 Such as the externalities above-mentioned.230
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Codes often emphasise giving independent advice to the client but the requirement to be 
independent of the client is mysteriously  absent.   231 232
A Duty for Responsible Administration?: 
According to Sabel and Simon (2016), bureaucracy is constructed around the tension 
between a system of stable, hierarchically promulgated rules and lightly supervised 
discretion ... but they worry that the balance may no longer suit todayÕs issues in that 
Òaddressing current problems requires more flexibility than rules permit and more 
transparency than discretion typically affords.Ó  233
They write in the context of the policing of Civil Rights but it would seem just as 
appropriate to the work of IPs. The US notion of a Ôduty of responsible administrationÕ 
points to an increasing interest in the need to reassess routines in the light of changing 
circumstances. This might offer an additional yardstick against which the accountability 
of actors might be measured? It also appears an interesting route to assessing the ways 
in which discretion has been used. 
4.2 Accountability for Actions: 
This section turns to examine those areas in which actors may be held accountable. 
These are developed mainly relating to IPs as this is a well-reported area É but many of 
the central ideas suggest connections to other areas  of our enquiry. 234
 The ensuing regulatory deficit embedded in Codes is further enlarged when one searches for mention 231
of accountability to Society.
 Which may be intriguing when Banks contract with IPs for advice prior to a Pre-pack?232
 Sabel, C.F. and W.H Simon. (2016) The Duty of Responsible Administration and the Problem of 233
Police Accountability 33 Yale J on Reg 165 
 As for example, Directors on Running the Business; the Insolvency Service on Acting as a go-234
between; and the Football Authorities on Sanctioning   .. all to follow in this section.
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Accountability across Tasks: 
Finch, in her Avenues of Accountability (2012)  paper, makes the point that often an 235
across-the-board judgement on an actorÕs performance may be over-comprehensive in 
approach; it may make more sense to break an actorÕs performance into constituent 
parts  with each element being assessed separately. 236
IPs  undertake several elements/functions and various factors impact differently on IP 237
accountability for carrying out these activities. A selection of tasks follows  É 238
Advisory work: 
The provision of client advice by IPs will be given under contract which indicates the 
scope  of advisory work. Given that the clients will be experienced, knowledgeable 239
and, crucially, well able to communicate in the appropriate language, they will be in a 
good position to assess the quality of advice given. Other interested parties are unable to 
benefit from such advice at this stage but may learn of its substance later at creditors 
meetings. Potentially, IPs can be accountable to their clients via the market mechanisms 
of repeat business and reputation. IPs are not directly accountable to other creditors  240
for advisory work. Additionally, IPs are adjured to be heedful of duties owed to all 
creditors to note the possible liability of "any person who is party to a decision that 
causes a company to incur credit and who knows that there is no good reason to 
believeit will be repaid".  In the circumstances of a pre-pack sale, the Kayley 241
Vending  case established that the applicant should make the same disclosures as 242
 Finch, V. ÔInsolvency Practitioners: The Avenues of AccountabilityÕ The Journal of Business Law, 235
2012, Issue 8, p.645
 Dependent on the functions carried out.236
 The line of argument could be extended to cover the Insolvency Service and the football authorities  .. 237
but for space reasons this has been avoided.
 They are examined singly but overlap in practice.238
 Which will delineate it from any subsequent role for the IP should an Appointment be forthcoming.239
 SIP16 looms as a form of background regulation of IPs in the instance of directors obtaining an 240
interest in pre-packed asset sales.
 SIP16241
 Kayley Vending Ltd, Re [2009] EWHC 904 (Ch)242
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outlined in SIP16   
Collecting Evidence and Data: 
With respect to turnaround  IPs need to collect information on entry into 243
administration which needs to be up-to-date, accurate and relevant. Disclosure of 
information around the area of pre-packs falls within the ambit of the Insolvency Code 
of Ethics which urges IPs to ensure that decision-making is transparent, understandable 
and readily identifiable TO ALL affected by the proposed sale. The criterion of 
relevance expands the informationÐcollection net widely ... in theory to anyone with 
commentary relating to possible outcomes. SIP16 acknowledges that this may not be 
practically possible before key decisions are made when it sets out after the event 
disclosure requirements that the IP should bring forward to unsecured creditors ...  
ÒA detailed explanation and justification of why a pre-packaged sale was undertaken, 
so that they can be satisfied that the administrator has acted with due regard for their 
interests.Ò 
IPs are accountable under the Insolvency Act  for their actions and, as an Officer of the 244
Court,  must behave rationally and reasonably when exercising discretion. Finch  245 246
comments that the Office of Fair TradingÕs 2010 report concludes that IPs were wont to 
supply information to unsecured creditors which Òdoes not greatly help their 
understanding of the processÓ and she reports that a majority of respondents considered 
that the information provided under SIP 16 to justify pre-packs "is insufficient for 
[them] to make an informed judgement as to whether the sale is in their interests (or 
does not unfairly harm their interests)".  
Consequently, it is difficult to argue that IPs are held to account by this device.  
 Not everyone agrees with Finch that this is adequately performed. 243
 IA 1986 Sch B para 3.244
 When acting as an administrator.245
 OFT, The Market for Corporate Insolvency Practitioners (2010) paras 1.16, 4.70. See also IS, 246
Improving the Transparency (2011), p.12  
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Managing the Business: 
IPs conduct a variety  of operating management activities ... and charge fees for this. 247
As officers of court, they will be responsible to the judiciary for the quality and 
consequences of their actions. In practice, judges are reluctant to comment on this. 
Finch suggests that they justify this reticence by observing that they have neither the 
skill nor the experience needed to make such judgements. Secured creditors are able to 
exercise oversight as and when IPs make their reports but there appears no substantial 
mechanism whereby unsecured creditors are Ôkept in the loopÕ as to ongoing operational 
activity. 
As to the accountability of IPs for the fees  charged for managing the business, one 248
notes that this is an area which has received much scrutiny in recent times É  thus 
encouraging comments of the Ôno smoke without fireÕ type? 
Thus, the degree of accountability exhibited by IPs in relation to the task of day-to-day 
running of the troubled business seems notable only in the case of powerful secured 
creditors. A similar profile might also obtain in respect of fees charged for this 
management task. 
Acting as Go-Between: 
The IP may also be portrayed in go-between terms É  acting as a ÔfixerÕ. This calls for a 
high degree of communication and social skills whilst facilitating, manoeuvring and 
deal making. The display of such attributes in relation to repeat-playing and 
knowledgeable secured creditors will not encounter many problems as specialist 
language, norms and susceptibility to the profit motive can be expected to smooth 
matters. Perhaps IPs are inclined to give substantial weight to the interests of such 
parties in developing ÔsolutionsÕ? The picture differs when communications take place 
with unsecured creditors whose strengths do not include facility with the relevant 
 including HR decisions about staff retention; financial decisions about funds raising and funds usage; 247
and interacting with suppliers and customers.
 Fees may be fixed either by CreditorsÕ Committees or by the court. There were moves in 2010 to 248
obtain greater transparency around the calculation of fees and expenses; and  to require more detailed 
reports to creditors  .. and in 2012 a new Practice Direction set out eight guiding principles to be followed 
when preparing fee invoices. The Insolvency Service was also sufficiently aroused in 2011 to engage in 
consultation as to whether IP fees might be challenged after the event by dissatisfied parties.
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concepts and whose inclination to engage with the IP is diminished by their fragmented, 
unorganized and poorly resourced positions. Thus, unsecured creditors have minimal 
inclination to hold IPs to account for their actions as a fixer ... and secured creditors 
have minimal need to do this.  249
IPs are also subject to control by their own regulators (see discussion of SIP 16 above) 
but this addresses only matters for the CreditorsÕ Meeting and is silent on the exercise of 
communications skills. In theory,  the courts also have a part to play. 250
Protector of Rights: 
IPs are obliged to conduct the affairs of a troubled company with respect to the rights of 
all affected parties. Absent this, they can be held to account in three ways. Firstly, by 
provision of law: there is the provision under the Insolvency Act 1986 for aggrieved 
actors to obtain remedies for misfeasance/unfairness and the courts can remove IPs if 
they find conflicts of interest. Surprisingly, the courts do not view a breach of the IPÕs 
professional bodies guidance as automatic grounds for removing an IP from an 
appointment. Secondly, by the internal regulations of their professions: the failure of an 
IP to protect rights may incur action via the relevant regulatory standards mechanisms 
of their profession. The reputation of professions for such self-regulation is not high. Or, 
finally, by references to Codes of Conduct: a third aspect where control may be required 
relates to questions of conflicts of interests ... which can result in one partyÕs rights 
being downgraded in favour of anotherÕs. The Insolvency Code of Ethics offers clear 
framework as guidance in this regard and there also exists a Code of Conduct 
promulgated by the Secretary of State. 
But in the effort to hold Insolvency Practitioners to account on the task of Protector of 
Rights, the conclusion is largely similar to that pertaining to the other tasks explored 
above, in that ... secured creditors do not really need the controlling devices; unsecured 
creditors have neither the inclination nor the resource to avail themselves of these 
 They can use informal social power and market power perfectly well to protect their position.249
 Control of IPÕs actions might be via the courts where it is open to an aggrieved creditor to bring an 250
action in respect of an IPÕs failure to discharge the obligation to take all relevant factors into account 
when arriving at decisions. This seems excessively costly for any likely returns and may be discounted as 
an everyday source of control.
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devices; professional bodies apparently have other priorities; and, as the administration 
of justice requires very deep pockets, the courts rarely become involved. 
Accountability Supports: 
To ensure that accountability succeeds, supporting mechanisms are needed. Although 
three  separate support mechanisms are explored below, there is no suggestion that 251
these supports stand on their own. Tripod-like they serve to complement each other  in 252
real-life use.  
Reports  ... 
Regulators may call for reports by regulatees on their performance and use these reports 
to assess any need to hold the regulatee to account. The hope, here, is that the 
preparation of reports will counteract the self-interest and cognitive biases which may 
influence any decision-making. The ensuing dialogue may be informal and designed to 
inform/persuade or to guide behaviour back to the expected standard. Alternatively, the 
assessment may result in sanction-imposition when the non-compliance is more serious. 
The IP Code of Practice is an example of a mechanism of this type.  Whether this 253
mechanism will support accountability is questionable. Calls to account may be resisted 
by actors who sense that the attempt to control  lacks legitimacy.  This could imply 254 255
intra-systemic  control by this method may be more successful than inter-systemic  256 257
 To wit: reports; dialogue; and sanctions.251
 Each is suggested to be able in some way to help in the process of bringing actors to account for their 252
behaviour and actions.
 Possibly there may exist an expectation that larger, more sophisticated actors will develop internal 253
systems which encourage self-checking of performance against Code of Practice standards before such 
reports are provided. This will be so for IPs who work for larger groups of accountants or solicitors who 
will have further professional codes to consider and with which compliance will be required.
 - or the controller - or the mechanism of control?254
 Naturally if all these elements are perceived to be legitimate then the converse will apply.255
 As when IPs are invited to report on their performance by their own RPBs.256
 eg the legal systemÕs attempts to influence the behaviour of company directors.257
!  73
attempts.  Nevertheless, the publicity effects associated with the use of this 258
mechanism may reassure public confidence. 
Dialogue ... 
Associated with reporting, dialogue  may further accountability via the guidance 259
effect. The Insolvency Service is renowned for its ÒDear IPÓ letters   which may be 260
prone to regulatory capture  (see earlier). A sophisticated, yet real, problem 261
highlighted by Lerner and Tetlock(1999)  is whether the views of the regulator are 262
known in advance to the regulatee. If not, they suggest regulated actors will be more 
self-critical and more ready to explore alternative perspectives in anticipation of the 
regulatorÕs response. If the regulatorÕs views are known then the only effort needed 
may be for crude/ unthinking conformance.  Thus, there is every chance that regulated 263
actors will press for indications as to what compliance looks like.  If paradigm 264
change  featured in the objectives of the regulators, then allowing predictability may 265
not be the best route to adopt. 
Effective sanctioning ... 
Greater accountability arguably will follow more effective use of sanctions whereby the 
deterrent effect of being sanctioned will influence actor behaviour. The deterrent stands 
to legitimate behaviour of actors who behave within bounds and to punish behaviour 
 However, this does not discount the possibility that, within an actor-subsystem, there may be disquiet 258
as to differential treatment between large and small actors
 Formal or otherwise.259
 And also from other sources.260
 At least solicitors (aka The Law Society) are aware of this and have suggested ways of dealing with 261
the issue.
 Lerner. J.  and P. Tetlock, (1999)  ÔAccounting for the Effects of AccountabilityÕ  Psychological 262
Bulletin 255, 258Ð259.  
 Such as unreflective box-ticking.263
Or perhaps exchange Ôwar storiesÕ amongst fellow actors so that some predictability can be achieved.264
 Paradigms are organisational Ômind-setsÕ driving organisational behaviour: if an organisation 265
consistently behaves in a way counter to regulation then a regulator may wish to alter this paradigm.
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which is outwith these bounds. It also fulfills a Public Relations function by 
demonstrating to Society that the regulator has legitimate power over relevant actors 
The behaviour of actors will be strongly influenced by the norms held by the actor 
These norms will have a combination of origins; strongly held norms are deeply 
internalized, weakly held norms are unlikely to influence behaviour beyond the short 
term. Thus, sanctions are likely to link only to weakly-held norms as to ÒappropriateÓ 
behaviour. As Jones (2006)  and Blair and Stout (2001)  note, key factors in deep 266 267
normalization include whether the regulated actors consider the norm to be fair, whether 
they understand that compliance is expected and whether they sense that their peers also 
comply. There exists also concern  that over-frequent sanctioning leads to a culture of 268
resistance and/or denial as actors attempt sanction avoidance rather than behaviour 
modification. 
The nature of the sanction may also have effect. ÔLet the punishment fit the crimeÕ  269
oversimplifies matters but the regulating bodies  have an arsenal of graded sanctions 270
which are deployable to fit different levels of misdemeanour ... and they have additional 
reference powers to recommend striking off professionals in the most serious cases.  
The above does not dwell on the resource implications for regulators when using 
sanctions  but it is probable that Ôthe powerfulÕ will defend themselves; and so the 271
regulator may choose to save ammunition for less resourceful targets. The use of 
 Jones, R. (2006) ÔLaw, Norms and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in 266
Corporate  
GovernanceÕ 92 Iowa Law Review 105, 129.  
 Blair, M. and L. Stout. ÔTrust, Trustworthiness and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate 267
LawÕ (2001) 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1735, 1796Ð1798.  
 As expressed in general by Ayres, I. and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 268
Deregulation Debate (Oxford: OUP, 1992) 20.
 Gilbert, W.S. and A. Sullivan The Mikado 1889269
 Those associated with corporate insolvency.270
 Engaging with regulated actors who will defend themselves vigorously in the courts will exhaust the 271
budgets of all but the most well-endowed of regulators.
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sanctions may not do much to hold the powerful to account ... but may well be useful 
when dealing with smaller actors or those whose norms are broadly consistent with 
those of the rule-setter and of the regulator. Parker (1997)  observes that what is 272
missing with holding powerful professional firms  to account is some practical 273
Òframework of accountability and responsiveness to dialogue with the communityÓ in 
which they might be obliged to justify their actions to the community.  274
Recent developments for IPs: 
There have been recent changes  in the structure of the IPs Regulatory Regime.  Some 275
are noted here ... 
Authorisation  to practice as an IP must be received from (now ) one of five RPBs, 276 277
each monitored by The Insolvency Service. An augmented Complaints System for 
receiving complaints against IPs  has also been introduced.  For our purposes, the 278 279
main area of complaint explored is IPÕs remuneration  (and expenses) É 280
RPBs are now expected to encourage IPs to charge fees that are Òfair and reasonable.Ó 
In addition, new rules (which apply in bankruptcy, administration and most liquidation 
cases) require IPs to provide upfront estimates of their fees for creditorsÕ approval. They 
will not be allowed to take extra fees unless agreed by creditors.Ó  281
Upholding of a complaint means that IPs may face a range of sanctions from their RPB; 
currently the ultimate sanction being withdrawal of authorisation to practice ... tough on 
 Parker, C. (1997) ÔCompeting Images of the Legal Profession: Competing Regulatory StrategiesÕ 25 272
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 385, 401.  
 and their employees !273
 Echoing Ayres and BraithwaiteÕs PIGs ? ( public interest groups ).274
 Source : Commons Library Briefing 28 September 2016  ;  changes effective as from September 2016275
 As per Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015276
 Originally there were eight RPBs regulating IPs.277
 Note ... not about specific legislation nor public policy278
 June 2013279
 Recall that IPs may have a coincidental (!!) interest in prolonging the extent of an Administration if 280
they are being remunerated on a per diem basis or some derivative thereof.
 Ibid281
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the IP concerned as this activity is very well remunerated  but of no great help to the 282
complainant? The Insolvency Service reported  in September 2016 that ... 283
ÒThe RPBs should enter into discussions with the Insolvency Service to consider the 
feasibility of a mechanism whereby compensation can be paid to the complainant by 
the IP where they have suffered inconvenience, loss or distress as a result of their 284
actions. 
This puts the holding to account of IPs on a commensurate level with that to which 
directors of financially distressed football clubs may be held to account both by Ôpublic 
law and by private lawÕ. 
4.3 A Coda on Accountability.  285
As a sizable thrust of this thesis involves the activities of IPs, the analysis 
continues and briefly attempts to pick up some of the themes touched on in the 
preceding sketch of the area ... and to travel with these themes just a little further. In a 
way, this is a coda which points to the changing nature of the work of the IP. 
Administrative Accountability:  
Ab initio, IP practice might be surmised to have been dominated by small groups of solo 
or loosely connected practitioners devoid of managerial expertise or oversight.  286
However, this seems to have changed over time (at least in part). The inexorable 
increase in size of IP assignments and their requirement to be serviced by increased 
resource quite possibly drove an increase in size in the firms which employed IPs ... 
 Cooper, C. and Y. Joyce. (2013) ÒInsolvency practice in the field of football Ò Accounting, 282
Organisations and Society 38 108-129 
 CLB Sept 2016 op. cit. 283
 AuthorÕs emphasis.284
 Much of the thinking in what follows is suggested by the work of Friedson and Dingwall who both 285
principally write in relation to medicine. See later and in references for specific citations.
 See Finch. V. (2009) Company Insolvency Law, 2nd Ed. (2009) Cambridge University Press  É 286
generally 202-221
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mainly large accounting practices with some concomitant growth in legal practice too. 
Inevitably this began to constrain the dominance of the IP as an independent practitioner 
as manager-administrators exerted control. The ways in which control developed could 
be examined elsewhere (perhaps under Ôdevelopments in practice structureÕ) but most 
of these focus on financial outcomes at the possible expense of more value-driven 
approach (see norms of profession above).  
An intriguing second difficulty arises with the notion of Ôclient resistance.Õ Friedson 
(1983)  points to (in the medical context) the apparent readiness of patients to seek 287
alternative advice from unlicenced sources  (perhaps the homeopathy movement ?) in 288
preference to Òmanagerialist medicine Ò. This implies a faceless approach to medicine 
based on large-population-generalities rather than careful examination of the specifics 
of a presenting individual. One might speculate that the continuing (and expanding ?) 
existence of the ÔTurnround Consultancy Ôechoes a similar trend in Corporate 
Insolvency ? 
Client Accountability: 
The term ÔclientÕ sits awkwardly in the current discussion. If there is to be a payment 
nexus then in very many cases, the unsecured creditor is in fact the payor; if the 
appointing arrangement is held to be key, then the secured creditor (banker, bond-holder 
and so on) might be argued to be the real client (especially in the instance of repeat-
playing) ; but if some parallel is made to the medical profession, then the distressed 
company might be inferred to be the client/patient. This might be seen as hair-splitting 
but is meaningful in the context of accountability. 
Arguably, FriedsonÕs early work does not really take account of evolving social and 
market issues in at least four dimensions É 
➢ The demise of paternalism: Asymmetrical possession and use of information, 
knowledge and expertise might have been more acceptable in an era in 
 In the ÔThe Reorganization of the Professions by RegulationÕ, Friedson. E (1983) Law and Human 287
Behavior, Vol. 7, Nos. 2/3, 
 Op.cit.288
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which Òthe professional knows bestÓ but perhaps this approach is less 
justifiable when even the novitiate unsecured creditor may expect some 
sense of meaningful communication and involvement in the insolvency 
process. It is acknowledged that this factor does not apply in respect of 
others in the community of practice. That this may drive a superficial 
attempt by IPs to ÒonsideÓ unsecured creditors by the formulaic 
communication of information might possibly be expected? 
➢ The rise of negligence litigation:  
This has been discussed elsewhere in the literature  in relation to other 289
professions; as yet, this may be somewhat insignificant in the UK .. yet, UK 
practice often appears to evolve slowly but surely behind that in the US. 
Whether this will constitute a threat to the current professional dominance of the 
IP is questionable as, presumably, matters in such actions would feature expert 
testimony by one IP against another IP... but it is a factor worth continuing 
observation and perhaps some State Òwing-clippingÓ of IPs powers and practices 
can not be ruled out? 
➢ The emergence of competition: 
That IPs still control activity within the formal process of corporate insolvency 
is not held to the main issue here. It is more a question of what transpires 
ÒupstreamÓ of that formal process. IPs themselves agree to by-pass much of the 
formal process when they become involved in Òpre-packingÓ yet there seems 
evidence of rather more action then heretofore by individuals / firms acting as 
ÔTurnround Specialists.Õ Such turnaround activity may, of course, come after the 
IP appointment but the thought persists that they are approached as an 
alternative to engaging with the formal process. When one adds the comment 
that the Restructuring Market activity is ten times that of the Corporate 
Insolvency market,  one might speculate that Bond-holders / sophisticated 290
international lenders are perfectly aware of and supportive of alternatives to 
eg In Friedson op.cit. but in a variety of other articles also.289
 Private communication with a family member responsible for business affairs in a very large 290
international law firm.
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using the formal legal process ... at least in the context of high-value entities and 
possibly those with cross-border operations and/or ownership. 
➢ The changing nature of ÔGate-keepingÕ  291
That professionals control access by others to desired states/resources/processes 
is almost trite. Nevertheless, the opportunity to misuse this control is probably 
incontrovertible ... which is not at all to say that all professionals DO become 
involved in such abuse. However, there has been an abundance of recent 
examples  which highlight the dangers in this regard. It takes only a moment to 292
recall the widespread use and acceptance of ÔbribesÕ in relation to the 
prescription of pharmaceuticals or the continuing question-marks in relation to 
UK audit practices. It is hardly likely that the State will not attempt to introduce 
mechanisms to deal with such abuse.  
Reviewing Friedson through Dingwallian  spectacles gives rise to the following 293
Endnote .... 
Òa monopoly such as that enjoyed by IPs is given in response to their manifest expertise 
AND to their role as societal control agents  .. in other words insolvency is something 
requiring social management. The claims of creditors (particularly of unsecured ones) 
need to be rationed to accord with the capacity of Society to deal with them; IPs are the 
main tools in this rationing process. Ò 
 See for instance the Zacharias article ÒLawyers as Gatekeepers Ò. This article makes a simple, and 291
ultimately uncontroversial, point that professionals such as IPs are gatekeepers, and always have been. 
Whatever one's position on the merits of the specific reforms currently being proposed, it is important to 
avoid the misconception that IPs have no role to play in preventing client misconduct. 
Zacharias, F. C. ÒLawyers as gatekeepersÓ,  San Diego Law Review Sept 2004
 Of which, the current criminal proceedings for fraud against three IPs involved in various aspects of 292
the insolvency of Glasgow Rangers FC is possibly merely a current manifestation of an on-going problem 
within this profession. The fact that no Scottish firm was inclined to accept this case may indicate some 
locally widespread sense that all was not right at that club? Duff and Phelps, for whom the accused IPs 
worked, are not Scottish.
 As suggested by reading Dingwall R (2008) Essays on Professions. Ashgate Classics in Sociology. 293
Aldershot: Ashgate.  
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Underlying this view lie two factors ... an economic one relating to the scarcity of 
resource and a moral one in that Society has a responsibility to meet the claims resulting 
from corporate insolvency. 
Notwithstanding the events of 2007-2009, the notion of scarce societal resource may be 
over-played. But, what may happen if/when Society reviews itÕs labelling of the 
corporately insolvent role from that of unmotivated deviance (whereby claims such as 
discussed above are justifiable) to some other label, like motivated deviance ... still 
deviant but different. Would Society then expect different actions from creditors (and 
other parties)?... and would Society continue to require IPs to perform their current 
function?  
In short, would the emphasis move from social control to social protection ...  with the 
policy objective shifting to that of ensuring that people get what they pay for? And how 
would this be done? 
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Chapter 5: An Overview of the Context of Corporate Insolvency ( via 
the metaphor of The Insolvency Casino ) 
Even superficial examinations of corporate life within capitalist economic systems 
cannot fail to note that the bright side of success is mirrored by the dark side of failure. 
This is inevitable when competition throws up winners and losers. This chapter looks at 
what happens to these losers.  
Patterns of behaviour can be discerned in those involved in their appetites for risk; their 
experience/knowledge of both business life in general and of failure in particular; and 
their dispositions to individual/collective action. The ways in which English law 
constrains, guides and ameliorates these patterns will be indicated ... and this will take 
place against an almost hidden backdrop of tensions created by ÔnewÕ capitalism; by 
post 2008 economic turmoil; and by ever-increasing internationalization of social, 
economic and political structures. 
The metaphor of the modern gambling casino is here used to structure the discussion 
and in turn we look at ÔThe PlayersÕ; at ÔThe Rules of the GameÕ; at ÔThe Set PlaysÕ and, 
finally, at ÔThe Awkward CasesÕ. In each instance, key features are explored before 
ending with conclusions in an Epilogue with links to other chapters being offered. We 
start with a short exploration of the back story behind what goes on Ôin the casinoÕ É 
the roots of UK Corporate Insolvency.   
5.1 The Roots of UK Corporate Insolvency Legislation. 
The oft-considered start to reviewing English Corporate Insolvency Law is the so-called 
Cork Report of 1982 which laid the founds for the major legislation of the 1986 
Insolvency Act. There were actually two Reports by Kenneth Cork-chaired committees; 
Cork 1 (of 1976) which was established as a consequence of the UK joining the 
European Community and looked at how English law on bankruptcy / insolvency might 
sit with other European jurisdictions ... and the more substantial Cork 2 which is the 
principal focus here. This report pushed the notion of ÔrescueÕ of distressed companies 
centre-stage and made many proposals aimed at facilitating the saving of businesses and 
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jobs which under the existing legal regime might well have been lost. For Cork, 
business rescue needed talent and time. Talent was required to develop and execute 
plans aiding the ailing firm and time was required for the firm to find its feet and for the 
rescue plan to run its course. Where providers of capital had been granted a floating 
charge, there was ample opportunity to insert an experienced receiver to potentially 
provide the talent to achieve more than might be derived for creditors from a 
straightforward winding-up. Prior to CorkÕs proposals a formal  moratorium  was 294 295
not available. 
In the event, the 1986 legislation did not provide for a moratorium; this had to wait till 
the Insolvency Act of 2000 wherein such a facility was enacted for small companies. 
However, the 1986 Act did introduce the new Company Voluntary Arrangement 
procedure (CVA) which enabled the distressed company to enter into a formal contract 
of composition with creditors and thus give that company an opportunity for a fresh 
start. It also created a new Administration process.  The first set of Insolvency Rules 
also grows from Cork 2 and were implemented in 1986. 
Both Cork 2 and the following legislation attempted to address the tension between 
allowing entrepreneurs to do what they do best (developing new ideas for profit) and 
making those entrepreneurs who behaved recklessly or dishonestly  face the 296
consequences of their actions. Since 1986, there have been a number of further 
amendments to both the law and practice of corporate insolvency; some, specific and 
narrow (such as legislation relating to banks  and to insurance companies ) and some 297 298
with rather wider implications (eg. The Human Rights Act 1998, (HRA)). For instance, 
there were two Insolvency Acts passed in 1994; the first  dealing with the liability of 299
 Notwithstanding the use of the London Approach for larger firms whereby an informal stay might be 294
arranged.
 Of the type prevalent in US legislation; see later comments re ÔChapter 11.Õ295
 Curiously, little attention seems to have been given to incompetent entrepreneurs!296
 eg. The Banking Act1989297
 eg. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000298
 Insolvency Act 1994299
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office holders to employees and the second  clarifying the position of purchasers of 300
land at an impugned undervalue. 
In 2000, a further Insolvency Act  provided that small companies could seek a 301
moratorium in the context of voluntary arrangements; that disqualification undertakings 
might substitute for court hearings/legal proceedings in connection with director 
disqualifications; that changes to evidence provisions when criminal proceedings were 
being undertaken ... in order to comply with the HRA; and finally, the 2000 Act 
conferred power on the Secretary of State to give effect to the Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency.  This international dimension to UK corporate insolvency law was 302
amplified by the coming into force in 2002 of the EC Insolvency Regulation  which 303
established a European Union regime for the handling of cross-border insolvency cases. 
The period up to 2002 was one of review ... which culminated in the enactment of the 
Enterprise Act (EA) of that year. Several notable reforms were thus brought forward ... 
➢ the abolition of the floating charge holderÕs right to appoint an 
administrative receiver. 
➢ the abolition of the CrownÕs status as a preferential creditor. 
➢ substantial streamlining of the administration procedure. 
Subsequently, the Insolvency Service has engaged in a long-running project attempting 
to review and simplify both the Insolvency Rules and associated statutory instruments 
and also to lighten the bureaucratic burden connected with the administration of 
insolvency procedures. This occasioned the Deregulation Act of 2015 (DA). Moreover, 
the ÔTransparency and TrustÕ review resulted in the Small Business, Enterprise and 
Employment Act 2015 (SBEEA) which establishes significant changes linked to ..  
➢ the bringing of wrongful and fraudulent trading claims by administrators. 
➢ the increase of penalties when directors are disqualified.  
 Insolvency (No 2) Act 1994300
 Insolvency Act 2000301
 Subsequently incorporated into UK law in 2006302
 The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 2000303
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➢ changes in sanctions to exercise liquidatorsÕ powers. CreditorsÕ meetings and 
proving of debts. 
Certain sectors have somewhat different provisions regarding insolvency, notably 
Financial Services . This factor will be returned to later, primarily in connection with 304
the development of the Sporting Interest in section 7.3 
The UK has historically been open to influence from external sources; and corporate 
insolvency law is no exception. The most obvious source of influence from the US is 
ÔChapter 11Õ.  Periodically, both academic commentators and legislators in the UK 305
have contemplated how Chapter 11 might be of benefit in the UK. This procedure has 
much to offer companies in distress, being both flexible and rescue-aligned and is said 
to be the usual choice of route for business restructuring. Key elements include the 
continuation of ownership of its assets by the distressed firm which continues to be 
operated by the previous managers albeit under court supervision and ostensibly for the 
benefit of creditors. However, a Trustee may be appointed if the court believes that the 
existing management is dishonest or ineffective. 
Under Chapter 11, the company in question can avail itself of a moratorium during 
which a Chapter 11 rescue plan/restructuring can be assembled for the approval of the 
creditors committee.  This plan is confirmed only on the affirmative votes of creditors 306
whose votes are both divided into classes and are weighted by the amount owed. In the 
event of the required majority not been achieved, there lies the possibility  of a cram-307
down to gain approval despite hold-out opposition. UK interest has perhaps focused 
most on the cram-down, moratorium and emphasis on unsecured creditor involvement 
technical provisions as well as on the cultural predisposition to offer a Ôsecond chanceÔ. 
That modern commercial life necessitates cross-border trading is clear. Perhaps it thus 
inevitable that cross-border insolvency may also result. Such events throw up instances 
 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 ( Insolvency) Order 2001304
 More precisely É. Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code / (US) Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978305
 Appointed from non-insider largest 20 unsecured creditors306
 Certain statutory tests have to be met for this.307
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of conflict of laws which need to be dealt with in as methodical and predictable way as 
possible. UK corporate insolvency is not confined to national borders ... and thus 
influence from outside the English legal regime has to be noted. Here we will the 
influence of both the United Nations and of the European Community, the latter  308
being considered in a more detail later in this chapter and the former being briefly dealt 
with here. 
The United Nations  brought forward a Ômodel lawÕ  in 1997 which subsequently 309 310
has been included in the domestic legislation of many major trading countries. Like the 
EC legislation which followed, the model law attempts to establish the idea of Òmain 
proceedingsÓ to be commenced in the Centre of Main Interest (COMI) in relation to the 
corporate debtorÕs activities; imaginatively, all other proceedings linked to the debtor 
are termed Ônon-mainÕ. The purpose of the model law is to encourage signatory states to 
co-operate with foreign insolvency officials/practitioners in respect of both main and 
non-main proceedings; and to attempt to limit preferences for local creditors as against 
foreign creditors.  
5.2 The Players in The Insolvency Casino. 
In this section, attention will focus on those main players who dominate the play in The 
Casino. All three types possess varying degrees of skill, power and motivation. All have 
access to information which they may use to pursue their separate agendas and, for at 
least two types of player,  they have substantial repeat-playing experience. 311
Insolvency Practitioners (IPs): 
IPs are said, at least by themselves, to constitute a profession. Not everyone will 
perceive them to conform to early sociological criteria on this claim and this may be of 
 This was the impetus for Cork 1 mentioned above.308
 In full, The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law309
 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 1997310
 IPs and lenders.311
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significance during our investigations. Being more specific, one of FlexnerÕs  312
necessary criteria for a profession is the existence of Ôpublic spiritednessÕ; the absence 
of which disqualifies a group from being truly a profession. Acknowledging some IPs 
give time without charge to ÔprofessionalÕ activities and noting that IPs claim that not all 
of their fees are paid, it still is hard to make a strong case for the existence of this 
criterion. But, then Flexner wrote three generations ago ... and perhaps the definitional 
world has moved on? 
The examination of the professions in the literature often encompasses issues of status 
(both within and without the profession), of control (both of access to the profession and 
quality of work done) and of power (to determine the focus of agendas and the 
distribution of rewards). Additionally, attention is paid to a professionÕs propensity to 
develop norms and values. This is central in two ways. Firstly, in the way that this may 
mesh with the stateÕs usage of IPs as a Soft Law mechanism to control the manner in 
which CapitalismÕs failures are disposed of; and secondly, as a hidden driver (or 
motivator) for the way in which IPs conduct business. 
IPs practice in corporate insolvency, in personal bankruptcy ... or in both. Some appear 
to work full-time in their field and others part-time; about two-thirds of IPs accept 
ÔappointmentsÕ.  Further shadowy areas in connection with IPs link to gender  and 313 314
little seems known about other potential areas of within-tribe power and dominance. 
Consequent to Cork and ensuing legislation, IPs gained a monopoly licence from the 
state to conduct most proceedings relating to corporate insolvency. Following the Cork 
Report in 1982, the Government enacted legislation (Insolvency Act 1986 and then 
Enterprise Act 2002) giving a monopoly of most of the activity surrounding corporate 
insolvency to IPs. That this affected the conduct of proceedings in personal bankruptcy 
 Flexner wrote 90 years ago and pioneered the use of attribute theory in the study of professions. 312
Attribute theory has its critics but the idea is helpful here.
 About two thirds take ÒappointmentsÓ ie conduct cases. It is not known what the remaining third does  313
.. but surely they cannot all work in The Insolvency Service ?
 eg.the female President of R3, Liz Bingham, lamented in 2013 that only 20% of the IP profession 314
were women. (see Recovery Summer 2013)
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is not relevant to this thesis. They are few  in number and highly qualified. In effect, 315
IPs hold double qualifications; firstly, as an accountant or solicitor and then by 
examination and experience to become an IP. Much is made of the difficulty of the 
exam which is consistent with the idea of professional status-building but little is known 
about the nature of the mandatory five yearsÕ experience required.  
The handling of substantial/complex cases is likely to be done by IPs working within 
one of the Big Four accountancy firms and a de facto ranking system for the profession 
is discernible with personal bankruptcies being handled mainly by small, provincial IP 
firms. There is also some sector-speciality formation with insolvency events at football 
clubs being handled by a group of repeat-playing IPs. IPs generally have prior 
backgrounds, either in accounting or in law. Leaving aside those IPs who are regulated 
by the Insolvency Practitioners Association (and whose membership rules are 
ambiguous), a cursory inspection of R3 membership figures points to the accountant to 
solicitor ratio being about 4 :1. Interestingly, despite being a small group, they will be 
licensed by one of several professional bodies ... who themselves are monitored by 316
The Insolvency Service.  
A neo-Marxist view of IPs offers the thought that IPs have several overlapping 
functions in modern capitalist society with some IPs being better at one function than 
another. Three main functions appear evident,  viz: 317
a). ÒSclaffieÓ (a Glaswegian term for roadsweeper) whereby the IP cleans up the mess 
relating to Failed Firms created by the workings of Market Forces. This tedious work 
demands application but not inspiration. Efficiency of clean-up is valued more than 
speed in this regard. According to Frisby (see her 2007 report to ABRP, the predecessor 
of R3), many insolvency procedures take above a year to conclude; possibly as IPs are 
diligent in their job of maximising the insolvent firmÕs estate, possibly not? 
 Perhaps around 1750, according to R3. 315
 At the time of writing there were eight bodies (RPBs) who together regulated the activities of the 316
members of this tiny profession ...  there now five RPBs. Despite the obvious cost and inefficiency 
penalties that this attracts, R3 in a recent consultative response to government declared that no change 
was necessary; hardly the expected response of a forward-looking profession?
 These categories and the ensuing exposition are from the author.317
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b). ÒPara-medicÓ whereby the IP attempts, perhaps with expert help, to rescue Failing 
Firms that may still have a viable life left to lead. Here, speed is of the essence and 
short-cuts are common. A source of continuing concern, felt most keenly by unsecured 
creditors, is the practice of Ôpre-packingÕ whereby a failing company is sold quickly and 
without formal advance notice. The suggestion is that speed is of the essence in order to 
keep key employees and to retain essential supplies; this is countered by unsecured 
creditors suggesting that such a sale may materially undervalue the firm and thus 
disadvantage their returns.  The difficulty in the valuation of knowledge (see later) 318
merely compounds the complexity on this. 
c). ÒCherry-pickerÓ whereby the IP pursues la Dolce Vita and, at a pace congenial to the 
IP, deals only with such dramas resulting from the market as seem to be substantial yet 
easily financially beneficial to that IP. Occasionally, the State seems concerned  about 319
the exercise of this function.   
Lenders (and Lending): 
With respect to corporate insolvency, there are many players who could be loosely 
categorized in the Lender category. Arguably, all voluntary  lenders might fall to be 320
considered here but perhaps it is more fruitful to exclude trade suppliers  and the tax 321
authorities. Instead, we briefly focus on suppliers of capital and of capital goods. 
Historically in the UK, firms raised much of their capital via the debt route  and the 322
principal suppliers of funds were the banks. Virtually always, this funding was secured 
either on a fixed or floating charge basis, sometimes both.  
Fixed charges were secured on specific assets such as land and equipment which the 
firm might not dispose of without the prior approval of the lender. This gave the creditor 
 But also see Subsequent Events section in Chapter 6.318
 See the OFT Report on ÒThe market for corporate insolvency practitioners Òwhich tries to throw light 319
on this and related concerns.
 Thereby excluding non-voluntary lenders such as tort claimants and employees.320
 Because these are possibly small scale, frequent and for short time periods  .. and, crucially, are very 321
often unsecured.
 As compared with equity.322
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substantial protection although there was always the risk of the value of the secured 
asset falling. In contrast the floating charge was able to be used/disposed of in the usual 
course of business as the firm saw fit. This freedom could be advantageous to the firm. 
As the charge floated over all the firmÕs assets it was possible that the sum covered 
would appreciate in hypothetical value. However, in corporate insolvency the floating 
charge crystallized but does not enjoy preferential status (unlike the fixed charge) and 
became unsecured debt. 
Other sources of funds for various uses in the business can include hire purchase, lease 
and invoice factoring. Normally, these would have some form of Retention of Title 
clause giving substantial security to the lender if corporate insolvency occurs ... these 
secured assets are removed from the insolvent companyÕs estate before dealing with any 
distributions to creditors. 
When a company fails, its assets fall to be distributed in a legally determined sequence 
viz: firstly, comes the secured fixed charges and then the fee and expenses of the office 
holder; then followed by preferential debts such as Ôthe prescribed partÕ and certain 
employee rights  and then, secured floating charge holders; these are subsequently 323
followed by amounts owing to unsecured creditors and finally (if at all), the 
shareholders of the wound-up firm obtain any residue. The 'prescribed part' included 
above is an amount which must be set aside by the administrator or liquidator for the 
benefit of unsecured creditors to a maximum of £600,000. 
Depending on the nature of the loan, itÕs size and the relations between bank and firm, 
frequently there would be conditions attached to such loans.  Banks would take a 324
distant interest in the affairs of the firm if these conditions were met. The onset of 
distress, however, would trigger an increasing series of requests  for information and 325
other business-related items with the ultimate step being the transfer of the firmÕs 
banking facilities to ÔThe Intensive Care DepartmentÕ whereby the bank would press the 
 See later in Section 5.5 for amplification.323
 Frequently termed ÔdebenturesÕ.324
 Some would say ÔthreatsÕ.325
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distressed firm to take remedial steps  or alternatively the route to receivership and 326
windingÐup might be selected without further firm-managerial intervention. 
In recent times, the role of the banks has begun to change ... noticeably so, for larger 
companies. Banks are often content to become debt-originators and sell on such debt in 
a packaged/securitized way to investors who may have differing appetites for packages 
of different types of risk. There are two immediate consequences with another 
potentially following later. The first consequence is that having sold the debt, the banks 
lose interest in monitoring the performance of their debtor clients with knock-on effects 
for unsecured creditors who previously had a free ride on monitoring the company 
performance. The second consequence is that dispersed ownership causes co-ordination 
difficulties between parties if the firm becomes distressed. 
The final development of note is germane for bigger firms approaching financial 
problems É the advent of the market for distressed debt. Traders in this market use 
sophisticated techniques in order to spot opportunities to purchase debt of distressed 
companies in the hope/expectation of being able to either to later sell the debt for a 
profit ... or even to convert the debt into equity of the distressed firm and with judicious 
actions return the firm to health and then cash in the acquired equity  É a form of 




In the UK, any registered company has the privilege of limited liability and the directors 
of such companies are not personally liable for the debts of that company. This situation 
can invite unscrupulous conduct by directors and the law seeks to address this. 
The current provisions in relation to corporate insolvency vis-a-vis directors stem in no 
large measure from the Cork 2 Report which was concerned by the need to address such 
mischiefs as phoenixisation. Phoenixisation was the (mal-) practice of directors 
allowing their company to take on trade debts for both supplies and equipment and then, 
 See remark elsewhere about RBS and its GRG activities.326
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possibly whilst extracting substantial sums via remuneration, running the firm down till 
it was no longer viable. At which, the directors declared the firm insolvent and invited a 
ÔtameÕ liquidator to deal with the liquidation. The directors then purchased the assets of 
the old company Ôfor penniesÕ and resumed trading under a similar name and using the 
old companyÕs workers. The creditors of the old company were left to pursue the now-
empty shell for satisfaction of its liabilities ... a forlorn pursuit!  
The Companies Act (CA) 2006  lays out the duties which lie upon a company director 327
and the term director is wide in reach encompassing those who have been formally 
appointed (de jure); those who assume the role (de facto) and those whose instructions 
other directors commonly obey (shadow). That these duties lie also to the future as well 
as the present was confirmed in Winkworth v Edward Baron.  Thus, lenders engaged 328
in company management like banks, managers deputed from parent companies  and 329
turn-round specialists (but NOT IPs) may all be susceptible to challenge for their 
actions particularly in respect of duties to avoid interest conflicts; to act within powers; 
and to take care. The Produce Marketing Consortium  case particularly stressed this 330
last point; one which could well trouble some directors of football clubs. Of particular 
import in the context of impending company failure is the morphing of the focus of 
such directorsÕ duties ... away from promoting the company for the benefit of its 
members to having regard for the interests of creditors as a whole. A position which the 
decisions in Gwyer and in Whalley did not entirely resolve.  331
Breach of CA duties renders the director concerned liable to an action for misfeasance. 
Any monies recovered from this source are returned to the company and used to pay 
creditors in the usual order. Such actions are raised in the name of the failed company 
 CA 2006 s171-177327
 Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 1512328
 In Hydrodan (Corby)Ltd, Re {1994] BCC 161 it was held that such managers had to have specific 329
responsibilities in the subsidiary.
 Produce Marketing Consortium (in Liquidation), Re (No 1) [1989] 1 WLR 409330
 Gwyer [2003] 2BCLC 153 and Whalley [2004] BPIR 75.331
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by the liquidator/administrator and, are assignable to third parties ... which allows the 
liquidator some discretion in terms of the risk/reward calculus in respect of litigation. 
In addition to the Companies Act provisions in respect of directors, there are also 
provisions in the Insolvency Act 1986 which attempt to deal with directorial behaviour. 
These mainly relate to the notions of Ôfraudulent tradingÕ  and Ôwrongful tradingÕ,  332 333
both criminal offences. The former offence requires that the director in question has 
knowingly behaved dishonestly by everyday standards.  The well-known ÒGhoshÓ 334
standard on (dis)honesty was disapproved by the verdict in Ivey v Genting. Being 
subjective, it is notoriously difficult to prove that this standard has not been achieved. 
The wrongful trading offence  is one which focuses on the idea of director 335
negligence  rather than on dishonesty. It is worth noting in this regard that a separate 336
offence of Ôfraudulent tradingÕ  under the Companies Act still exists. The BCCI  337 338
case merely underlined that the offence needed to be intentional. 
Wrongful trading attempts to catch directors (as above) who continue in business if Òat 
some time before the commencement of the winding up of the company, that person 
knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the 
company would avoid going into insolvent liquidationÓ. Here, the director is assessed on 
the basis of having the skill needed for their job  (or higher if they possess special 339
qualifications).  
As the cause of action in regard to possible s213 /s214 offences lies only with the 
liquidator/administrator it is not currently possible for third party assignment to take 
 IA 1986 s213332
 IA 1986 s214333
 R v Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2 ; Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 67334
 s214 IA 1986335
 Perhaps easier to prove ?336
 CA 2006 s993337
 Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA, Morris v State Bank of India [2003] BCC 735338
 As in Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd (No 2) which was the first UK case in this area.339
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place. Thus, there may be reluctance to carry such litigation forward. Awards made on 
successful proof of offences under the Unlawful Trading provisions are compensatory 
(thus reflecting company losses in the time period involved) rather than being punitive 
(as would be under conviction for a CA s993 offence). 
The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA) outlines the procedures 
used to investigate and disqualify company directors who are suspected of misconduct. 
The disapproved behaviour included continuing to trade when knowingly insolvent; 
continuing to take credit when there was no reasonable prospect of the creditor being 
paid; and misrepresentation of facts about the company. In particular, the Act extended 
the grounds upon which a court could grant a disqualification order, as well as 
extending the maximum period of disqualification to 15 years for directors found guilty 
of wrongful or fraudulent trading. 
The CDDA consolidates much legislation related to disqualification orders and 
implements the new concept of mandatory disqualification. Section 6 states Òthat a 
disqualified director cannot take part in the direction, management, promotion, or 
formation of a limited liability company in the UK, unless given leave by the courtÓ. 
Liquidators or Administrators are required to submit Returns/Reports  on the directors 340
of any company entering Insolvent Liquidation or Administration to the Insolvency 
 A return confirms no misconduct whereas a report sets out evidence of misconduct found.340
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Service (IS).  These documents are prepared following professional rules   and are 341 342 343
not shown to the director(s) concerned. Should the IS consider it to be in the public 
interest, they will open proceedings for director disqualification. In which instance, it is 
open to such a director to choose to give a ÔDisqualification UndertakingÕ having a 
similar effect to an order but usually resulting in a shortening of the disqualification 
period and in cost savings. Someone subject to an order or undertaking in this context  344
may not act as a director; nor may they manage, promote nor form a company directly 
or indirectly. 
A director violating the terms of a Disqualification Order is guilty of an offence 
carrying a sentence of up to 2 years in prison and/or a fine. They may also be held 
personally liable for some/all of the debts of the failed company. 
This act also lays out the standards for assessing unfitness to be used to determine 
whether a director is fit to serve as the director of another company in the future based 
on their previous performance and conduct.  
Three types of disqualification are covered in the CDDA Ð mandatory, automatic, and 
Ôat the CourtÕs discretionÕ. It is worth observing that the CDDA only applies when a 
company has gone into liquidation and that this may incline directors to consider CVAs 
(where there is no investigation of directorial conduct) rather than liquidation. This is a 
point of which directors of financially-troubled football clubs are usually acutely aware. 
 The IS will act on behalf of the Sec of State for BIS.341
 SIP 2 (on investigations) and SIP 4 (on reporting misconduct).342
 Matters which SIP 4 advises should feature in a D Report are: 343
¥ Attempted concealment of assets 
¥ Unexplained disappearance of assets 
¥ Unexplained deficiencies in the balance sheet 
¥ Transferring assets to other companies on terms which are not commercially reasonable 
¥ Preferences (giving unfair priority to the repayment of money owed to themselves, their family, other 
companies that they control or creditors to whom they have given personal guarantees) 
¥ Loans made to directors 
¥ The occurrence of dishonoured cheques 
¥ The use of stalling tactics with the companyÕs creditors 
¥ Allowing tax arrears to accrue whilst trading continues and, in particular, failing to account for VAT, 
PAYE and NI whilst trading continues 
¥ Improperly re-starting the business through another company 
¥ Abuse of a factoring or invoice discounting facility 
¥ Taking deposits from customers and failing to deliver the goods or services for which the deposits were 
taken and cases resulting in criminal conviction
 Of limited companies.344
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Further provisions relating to the CDDA were introduced in 2015  345
The new and amended provisions are intended to tighten up the directorsÕ 
disqualification rules to ... 
 Òprevent an individual from acting as a director where that individual through their 
conduct has shown him or herself to be ÔunfitÕ. The measures introduce new grounds for 
disqualification, create a new way in which creditors may receive financial redress for 
loss suffered through director misconduct, make the disqualification regime more 
efficient and update the matters that courts must take into account when considering a 
director disqualification.Ó  
It is also significant that, since the Welfab  case, it is clear that directors also have a 346
duty to consider their employees in circumstances surrounding corporate distress. 
5.3  The Casino Rules: 
Liquidation: 
The process of Liquidation brings death to the company, there is no way back. In one 
form or another, there has been legal provision to wind-up a companyÕs affairs since the 
mid nineteenth century.  The sole aim of liquidation is repay as much as possible to 347
creditors from the sale of such of the wound-up companyÕs assets as can be ascertained 
and sold. In the unlikely event of there being a surplus after repayment, any outstanding 
monies are returned to shareholders.  
There are several possible routes to company death, each dependent on context 
 As part of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015345
 Re Welfab Engineers (1990) BCC 600346
 Joint Stock Companies Winding-up Act 1844347
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➢ The voluntary route, initiated by directors / shareholders. If the directors can 
declare that the company is solvent, then they will remain in control of the 
Ôlast ritesÕ. If not, then the creditors are in charge of the procedure. 
➢ The compulsory route, whereby the court is petitioned for a compulsory 
winding-up order. This route may be started by one of shareholders/
directors/creditors/the company itself. However, it should be noted that 
insolvency is only one reason for the petitioning; motives may be mixed as 
in the UK-Euro Group  case. 348
Additionally, if an Administrator has been unsuccessful in achieving some form of 
rescue (see later), there also exists a route into Liquidation from Administration. 
The Liquidator is there to maximize the value of the companyÕs remaining assets. Thus, 
sales need not be undertaken immediately and there is much discretion exercisable as to 
the exact conduct of this value-maximising activity. For instance, action may be taken 
against outgoing directors for Ôa contributionÕ or attempts may be made to avoid some 
previous transactions contracted by the company. There also exists a moratorium 
whereby any disposal of the companyÕs property made after the commencement of 
winding-up shall be void, unless the court decides otherwise. 
Distribution of funds realized by these sales is governed strictly by statute with claims 
being met in the following sequence  É 349
➢ Fixed security holders 
➢ Preference creditors ... such as the liquidator; certain employee claims (see 
later); the 20% ring-fenced unsecured creditors fund. 
➢ Holder of a floating charge 
➢ Unsecured creditors 
➢ Any deferred debt 
 UK-Euro Group Plc, Re [2006] EWHC 2102 (Ch)348
 IA 1986 ss 176ZA (insolvency practitioner expenses), 175 (preferential creditors: employees and 349
pensions) and 175A (ring fence fund)
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Any residue goes to shareholders. In the context of professional football, Ôfootball 
creditorsÕ are preferred creditors in that they MUST be paid in full if the club concerned 
is to survive. 
The Liquidator owes duty only to the company and thus may be sued only by the 
company for such as negligence or improper use of powers. Also as a fiduciary, there is 
the usual requirement against the making of secret profit and acting in conflict of 
interest.  
The process of appointing a Liquidator can take time ... during which assets and/or 
records may be lost or delinquent directors may still be able to continue with 
misconduct such as fraud. In this situation, the court can appoint an emergency 
Provisional Liquidator to take immediate temporary control of the company thus 
rendering the directors out of office without further notice. Any application for such an 
order would be expected to demonstrate that the company is without doubt going to be 
declared insolvent and that there has been misconduct by one or more directors. This 
procedure may also be followed on application of the Secretary of State for a 
ÔLiquidation in the Public InterestÕ.  
Pari Passu: 
On the engagement of the liquidation procedure, individual creditors  are no longer 350
able to pursue the company for debt repayment. Instead, creditors become part of a 
collective regime which has the objective of equitably distributing the estate of the 
failed company amongst its creditors. This distribution is performed rateably and is 
called pari passu. However, not all the pool of collected assets are distributed in this 
manner as certain creditors may be paid from the estate before distribution to ordinary 
creditors (see secured creditors and preferred creditors above). Additionally, other 
creditors may have utilized rights in rem to except certain assets from the common pool. 
Consequently, this pool can well be substantially reduced prior to calculation of 
distributions. 
 But see discussion on The Football CreditorsÕ Rule later350
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Acting to support the pari passu distributions, is the common law ÔAnti-deprivationÕ 
rule which stipulates that a contract term cannot operate to deprive creditors of an asset 
which the failed company possessed just before the beginning of insolvency. The 
landmark case which settled many of the complexities involved in relation to anti-
deprivation was The Perpetual Trustee case. This case is is also relevant to the High 351
Court hearing in regard of the Football CreditorsÕ Rule which is the subject of section 
6.3 later.   
The contract terms are usually one or other of two types vizÉ 
¥ Contracting out of pari passu is not permitted (British Eagle  being the 352
renowned case) as this would promote one creditor ahead of others. However, 
there is nothing to prevent a term agreeing a relegation behind others. 
¥ Contracting to remove assets from the insolvent estate on insolvency is not 
permitted if this is for less than fair value consideration. However, exceptions 
are made if rights/ obligations are made over time ... so leases and licences 
commonly are terminable upon insolvency.  
¥
Both pari passu and the anti-deprivation rule turn out to be central to our Chapter 6 
discussion of the Football CreditorsÕ Rule. Interestingly, pari passu does not apply to an 
Administrative Receivership as this is Ônot a true collective proceedingÕ  as 353
established by the HPJ UK case. 354
Other Rules: 
The period between serving the petition for winding-up and the appointment of the 
Liquidator is one in which the assets of the failed company may face a risk of 
 Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v BNY Mellon Corporate Trustees Services Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1160351
 British Eagle International Limited v Compagnie Nationale Air France [1975] 1 WLR 758352
 See Goode, R. (2011) Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th Ed. Sweet and Maxwell. 238353
 HPJ UK Ltd (in Administration), Re [2007] B.C.C. 284, Ch D 354
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dissipation. Thus, there is a general rule that dispositions by the failed company of any 
property, even if they benefit the company, are void absent approval by the court. 
Dispositions can be money payments, asset transfers by gift, exchange or sale and 
granting of mortgages or leases. Transfer of property by prior arranged contract and use 
by the company of its own assets are not deemed to be dispositions. Avoided 
dispositions will mean that the property is treated as never having left the company and 
thus may fall within the scope of an appropriate floating charge.  Ward LJ. is cited by 
Goode  as suggesting that avoidance mechanisms under the Insolvency Act É 355
ÒÉ are integral to and central to the collective nature of bankruptcy and are not merely 
incidental procedural matters É  Ò  356
There also exist five main reviewable transactions in which the incoming Liquidator 
may take an interest in order to swell the failed companyÕs estate by having such 
transactions set aside and the Liquidator certainly has a duty to investigate prior 
transactions of the failed company. In no particular order, these are ... 
➢ Transactions at an undervalue;  this occurs when the company makes a 357
gift or enters into some transaction wherein the consideration provided by 
the purchaser is notably less in money value than the provision by the 
company. Such transactions may be challenged by the Liquidator if they 
occurred up to two years before the onset of insolvency and the transaction 
took place when the company was unable to pay its debts.  There is a 358
rebuttable presumption, here, that the transaction was made to a Ôconnected 
person.  There are defences to the claim to void such transactions if the 359
company can show that it entered the transaction in good faith or if the 
company had reasonable grounds at the time of the transaction for thinking 
 Goode, R. (2011) Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th Ed. Sweet and Maxwell. 522355
 Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2010] EWCA Civ 895356
 IA 1986 s238357
 Where the company fails to pay a statutory demand; or proves to the court that it cannot pay its debts 358
as they fall due; or has assets less in value than its liabilities  
(including contingent and prospective).
 eg. directors, shadow directors and associates.359
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that it would benefit the company in some way. It is a matter of doubt that 
player-transfers are always made at true market value in the context of a 
financially embarrassed football club seeking to avoid insolvency. 
➢ Preferences;  these can be seen as the company doing anything  or 360
suffering anything to be done to a person (creditor) which has the effect of 
putting such a person in a better position if the company enters liquidation 
than would otherwise have been the case. The key test in this instance is not 
just ÔintentionÕ but ÔdesireÕ... the company must positively wish the result. 
The relevant times for preferences are two years for a connected person and 
six months otherwise. 
➢ Floating charges ;  the avoidance here is to prevent the company granting 361
a floating charge for existing debt where no new consideration is given. If 
the charge is to a connected party then the two year relevant period applies; 
if the charge is to an unconnected party then the relevant period is six 
months with the proviso that the company needs to be insolvent at that time 
or to become so as a result. 
➢ Transactions defrauding creditors ;  this catches transactions which 362
attempt to put the companyÕs assets beyond the reach of anyone who might 
make a claim against the company in the event of insolvency or which 
otherwise prejudices the interests of creditors. There is no relevant time 
period in this instance. The popularity in football circles of off-shore 
accounts to conceal asset ownership and to help avoid tax is oft-reported. 
Some argue  that this defrauds creditors. 363
➢ Extortionate credit transactions ;  the mischief dealt with here is that the 364
company may have entered into a credit arrangement in which the company 
was required to pay grossly exhorbitant amounts in respect of the risk borne 
by the credit provider. The relevant review period for this is three years. 
 IA 1986 s239g360
 IA 1986 s245 and IA1986 Sch B1 paras 3, 51 and 56361
 IA 1986 s423362
 See media coverage of The Panama Papers.363
 IA 1986 s244364
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The liquidator also has the power of ÔdisclaimerÕ which entitles the unilateral 
repudiation of a prior contract so as to preclude the requirement for future performance 
of that contract.  The disclaiming of unprofitable contracts was an action approved of in 
the Nottingham General Cemetery  case. 365
It should be stressed that the law does not hold a director personally liable solely for any 
of the above transactions. However, Liquidators do investigate the conduct of directors 
of insolvent companies and may well cover this in a report under the CDDA.  366
One notable principle affecting the extent of the insolvent companyÕs estate is 
ÒInsolvency Set-offÓ  as contemplated by the Insolvency Rules.  Here, set-off acts as 367 368
a type of netting arrangement in which one of the parties (either the insolvent company 
or its creditor) applies the sum owed to it by the other to the reduction of any sum owed 
by the second party to the first. The resultant balance then remains to be paid or claimed 
as appropriate. The rules for this seem clear É 
➢ The rules are mandatory and the court may not vary them. Authority for this 
is the NatWest v Halesowen case.  369
➢ They take immediate effect upon liquidation. 
➢ They cannot be disapplied by the prior agreement of the parties. 
Further to these, may be added the requirement that the set-off be in expressed in 
monetary terms and that the debts are held mutually.  
As Lord Hoffman characterized it, É ÒInsolvency set-off enables the creditor to use his 
indebtedness to the insolvent as a form of security.Ò  Thus, the underlying effect of a 370
set-off is to give a preference to one creditor as against the rest of the creditor class; in 
effect, this creditor gains an unpublished security. 
 Nottingham General Cemetery Co, Re [1955] Ch 683365
 Company DirectorsÕ Disqualification Act 1986366
 The other types of set-off are known variously as statutory; equitable; contractual and bankersÕ set-367
offs; they will not be pursued further here.
 Established in conjunction with IA1986.368
 National Westminster Bank Ltd v Halesowen Presswork and Assemblies Ltd [1972] A.C.785369
 in Stein v Blake [1996] AC 243 at 251370
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5.4 Set-plays in the Casino: 
As a preface to the discussion on ÔSet-PlaysÕ, we might note that warning signals may 
exist for those interested in the financial affairs of any particular company. In an effort 
to facilitate transparency, the UK Government has required  a substantial amount of 371
financial information  to be lodged with the Registrar of Companies and this is easily 372
available for scrutiny.  Of course, these warning signals may not always be heeded  373 374
by some or all of the key actors. 
Administration: 
Administration lies at the heart of the post-Cork Report attempts to establish a Ôrescue 
cultureÕ in UK Corporate Insolvency activities. Its ultimate aim is to offer the prospect 
that financially distressed companies with the capacity to become viable in the future 
are able to carry on their business. The administration procedure can be started either by 
application  to the court for an Administration Order or by the out of court route which 375
merely requires the filing of papers with the court indicating that an Administrator has 
been appointed.  The current practice for bigger or more complex administrations is to 376
appoint Joint Administrators ... which inevitably helps with the time scales and 
information processing entailed in this procedure.  
Special procedures also exist for financial service companies.  377
Applications for Administration Orders need to be able to show that the company 
concerned is currently unable to pay its debts or will so become within a very short 
 With penalties for defaulting.371
 eg Annual Report and Accounts; particulars of charges; particulars of all special and extraordinary 372
resolutions.
 Although, arguably, only specialists may make complete sense of such material.373
 Which calls into question issues of motivation and of understanding.374
 Usually made by  375
the companyÕs directors or creditors. 
 May be made by the company or its directors or by a secured creditor who is the holder of a 376
Òqualifying floating chargeÓ (ÒQFCÓ).
 eg The Banking Act 2009. For space reasons these will not be followed further here.377
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period; exception to this rule pertains when the application has been made by the holder 
of a QFC who is entitled to appoint in the event detailed in the charge document 
allowing enforcement of that charge.  However, the court still retains the discretion 378
not to grant such an application if it sees fit.  
Whatever the route followed, the incoming office-holder is required to offer an opinion 
that the purpose of Administration as set out in the Insolvency Act 1986 is Ôreasonably 
likely to be achievedÕ. This purpose is stated in hierarchical form to be, firstly, the 
rescue of the company as a going concern. If this is not achievable or does not yield the 
best result for creditors, then the second objective applies viz:  the result of gaining a 
better outcome for creditors as a whole than would be obtained by winding the company 
up. In the instance of this objective not being practicable, then the third and final 
objective of realizing property for the benefit of secured and/or preferential creditors 
obtains.  
On the completion of any filing and notice requirements, the distressed company 
automatically commences the protection of an interim moratorium pending the 
appointment of the administrator. During this moratorium, the company is protected 
against being wound up and legal proceedings may not be commenced;  security may 379
not be enforced and goods held under hire purchase; leasing or retention of title 
agreements may not be repossessed. Landlords may not regain entry to premises let. 
However ...  a big however ...  a QFC holder has the right to appoint their own 
Administrator who will take precedence over the preferred appointee of others. In some 
circumstances, the QFC holder can appoint an Administrative Receiver who may then 
move to wind the company up.  
If the out of court route into Administration is selected and there is no one to whom 
notice giving notice is a requirement, there is no interim moratorium and the filing of 
the requisite documents triggers a full moratorium. On this, the holder of a QFC loses 
 Commonly, a default under a Loan Agreement.378
 Except on Public Interest grounds.379
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the power to appoint an Administrative Receiver  and any wind-up proceedings are 380
dismissed. 
On appointment, an Administrator takes over the complete responsibility for the 
management of the distressed company including its property. This is accompanied by 
the assumption of wide powers which potentially may conflict with those of existing 
Directors who consequently lose their powers unless specifically consented to by the 
office-holder. This may be the case if the Administrator wishes the company to continue 
trading for the time being and is satisfied with adequacy of control of and by these 
Directors. The office-holder acts as the agent of the company and has a duty to act for 
the benefit of all  creditors. 381 382
As soon as possible after appointment the Administrator will need to obtain a Statement 
of Affairs detailing assets and liabilities; and fixed and floating charges from the 
Directors of the distressed company. This will help both in the assessment of the current 
financial situation and in the formulation of proposals which the Administrator is 
required to submit to all known creditors  prior to the initial creditorsÕ meeting. It is a 383
requirement that these proposals are sent within eight weeks of appointment and are 
discussed within ten weeks. 
The requirement to hold an initial creditorsÕ meeting is obviated in the instance of the 
Ôpre-packÕ sale whereby the sale of some or all of the companyÕs assets is agreed prior 
to the AdministratorÕs appointment and the sale then proceeds quickly on appointment. 
This route does not need the approval of creditors and consequently its use is an on-
going source of concern and disapproval.  Those dealing with Administrators in good 384
 See Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corp. Ltd [1993] AC 295 for relevant authority.380
 As compared with an Administrative Receiver whose duty lies solely towards the holder of the 381
Qualifying Floating Charge responsible for the appointment. For a charge to be a QFC it must relate to 
the whole, or substantially the whole, of the companyÕs property. 
 Again, see account of FCR which follows in next chapter.382
 And also to members of the company.383
 See comments elsewhere in this chapter on Pre-packing in general.384
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faith and providing value in consideration do not need to enquire whether the 
Administrator is acting within their power. 
The administrator also does not need to convene an initial creditorsÕ meeting if there are 
sufficient funds to pay all creditors in full or, more likely, there are no funds (other than 
the Ôprescribed partÕ ) available at all for a distribution to unsecured creditors. The 385
meeting, however, must be convened in the event of more than 10%  of the creditors 386
so wish. 
In respect of the AdministratorÕs sundry powers, these may usefully be compared here 
with those of a Liquidator. Both may seek court orders for the setting aside of 
transactions at undervalue; for preferences; and for fraudulent activity. Currently,  387
only the Liquidator may seek a court order for a directorial contribution to the 
companyÕs estate if investigation has uncovered acts of unlawful trading. Both have a 
duty to provide a report  to the Insolvency Service on the conduct of current and 388
previous directors. 
After 12 months,  the administration of the distressed company ends. The IP 389
concerned may also demit office earlier if it is felt that the purpose of administration has 
been sufficiently achieved. In the event of sufficient funds having been raised to pay 
secured creditors in full and there are monies available for a distribution to unsecured 
creditors, then the administration may be terminated via a CreditorsÕ Voluntary 
Liquidation.  Other possible exit routes from administration are via a CVA; via a 390
Scheme; or via Compulsory Liquidation ... the merits of each approach will be 
dependent on the prevailing circumstance. In the instance of there being no property or 
funds available for distribution, the Administrator will usually dissolve the company.  
 The proportion of the proceeds of the sale of assets subject to any floating charge, currently up to a 385
maximum of £600,000, which is set aside for their benefit of unsecured creditors).
 By value.386
 About to be changed via the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015  387
 See comments elsewhere in this chapter on Directors on general.388
 Extendable in complex cases by court order or by creditor consent.389
 See comments elsewhere in this chapter on Liquidation processes and procedures.390
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Pre-Packs: 
On entering administration, the Directors of the distressed company lose their executive 
powers and an IP assumes these on behalf of all the companyÕs creditors. Consequently, 
the IP will wish to deal with the assets of the company in as efficient a way as possible 
to achieve the best results possible in line with the EA 2002. One avenue for 
consideration is disposal of the company via a Ôpre-packÕ. A pre-packaged insolvency 
sale (pre-pack) is one which has been set up prior to any insolvency procedure begins 
and an IP is appointed. The sale will then take place on the agreed terms in very quick 
order. The procedure to be followed is, most often, administration. That such an 
arrangement could be concluded absent the prior approval of either court or creditors 
was confirmed in the Transbus International  case. 391
With formal insolvency comes the requirement to give public notice. This may not 
necessarily be kind to the companyÕs reputation and may thus adversely affect the value 
of such a business. The Ôpre-packÕ is a method of dealing with this risk. IPs seek to gain 
an achieved price for the company which is in excess of that obtainable via other means, 
thus obtaining a better result for all creditors. This may particularly be so if a purchaser 
is around who is prepared for strategic or market-share reasons to pay more than the 
going rate for such a sale IF the reputational damage above has not been severe. 
However, in many instances, it will be difficult for the IP to adequately market-test for 
such a sale. Egregious failure in this respect may later render the IP open to challenge 
and the possibility does exist that the sale may be unravelled. 
The decision to pre-pack is a question to be weighed thoughtfully. On the one hand, the 
benefits of a speedy sale make it difficult for third parties  to disrupt matters; make it 392
much easier to maintain harmonious relations with key stakeholders;  and it obliges 393
directors to desist from trading when insolvent and so reduces risks of personal liability 
of their breaching their duty to creditors. On the other hand, downsides do exist. 
 Transbus International Ltd (in Liquidation), Re [2004] EWHC 932 (Ch) 391
 Such as suppliers and landlords.392
 eg key employees, customers and suppliers.393
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Unsecured creditors may feel left out because the speed of events leaves them 
unconsulted. The commonplace sale to connected parties may also exacerbate fears 
regarding Phoenixism.  Lastly, key contracts held by the insolvent company may be 394
vulnerable to termination by Ôinsolvency eventÔ clauses being precipitated.  
Company Voluntary Arrangements: 
For insolvent companies which have been previously profitable and which consider 
their trading difficulties may be only temporary, there is a ÔsolutionÕ which offers a route 
to a quick and efficient restructuring known as a Company Voluntary Arrangement 
(CVA). This binding agreement addresses unsecured debt only and seeks to replace 
existing contractual terms with new ones which result in the repayment of some portion 
of the current debt over time from profits yet to be earned. The rationale to this is that 
existing creditors may prefer to support the CVA as a better outcome than would be 
achieved from the low dividends paid in liquidation ... and those creditors might also 
retain a valuable trading partner on into the future. CVAs are noted for their flexibility 
in construction and thus are easily adapted to most trading circumstances. However, 
some have noted  that the CA approach has only one class of creditor thereby 395
increasing the chance that the different agendas of different types of creditors are not 
expressed in the ensuing CVA ... a circumstance which pertained in the insolvency of 
Leeds Utd in 2007.  396
The proposed CVA can involve capital restructuring; alteration of the terms of debt; or 
the disposal of unencumbered assets ... in short, anything which can be agreed with 
creditors who, naturally, will follow their own separate agendas. The CVA proposal may 
 The practice of allowing a new company run by the old directors in the same field to arise having 394
acquired cheap assets and hived off old liabilities.
 eg. Goode, R. (2011) Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th Ed. Sweet and Maxwell. 496395
 See ÔLeeds United: the unanswered questionsÕ in The Guardian of Friday 27 July 2007396
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be made by directors;  by Administrators;  or by Liquidators.  In practice, IPs are 397 398 399
usually retained to draft the initial CVA proposal and to satisfy both directors and 
themselves that the proposal is realistic. The IP would then file the CVA with the court, 
communicate with creditors and, as nominee, convene meetings of both creditors and of 
shareholders. These meetings vote on whether to approve the proposal. If approved,  400
any further legal proceedings against the company are stayed ... unless there is default  401
on the terms of that CVA. 
CVAs are attractive to directors of companies not yet in formal insolvency procedures 
as they remain in control  of their company. Significant benefits also accruing to the 402
company include the potential to write off considerable amounts of debt; to quickly 
adjust costs by terminating onerous supply and employment contracts; and, perhaps, to 
relieve pressure from the tax authorities. DirectorsÕ conduct is also not a subject for 
investigation. The procedure is particularly effective when the company is unable to 
transfer critical contracts or certifications on to another company.  Up until recently, 403
this was the only route to continued existence open to football clubs which had endured 
an insolvency event. Notably, the obligation to use this route came not from statute but 
from the private rules of footballÕs authorities. 
If the distressed company is small,  it may gain protection in the form of a moratorium 404
of 28 days during which the CVA can be developed and implemented without the threat 
of proceedings from creditors. Thus, there is no enforcement of security nor 
appointment of office-holders during this moratorium period. 
 Where the company is not in administration or liquidation.397
 IPs may seek the protection of the administration moratorium for a Ônon-small companyÕ while 398
simultaneously proceeding with the CVA.
 Where the company is in winding-up and where the liquidator thinks that this would be more 399
beneficial to creditors than liquidation of assets.
 The key requirement is to gain approval of 75% of the holders of the existing debt. Failure to achieve 400
this will usually result in voluntary liquidation.
 In which case, any creditor may apply for a winding-up order.401
 Note that the IP supervises the CVA but the directors still run the company.402
 Thus making the ÒPhoenixÓ a less attractive option.403
 Small companies are those with fewer than 50 employees; less than £6.5M turnover; or less than 404
£3.26M in balance sheet assets.
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The cost of a CVA is mainly in respect of IP fees  which derive from money otherwise 405
payable to creditors ...  and so the creditors need to agree this at the creditorsÕ meeting. 
Under the terms of CVAs in general, the nominee will receive a single regular monthly 
amount which is the consolidated agreed payment by the company to its creditors. After 
deduction of nominee supervision fees, this money is then disbursed under the terms of 
the CVA to all unsecured creditors. 
Perhaps the most significant advantage of this process in many cases is the absence of 
any requirement to publicise in the press; discreet and shadowy as is much action in The 
Casino. 
CreditorsÕ Schemes of Arrangement (Schemes): 
Another tool which may be of use to a distressed company is the CreditorsÕ Scheme of 
Arrangement (a Scheme). This is an agreement  to reschedule debt between the 406
company and any class or classes of creditor and requires to be approved by court. It 
differs from other procedures relating to the alleviation of company distress by not 
being a formal insolvency procedure  and by not offering a moratorium  when used 407 408
in standalone format. However, the Scheme can also be used in conjunction with formal 
insolvency if the protection of a moratorium is desired. At root, the Scheme is an 
arbitrary method for changing the financial structure (including debts) of a company, 
quite possibly against the wishes of some creditors and is normally used when a much 
needed reorganization cannot be achieved by other means. Court acceptance of such 
schemes can not be taken for granted as the Prudential v PRG Powerhouse case 409
 Real Business Rescue estimate (Aug 2015) that nominee (IP) fees will be in the region of £10k for 405
formulating / presenting the CVA with a further agreed amount for supervision to be agreed with 
creditors.
 As provided for by the Companies Act 2006, Part 26 (ss.895-901)406
 Such as administration or liquidation.407
 As in administration or in Small-company CVAs.408
 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v PRG Powerhouse Ltd [2007] EWHC 1002409
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indicates. Here Etherton J. rejected a proposed scheme on the grounds of unfairness and 
illogicality. 
Perhaps the main benefits of Schemes are twofold. The first lies in the ability of 
Schemes to provide an English law form of Ôcram downÕ  whereby the rights of 410
minority but dissentient creditors can be dis-applied if the prescribed class/classes 
majorities in favour of the proposed Scheme are achieved.  This is potentially very 
useful for distressed borrowing companies who face large and diverse lending 
syndicates. The Barclays v HHY Luxembourg  case is helpful in dealing with such 411
complexities. The second advantage results from the use of the Scheme to reorganise 
foreign debt in circumstances where local law is not able to deliver compromises of the 
required type. All that is required in this event is Ôa sufficient connectionÕ with UK 
jurisdiction ...  no COMI  nor establishment in the UK is needed. 412
A Scheme may be initiated at the behest of the company  or any creditor by court 413
application for permission for convening a meeting of creditors. This when the class or 
classes to whom the scheme proposal is to be put is/are identified. Any creditors not 
affected  by the proposed scheme are left out of these deliberations. If the requisite 414
voting levels are met,  the court will then make the appropriate order establishing the 415
Scheme. After receipt by the Companies Registrar, the Scheme becomes binding on all 
creditors in the classes involved in the proposals. The procedure is held to be expensive 
and, although versatile inasmuch as there are few limits to what may be included, 
awkward to set up and is likely only to be used when either of the main benefits 
mentioned above are significant and crucial. As we will see in the discussion to come,  416
Schemes are not without their uses in some high profile cases.  
 Well, closer to Ôcram-down liteÕ in comparison with the US Chapter 11 device.410
 Barclays Bank Plc v HHY Luxembourg Sarl [2010] EWCA Civ 1248411
 COMI = centre of main interest; see later discussion.412
 Or the administrator / liquidator of the company if it is formally insolvent .413
 Because, say, their debts are not affected by the proposals.414
 A simple majority in number of those voting in person or by proxy and a three!quarters majority in 415
value needs to be obtained.
 Regarding Cross-Border Insolvency.416
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5.5 Awkward Cases.  
Cross-Border Insolvency: 
As international trade for UK companies continues to grow both in absolute and in 
percentage terms and a corresponding growth is also noted in foreign companies doing 
business in the UK, it becomes vital to consider how to efficiently and effectively deal 
with corporate insolvency in a cross-border context. International insolvency, therefore, 
considers the treatment of corporate debtors who have assets and/or creditors in 
multiple countries. The field is concerned with the three areas of choice of law; of 
jurisdiction; and of enforcement of judgement. 
There are several bodies of theory  which are relevant here. Firstly, there is the 417
territorial approach which does not accept external interference in domestic law; both 
debtorÕs assets and creditors within such a country are dealt with domestically. 
Secondly, the universalist approach purports to adopt a single regime whereby all debtor 
assets would be administered by a single office-holder regardless of the country in 
which these assets or the debtorÕs creditors were situated. Lastly, we note the possibility 
of some hybrid approach in which countries co-operate and facilitate proceedings in 
whichever is agreed to be the most relevant of the possible jurisdictions involved. 
There are currently two sets of rules relating to international insolvency which are of 
interest to this study. These are the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency and the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 2000 (hereafter ... the 
Regulation). The starting point for both sets of rules is the finding of the Centre of Main 
Interest (COMI) of the debtor company. 
The COMI is not defined by the Regulation itself but its preamble indicates Ò'The 
"centre of main interests" should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the 
administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third 
partiesÓ. Those companies whose COMIs are extra-EU are not covered by the 
 See for example, Wessels 2008 (Wessels, B. ÒCross-Border Insolvency Law in Europe; Present Status 417
and Future Prospects Ò PER 2008 Vol 11 no1 pp 68-102 )
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Regulation. The determination of COMI has proven to a point fraught with contention 
as exemplified by the more than 20 different factors from decided cases which have 418
helped determine the location of a companyÕs COMI! The controversial 2004 case of 
Eurofood (a Parmalat subsidiary) which caused such a furore in both Ireland and in 419
Italy is indicative of the problems which can arise in this area   ..  and for fear Eurofood 
might be dismissed as a sample of one, other celebrated cases suchas Daisytek and 420
Collins and Aikman  might also be cited as exemplars here. 421
Neither is the term ÔinsolvencyÕ defined in the Regulation (cf the two UK tests 
discussed earlier.  However, Ôinsolvency proceedingsÕ are stated to be Ò'collective 422
insolvency proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of a debtor and the 
appointment of a liquidatorÓ. These proceedings can either be main proceedings or 
territorial proceedings. A potential cause of friction between jurisdictions is the 
omission of any mechanism for dealing with rival jurisdictional claims that their 
proceedings constitute main proceedings.  
The Regulation is, at root, a conflict of laws measure which allows the EU member 
states to develop their particular approaches to corporate insolvency. Notwithstanding 
this freedom, it does clearly establish that one jurisdiction will be deemed to be primary 
and that any others will be secondary. 
One would guess that EU interest in harmonizing laws exhibited in other areas falters in 
the domain of cross-border insolvency given the great difficulties in gaining agreement 
from individual states with widely divergent approaches to such matters as É 
➢ the purpose of an insolvency regime; where this might be seen as a choice 
between rehabilitation/rescue vs liquidation/distribution 
 See Wessels op cit pp75/76418
 Re Eurofood IFSC Limited (Irish company, part of the Parmalat group).  419
 Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd [2004] BPIR 30.  420
 Re Collins & Aikman Europe SA [2005] EWCH 1754 (Ch).421
 eg As in Fn 57422
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➢  the operation of set-off; where on the one hand, there are jurisdictions where 
creditors and debtors have mutual debts, the creditor may set-off the claim in 
its entirety ...  whilst on the other hand, some states oblige creditors to pay 
the debtor in full before then going to make their claim in proceedings  
➢ the question of whether the commencement of insolvency proceedings 
automatically stay secured creditors from the exercise of their rights. 
A revision of the Regulation was in place by 2017. This will address issues arising thus 
far and, as Marshall (2015)  states, Òhelp to promote an EU rescue culture Ò. 423
An important change of emphasis will be the expansion of the existing automatic EU-
wide recognition of insolvency proceedings whereby a main insolvency proceeding 
progressed in one member state gains automatic recognition throughout the EU. 
Currently, this catches only those proceedings in which an office holder has replaced 
management and thus liquidation is expected. The revisions open up the possibilities 
that pre-packs and / or other rescue mechanisms may be fall within the regulation ...  
and also that existing management may, in some instances, become debtors-in-
possession. 
The new Regulation carries an appendix to clarify the type of proceedings within its 
scope: evidently the UK does not list Ôschemes of arrangementÕ in this appendix. 
Schemes are held to be a useful tool in restructuring distressed companies whether they 
be of UK or non-UK origin. In the latter instance, UK courts will be satisfied by finding 
a Ôsufficient connectionÕ in order to approve such a scheme. Key here is the absence of a 
requirement that the debtor company has a UK COMI, as would have been necessary if 
schemes were entered in the appendix. 
The Regulation only applies to companies having their COMI in an EU state; and main 
insolvency proceedings must be opened in the state in which the COMI is located. 
There exists a rebuttable presumption that the COMI is situated where the Registered 
Office is to be found. This has enabled companies to move their COMI to a different 
 Marshall, J. ÒPlus ca Change Ò Recovery  Spring 2015 p8423
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country where different insolvency arrangements apply; sometimes known as Ôforum 
shopping Ô. The UK has perhaps a more developed and flexible insolvency regime than 
some other EU member states and shifting COMIs to the UK has resulted in several 
successful restructurings according to R3.  This has saved companies from going 424
under, preserved jobs and delivered added values for creditors  ... but has still attracted 
adverse comment from elsewhere in Europe as the lurid, yet memorable tag of the UK 
being the ÔInsolvency Brothel of EuropeÕ suggests. Amendments to the Regulation will 
not affect the better outcomes generated by COMI shifts but instead aim to offer more 
transparency in order to combat Ôabusive forum shoppingÕ. 
Dealing with group insolvencies in Europe has not always been easy under the 
Regulation (see Parmalat above). Accordingly, attention has been given to this area in 
the RegulationÕs revisions; the Commission at first suggesting a flexible, light touch 
approach to enable better co-ordination of such insolvencies but the European 
Parliament was more interested in a mandatory framework for co-ordination. Almost 
inevitably, the solution was a compromise arrangement which will establish a voluntary 
set-up for co-ordination. This considers appointing a group co-ordinator who may 
propose a restructuring plan for the distressed group. Individual group companies are 
able to opt-out of this plan if deemed not in the interests of their particular creditors. 
Likewise, office holders of participating group companies need only ÔconsiderÕ 
recommendations from the group co-ordinator as these recommendations do not bind. 
Briefly turning to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency  .. adopted 
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law in 1997. This is an 
attempt to help states develop a modern framework for dealing with cross-border 
insolvency proceedings. It makes no attempt to harmonize or unify; instead, it attempts 
to help build co-operation and co-ordination in the dealings which states have between 
themselves in relation to corporate insolvency. The Model Law has been a basis for 
legislation in more than twenty countries such as the UK, the US and Japan. Neither the 
main EU countries nor the BRICs have, as yet, made moves in this direction. Two 
aspects of the Model Law are worth highlighting here. Firstly, there is a procedure for a 
 See R3 website ...  https://www.r3.org.uk  ... accessed 24 June 2018.424
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Ôforeign representativeÕ (the representative of a debtor in a foreign proceeding) to have 
that proceeding recognized and for relief from the domestic court in respect of that 
proceeding. This can lead to the representative gaining the power to control the 
disposition of assets located in the domestic location, provided that sufficient safeguards 
are in place for local creditor protection. This can be also be used co-ordinate sales of 
debtorÕs assets in more than one foreign country. The second aspect of note is the 
requirement that courts within enacting countries should Ôco-operate to the maximum 
extent possibleÕ with foreign courts and office-holders.  
The increasing practice of English elite football clubs having part or full ownership of 
clubs in other European countries makes the above commentary potentially relevant in 
the future but, as yet, no actions have developed from that source. However, there is 
also the practice, said only to be nascent, of player-registrations being part-owned by 
clubs and part-owned by third parties. These third parties are said to non-UK entities 
and in the West Ham case  were thought to be of South American background. How 425
these interests might dealt with in a football club insolvency is not yet known. 
Employees in Insolvent Companies: 
The rights of employees of a company which is financially distressed emanate from two 
sources ... employment law and corporate insolvency law. These sources sometimes do 
not engage too efficiently and the position for individual employees is often complex 
and thus an additional source of stress for an already vulnerable stakeholder. What 
follows is the broadest of overviews only. 
One way to clarify matters is to start by considering the type of insolvency procedure 
which pertains to the employeeÕs company. If the company is in Liquidation, the 
company closes and the job ends. This, at least, has the virtue of clarity. However, if the 
company is in administration, then things become less clear-cut. 
 Sheffield United Football Club Limited v West Ham United Football Club Plc [2008] EWHC 2855 425
(Comm) aka The Carlos Tevez case
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EmployeesÕ rights appear under a variety of headings, many of which are hedged 
around with service period and earnings cap restrictions,  some of which are reviewed 426
annually. Those rights generally accruing from Corporate Insolvency legislation bestow 
preferential creditor status whereas those coming from Employment legislation 
generally only offer ordinary unsecured status. Dividends payable in the latter case are 
unlikely to be high. The bundle of rights due to include that they should be paid for 
work they have done (outstanding wages), receive any accrued Holiday Pay owing; and 
have their outstanding pension contributions paid. In addition, the usual Employment 
Protection rights in respect of Statutory Notice; Unfair Dismissal; and Protective 
Awards may well be place for qualifying employees. 
Thus, at first sight, the employee who loses a position due to his company going into 
Liquidation seems to be somewhat well placed, especially by comparison with other 
involuntary creditors. However, as indicated above, in Liquidations there is often little 
left for ordinary creditors and not necessarily too much, either, for preferential creditors. 
The nature of the cap results in those who have high skill or a managerial position 
finding only limited protection. The ability of employees to directly apply to the 
Redundancy Payments Office  (RPO) for relatively quick payment of certain monies 427
due albeit on a capped basis is useful. The excess over the cap may be claimed from the 
company as part of the Liquidation and the NIF then subrogates against the insolvent 
company for these payments. Employees will be expected to attempt to mitigate their 
loss in these circumstances by, for instance, claiming such state benefits as they are 
entitled; additionally, there may well be income tax implications with regard to certain 
payments. 
In the instance of a sale of the distressed company as part of an administration, 
employees may be transferred to a new business. Here there are protections for such 
employees under the TUPE regulations.  428
 eg Unfair Dismissal provisions under the Employment Rights Act 1996 ( s184 and elsewhere )426
 Which deals with claims on behalf of the National Insurance Fund (NIF)427
 Transfer of Undertaking (Protection from Employment).428
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We now look briefly at the impact of the Acquired Rights Directive on employees of 
troubled firms. Specifically, the focus is on situations where all or part of the company 
is being sold by the office-holder. In such circumstances an employee will either be 
transferred ... or not. If not, the provisions of employment protection in respect of 
wrongful dismissal are relevant.  It is the position of the transferred employee that we 429
will discuss here. 
There is an enduring tension between the purpose of the Acquired Rights Directive  430
which attempts to provide protection for a transferred employee from loss of service and 
other rights built up over time and the understandable enthusiasm of the purchaser 
(transferee) of the whole or part of the company to acquire the services of such services 
at least cost. It should be noted that the cost here is rather more than the existing terms 
and condition of service of the employee concerned; it also includes transferred 
liabilities which may be considerable.   431
Attempts have been made to lessen the burden of transferred cost to the transferee with 
the aim of improving rescue prospects.  Normally, a transferee will normally assume 
responsibility for all matters under or connected with the employeesÕ contracts but a 
limited exception is made in relevant insolvency proceedings (see below) so that certain 
sums outstanding at the date of a relevant transfer  will be met from the National 432
Insurance Fund (NIF), rather than by the purchaser. Timing is key here; the NIF will 
only pay out if proceedings have been ÔopenedÕ, if not then the purchaser will be held 
liable for all debts to employees. 
Regrettably, the law is less than lucid in this area and decisions taken by IPs and other 
parties cannot always be precisely calculated. For instance, a distinction has to be made 
as to which one of two insolvency routes is being followed. If the process is part of a 
liquidation then employees may be dismissed without liability for Unfair Dismissal 
 These claims are unsecured debt (not preferential) and stand little chance of being paid.429
 Enabled in the UK via TUPE (1981) and then amended by TUPE (2006)430
 Such as Protective Awards (see below). Transferors/IPs must now give accurate information on these 431
matters prior to transfer (no easy matter!)
 DBERR does not deem compulsory liquidation, or creditorsÕ voluntary liquidation as relevant.432
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accruing.  Alternatively, if the process is part of a rescue-oriented sale, then 433
employees gain protection. In the latter instance, dismissal may not necessarily be 
unfair if for an ETO  reason.  434
IPs are allowed to consider varying employeesÕ contract in an effort make a purchase 
more attractive; however, any such variations do need to be agreed with all parties 
including employee representatives.  If employeesÕ claims are taken to an employment 435
tribunal, an IP will endure careful scrutiny of their actions in order to establish the ÒReal 
ReasonÓ for employee dismissal with the fair/unfair argument being in focus. There are 
also requirements for the office-holder to consult collectively;  failure so to do attracts 436
substantial potential liability.  IPs will also find it difficult to plead that insolvency as 437
such is a Òspecial circumstanceÓ making consultation impractical. This is clearly an area 
of concern ...  with the difficulties in interpretation of the law and the calculation of risk 
to IPs, potential purchasers and, above all, to the employees involved. 
One might wonder why the above section is necessary when this thesis is exploring 
insolvency in football É and football creditors have a form of preferential status? 
Beyond the trite observation that there is no future guarantee that football clubs will 
continue to avoid insolvency as they have in the past lies a structural point relating to 
the way companies organise themselves. Many elite clubs structure themselves into 
divisions with the footballing operation being only part, albeit a very significant one, of 
the overall company. These other divisions might exploit merchandising, hospitality and 
other non-football sporting activities. It is submitted that employees in these divisions 
would be unlikely to fall under the heading of Ôfootball creditorsÕ. However, if the 
 Perhaps the key case here is Oakland v Wellswood (a pre-pack case) where the IP concerned admitted 433
that his purpose had not been the rescue of the firm but the maximisation of creditor return
 Economic, Technical or Organizational reason ; this has not always been easy to justify in court .. see 434
Frisby ÓTUPE or not TUPE?Ó (2000) 3 CFILR 259
 These will be trade unions representatives if a union(s) are recognized. Matters will necessarily be 435
more problematic if not. The Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 may 
conceivably be of use in such situations.
 20 or more employees at the one establishment over 90days ; key case here is Woolworths.436
 Can be a Protective Award ... up to 90 days UNCAPPED pay per employee affected.437
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football club failed, these employees might be caught up with events in the way any 
conventional employee would be. 
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Chapter 6 : The Football Creditors Rule 
6.1 Introduction  
The frequent insolvency events  in English football clubs have prompted many to call 438
for changes in insolvency legislation. In particular, what has come to be known as the 
Football Creditors Rule (FCR) has aroused widespread dissatisfaction. This rule has 
been held to be a highly significant factor in the way in which clubs have mismanaged 
their finances and thus resulted in insolvency. A major case in the High Court was 
brought by HMRC  in which a declaration was sought that the FCR contravened key 439
tenets of insolvency law Ð in particular, that FCR offended both the pari passu rule and 
the anti-deprivation principle. 
As an indicator of political concern, a report  in 2013 by a House of Commons Select 440
Committee indicated their disquiet with the failure of the footballing authorities to deal 
with the perceived financial ineptitude of professional football clubs and referred to the 
then recent insolvency case of Glasgow Rangers in 2012 as being Ò a powerful example 
of the excesses of professional clubs competing with one another, and the consequences 
for their community when mismanagement leads to financial collapseÓ. 
This committee saw the FCR as being immoral and as being simultaneously a symptom 
and the cause of financial mismanagement. They called for government action to 
improve governance in football and to overturn the FCR. Indeed, the then Sports 
Minister stated  ÒFootball is the worst governed sport in this country, without a 441
shadow of doubtÓ, 
 Which, of course, need not ultimately lead to the winding up of the club concerned.438
 HMRC v The Football League and FA/Premier League [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch)439
 House of Commons Department of Culture, Media and Sport select committee ÒDCMSSCÓ440
 Hugh Robertson, 10 Jan 2011 HoC441
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In brief, the FCR  states that if a club becomes insolvent, then payment must be made 442
firstly and fully to that clubÕs football creditors else that club will be expelled from the 
Football League (FL). A highly similar provision applies to clubs participating in the 
English Premier League (EPL) and in the four Scottish Football Leagues. The 
consequence of this regulation is that players and other clubs get paid in full qua 
secured creditors ... and other creditors get very little indeed. An oft-quoted example of 
the imbalance in settlements is the administration of Crystal Palace in 2010 in which 
football creditors got paid in full (circa £2m) and other creditors (including HMRC) 
were paid 2p in the £. 
6.2 The Football LeagueÕs Employment of the FCR  
All the clubs within the FL  have one share; often called the Golden Share. On entry 443
to the FL via promotion or exit via demotion, share transfer takes place between the in 
and out clubs. This Golden Share turns out to be hugely significant in what follows. The 
FL is a limited liability entity and the individual clubs are its members; governance is 
via the FLÕs Articles of Association and by its Regulations. The FL has adopted a clear, 
written Insolvency Policy which clarifies its position vis--vis the insolvency of a 
member club. 
One income stream to football clubs derives from contracts from the televising of 
football matches. This can be a considerable fraction of total revenue for many teams. 
The negotiation of television deals and other media rights is done on behalf of clubs by 
the FL  and each club receives itÕs share from the ÒPool AccountÓ. The right of a club 444
to gain access to its monies is dependent on that club following the rules of the FL 
mentioned above. 
The eventual decision in the HMRC Ôs case against the FL paid particular attention to 
five parts of the FLÕs constitution. These are briefly addressed below  .. 
 Technically, the FCR only applies to clubs in the three Football League divisions but the associated 442
arguments are broadly the same both for Premier League and for Scottish clubs.
 At time of writing (July 2018), there were 72 members of the FL443
 Again, the arrangements are similar for other UK football clubs in the PL and in Scotland.444
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1. Art.4.7.4 ... which compels a Òclub subject to an insolvency eventÓ to transfer 445
its Golden Share. 
2. Art. 4.8 ... which permits the FL to waive Art. 4.7.4 in the event of Football 
Creditors  being fully paid. 446
3. Art. 77.3 ... which indicates that the payment of monies from the Pool Account 
is conditional on the club in question fulfilling all its fixtures. Although interim 
payments ARE made these are stipulated to be completely returnable in the 
event of fixture default. 
4. Art 80.2 ... which requires that in the event of a club failing to pay a football 
creditor as per Art.4.7.4 the any residual amounts due to that club from the Pool 
Account will be forfeited to those unsatisfied football creditors. 
5. Reg. 61 ... which states that if a club leaves the FL as a result of a share transfer 
under Art. 4.7.4, then the registrations of footballers contracted to that club will 
be cancelled and then ownership of their contracts will fall to the FL; thus likely 
depriving the distressed club of its most important assets. 
The consequence of the above is a straightforward choice for a financially distressed 
club ...  it either pays up to its footballing creditors or it self-destructs as a commercial 
being. In either instance, non-football creditors lose out ... and in the instance of 
HMRC, that loss can be dramatic. As Serby  puts it ... the impact of the FCR is to 447
create Òa false market within the world of football; a reason for the spiralling wages of 
footballers ... which encourages clubs to overreach themselves and ...  many  become 448
insolventÓ. 
6.3 The HMCRÕs position in respect of the FCR  
That the HMRC should end up as being a substantial non-football creditor follows from 
two different aspects of the professional football system. Firstly, professional footballers 
at the level of FL teams are almost exclusively on fixed term contracts (often of several 
 See later for a list of these insolvency events.445
 Defined as being the FA, employees of that club and other clubs in the English professional football 446
system Interestingly, the position of non-UK football creditors is obscure ... but see later.
 Serby, T. British Football Clubs: ÔRegulatory Reform Inevitable ?Õ Int Sports Law J (2014) 14: 12447
 From 2002 -2012, 36 clubs in the FL became insolvent.448
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years duration). The NIC / PAYE sums due on these contracts are due in arrears ... 
offering an opportunity for a financially distressed club to accrue significant debt. 
Secondly, the amendments to the Insolvency Act 1986 brought in by the Enterprise Act 
of 2003, abolished the HMRCÕs  preferential creditor position; it now has to take its 449
chances with other unsecured creditors in any distribution of an insolventÕs estate. 
Consequently, HMRC was eager to remedy the situation which seemingly resulted in an 
endless loss of funds  to the public purse; hence, its  2012 challenge to the FCR. 450 451
The High Court Hearing: 
The HMRC pleadings labelled the practice by the FL of paying interim monthly 
amounts to clubs with the proviso that such payments did not belong to the recipient 
club till fixture-list completion see Art.77 above) as a sham intended to avoid the basic 
insolvency principle of pari-passu which intends that all creditors receive equal 
treatment. They argued further that Art. 4.7.4 (see above) was effectively a deprivation 
in that the Golden Share was removed from the club at the commencement of 
insolvency. The HMRC thus reasoned that such practices be held to be Òvoid and 
unenforceable as a matter of public policyÓ.   452
Unsurprisingly, the FL offered a detailed response which may be read in five parts ... 
a. Clubs need to be prevented from acquiring advantage unfairly by purchasing 
(new and better ?) players and then not paying the selling club in full. 
b. The whole point of competition in a league structure depends crucially on total 
fixture completion; all clubs NEED to play each other in order to make the 
competition credible. 
c. The risk of domino-defaultation whereby a default in debt by one club leads 
consequentially to a series of defaults in other clubs has to be minimised. 
 Or at least its predecessor bodies.449
  Serby (op cit) suggests that in the period 2000-2008, some £30 million was lost in unpaid tax from 450
professional football clubs !
 The Premier League also became involved in this case.451
 HMRC v The Football League and FA/Premier League [2012] EWHC 1372 (Ch)452
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d. The payment of interim monies from the Pool Account did NOT change the 
position of distressed clubs having no legal right to such monies until complete 
fixture fulfilment (see Art.77) and the payment of football creditors under Art. 
80 was perfectly reasonable as the monies in the Pool Account only become 
property of the club on finishing the fixtures. 
e. Finally, the FL pointed to the unreasonableness of asking other clubs to entertain 
as a fellow member of the League a club still owing funds to one or more of 
their community. The Stock Exchange case involving MMI Stockbrokers  was 453
quoted as precedent for the suggestion that the obligation to transfer the Golden 
Share was NOT a breach of the anti-deprivation principle. 
In the event, the Court judgement did not give HMRC the declaration which it looked 
for the FCR was not unlawful nor did it break the fundamentals of Insolvency Law. 
Having said this, the Court  felt able to deliver judgement in such strong terms as to 454
make one wonder why there has been no action some six years later. Some of the more 
emphatic comments are paraphrased below ... 
➢ The court accepted that a substantial moral case against the FCR had been made 
out 
➢ The court concurred that risky decisions in respect of trading valuable players 
are stimulated by the knowledge that payment will be forthcoming to the 
footballing party despite non-payment to ÔnormalÕ creditors. 
➢ The court conceded that the requirement to complete all fixtures before 
entitlement to money from the Pool Account was a lawful contract term. This 
opens up discussion of ÔThe Sporting Exception Ô which is dealt with in more 
depth later. 
➢ The court commented that the judgement in this occasion had been made on an 
abstract basis (on a Ôparadigm case Ô) rather than on one with a factual basis ... 
 Money Markets International Stockbrokers Ltd v London Stock Exchange Ltd. [2002] 1 WLR 1150453
 In the form of Richards, J. 454
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this was felt by Roberts  to leave the way clear for a further future challenge 455
based on a particular insolvency. It has to be noted that this has not yet happened 
despite a specific industry targeted amendment  to the 1986 Insolvency Act 456
being passed in respect of utility providers having to continue supplies even if 
existing debt has not been satisfied. 
The courtÕs comments merely extend the puzzle that the study of football insolvency has 
become. The question of the FCR being a symptom of prevailing financial recklessness 
or a cause thereof will be further investigated in the next section which looks at 
ÔFinancial Fair PlayÕ in the context of (major) football clubs. 
Subsequent Events  
Accountancy Age reported in 2015  that the Football League  had amended its 457 458
regulations in respect of the Football CreditorsÕ Rule from season 2015-16 onwards. For 
our purposes, the principal change was a new stipulation that in order to exit 
administration and retain membership of the Football League, the new owners of a 
financially distressed club would have to pay its unsecured creditors at least 25p in the 
pound on gaining control.  This, however, stands alongside the existing requirement to 459
pay all football creditors in full. Sanctions for failure to comply with these new rules 
revolve around an increased deduction  of League points which will almost 460
automatically result in relegation for the club concerned. 
Responding to widespread criticism (from R3 and others), the Football League also 
instituted a new requirement in that the ailing club be marketed by the IP/Administrator 
 Roberts D (2012) HMRC and the Football creditors Rule-An own goal? Olswang 455
 Amendment of s233 Insolvency Act 1986 after Wellworth Cash & Carry (North Shields) Ltd. v 456
Northeastern Electricity Board [1986] BCC 99, 265
 Richard Crump in Accountancy Age, 9 June 2015.457
 But not the Premier League.458
 Or 35p in the pound if Ôpaid upÕ over three years.459
 A 12 point deduction in some circumstance and a 15 point deduction in others.460
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for at least three weeks. During this period, any bid from the appropriate SupportersÕ 
Trust should be considered.  An additional and highly significant change was the 461
removal of the obligation for the insolvent club to exit administration via a CVA: the 
League would now be happy to transfer the crucial club share in the League to the 
AdministratorÕs preferred bidder, providing that all the other appropriate League 
regulations were fully complied with. It was hoped that these changes would reduce 
(professional) costs, deliver greater returns to creditors and limit the previous ownersÕ 
ability to control what happened in a CVA. 
The Accountancy Age article also reported, without comment, the somewhat 
triumphalist remarks made by the Football LeagueÕs CEO as É 
ÔThe League has now gone two full seasons without a club suffering an insolvency event 
which is an encouraging sign. The use of Financial Fair Play regulations in all three 
divisions, the requirement for new owners to demonstrate the source and sufficiency of 
their funding and the ongoing monitoring of clubÕs tax affairs have helped us bring 
more stability to club finances.Õ 
The omission of any justification for continuing to treat unsecured creditors who likely 
will get 25% of their debt repaid as third-class citizens as compared with their football 
counterparts who will get 100% of their debt repaid could be seen by some as being 
self-serving (or worse). Others might argue that it a step in the right direction and rather 
better than nothing. 
 Echoing the ÕIn Football we TrustÕ point made at Fn 95 above?461
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Chapter 7: Pan-European Developments in the Football Field. 
7.1 The Financial Fair Play Rules: 
The original UEFA FPP rules are outlined here; they also serve as a model for the 
subsequent English adoption and for ensuing amendments. The key concept is that of 
Ôbreak-evenÕ.  This seen as being relevant   income less relevant expenditure. Here, 462 463
income is the sum of gate money, broadcasting money, advertising and sponsorship, and 
any profit from player sales. Interestingly, there seems no mention of prize-money nor 
of items such as the notion of Ôparachute paymentsÕ for relegated clubs. Conversely, 
expenditure is stated to include the expected Õcost of salesÕ category but also include the 
writing down of transfer fees for incoming players and the wages paid to all footballing-
related staff. Despite being largely discretionary, finance costs and dividends are said to 
be relevant expenditure. Significantly, expenditure on stadia building are not included in 
the break-even calculation; nor, indeed, is expenditure on youth development or on 
womenÕs football. Presumably, these latter elements may serve an apparent Public 
Interest purpose? 
Departures from break-even as losses are permitted only to a stated limit over a stated 
period  but losses to a maximum  are allowable subject to the injection of owner 464 465
funds to cover the loss É clearly, owning elite clubs is for those with deep pockets and 
possessed of stout heart! In an attempt to control upwardly spiralling player/coach wage 
costs, these are restricted unless the club concerned can show commensurate revenue 
increase. This last point conceivably links to the one made earlier about the favourable 
expense treatment of building larger capacity stadia. In addition to the break-even 
stipulation, UEFA also instituted a ÔPayablesÕ rule which stopped clubs having ÕoverdueÕ 
creditors ... which links strongly to the corporate insolvency context in English law as 
discussed in this thesis. 
 Not defined in precise accounting terms as per the International Accounting Standards Board.462
 AuthorÕs emphasis.463
 Currently, a total loss of £15M over three years is permitted in the Premier League (PL) in England.464
 Currently, £105M in the PL.465
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It is quite likely that under-performance on the football pitch results in reduced revenues 
from gate-money and from performance payments. Continuing under-performance may 
well lead to relegation and further lost income. In such conditions, there must be a 
temptation to attempt to Ôbuy successÕ by acquiring better players who, in turn, demand 
higher wages. Thus, the goal of cost reduction may be undermined by the pursuit a 
strategy of short-term survival. 
To deal with this, the FL has, over time, brought in regulations focused on limiting over-
spending. One such rule is the requirement for PAYE reporting called ÔHMRC 
ReportingÕ which places restrictions on player purchase on those clubs who fail to keep 
their PAYE situation up to date. An additional development has been the institution of a 
Ôfit and proper personÕ hurdle to be jumped by anyone seeking to purchase a football 
club ... a development which rarely fails to amuse sporting journalists obliged to 
comment on the football scene who then delightedly point to the insalubrious 
backgrounds of many recent, would-be purchasers. The footnote  below provides a 466
topical and colourful example ! 
But even more activity in this regard has come from outside the UK ... especially from 
Europe. At roughly the same time as HMRC was bring its High Court case against the 
FL, the European football authority, UEFA, brought in clear boundaries as to the 
amount of loss permissible to individual football clubs in any given season.  The FL 467
followed UEFAÕs lead in 2012 and established its clone, also called by a similar name to 
that of UEFA, viz Financial Fair Play Rules (FFP). The required boundary to losses in 
the FL version was a mere £8 million per club per season from 2013-14 onwards. 
 The Guardian of 18 May 2017 ( Ed Aarons ) reported that Mr Evangelos Marinakis, a Greek shipping 466
magnate had purchased 100% of the shares of Nottingham Forest FC for £50M. To do this, Marinakis had 
passed the  Football LeagueÕs ÔOwnersÕ and DirectorsÕ Test ( formerly The Fit and Proper PersonÕs Test ). 
Marinakis also owns AthensÔ premier club, Olympiacos, and lurid photos of him entering the pitch 
packing a hand gun after a disputed match decision in 2016-7 Greek football season circulated widely in 
the media. At the time of this purchase Marinakis was being investigated by UEFA for match-fixing. 
These matters, seemingly, had no bearing on the English Football AuthorityÕs decision. Nottingham 
Forest were reported in The Guardian of 29 August 2018 as having spent more than £30M on transfer fees 
over the summer of 2018. There is no information on the source of Mr MarinakisÕs funding. 
 No more than 45 million Euros per season per club in 2011-12 and 2012-13 seasons !!467
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Failure to adhere to these figures invited punishment via a transfer embargo on player 
sales or a fine if the loss ensued from player purchase which gained promotion to the 
Premier League. Given the financial bonanza consequent on any such promotion, such 
threats might appear inconsequential in the circumstances. Some commentators  468
opined that the FL should get ready to justify these rules as a result of player 
contestation of the effects of the rule on their earnings. However, the UK Minister for 
Sport  seemed pleased ... 469
ÒThe implementation of FFP should gradually lead to clubs reducing their spending, 
and as a result, see fewer incidents of club insolvencies. I hope that the FFP, should, in 
turn, negate the need for football to rely on the Football Creditors Rule in cases of club 
insolvencies.Ó 
Sanctions levied on clubs vary from competition to competition and sporting regulator 
to sporting regulator but all include financial penalties, mainly substantial fines, and 
sporting penalties such as exclusion from the tournament, loss of points or demotion. 
Thus the sanctions seem severe ... but, in reality, evidence of preparedness to use these 
sanctions, this far, seems slender. 
Gallagher and Quinn (2017)  submit that although the FFP regulations have an 470
ultimate and intended goal of nudging clubs to avoid financial distress, this economic 
aim with an emphasis on finance has an unintended consequence of diminishing 
sporting achievement. This inevitably will downgrade overall quality within the 
competitions to which FPP applies and raises the spectre of a further unintended 
consequence in that the on-going viability of professional soccer competition may not 
be taken for granted. Arguably the results in this instance may be likely to make the 
original situation worse rather than to improve it; a perverse outcome. Whether the 
cause of these unintended consequences can be attributed to difficulties in modelling the 
interactions between system actors or merely the not-unusual tendency of regulators to 
attend more to immediate rather than to longer term interests is not entirely clear É 
quite possibly, both play some part here.  
 eg David Conn in The Guardian of 26/02/14468
 Hugh Robertson, 2013 30/04/2013 cited in Serby op.cit.469
 Gallagher. R, and Quinn, B. (2017)ÔRegulatory Own GoalsÕ ,unpublished.470
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The same authors also have concerns that the implementation of FPP rules merely serve 
to perpetuate the dominance of pre-existing soccer elite clubs.  Thus, the perspective 471
of regulation from a Private Interest standpoint seems perfectly well justified here. This 
mechanism gives this elite group of clubs the ability to extract more than their fair share 
of monies available to teams engaged in competitions to which FPP meaningfully 
applies.  
7.2 The Sporting Interest in Law 
The European Dimension: 
The theme of paradox explored elsewhere in this thesis becomes apparent again when 
consideration is given to an increasingly unusual acceptance of law-breaking in the 
context of sport in general and English professional football in particular. 
It might be asserted that Football breaks the both English and European law without 
compunction and does so continuingly. For instance ... although domiciled in England 
for most of my adult life, I cannot represent England as I am Scottish . If I did pay 472
football at the level discussed in this thesis, I would be unable to move to another 
employer when I so chose ... and quite probably I would have to reveal my 473
whereabouts to the authorities at all times should they institute a random drug-testing 
regime.  Thus, my protection against discrimination on the basis of nationality would 474
be flouted; my rights as to freedom of employment would be ignored; and my 
entitlement to privacy would be disregarded. Add to these ÔaberrationsÕ, the practice of 
football authorities selling media rights on a collective basis, ostensibly so that all 
participating clubs will share the commercial benefits; many would see this as a cartel ... 
banned under both English and European anti-trust/fair competition legislation. 
The reasons for the evident litany of law-breaking lie with the suggestion that because 
sport is not a ÔnormalÕ area of business, it is not just acceptable but prudent for such 
 One can easily reel off the names here ... Real Madrid, Barcelona. PSG, Bayern, Milan, Juventus, 471
Manchester City, Manchester United, Chelsea ... and so on. That the average ten-year old would have 
little difficulty with this list merely underlines the point being made.
 See the Deliege case : Case C-51/96 and C-191/97, Delige [2000] ECR I Ð 2549472
 See the Wouters case : Case C-309/99, Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577 473
 See the Meca-Medina case in what follows.474
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apparently illegal practices to be permitted. Thus, the notion of Ôsporting specificityÕ  475
has entered the legal lexicon from EU law sources as an indicator of the special and 
specific nature of sporting activity. In short, Football (and other sport) is to be treated, at 
times, in ways quite different to usual business practice. Sadly, the term Õspecificity of 
sportÕ enjoys a life of ambiguity which the evolution of the law over the last sixty years 
or so has merely made worse. As an aid to understanding, this phrase may have little 
more than Ôlabel valueÕ to commend it ... as will be shown below. 
The Evolution of ÔThe Specificity of SportÕ in Europe: 
The position of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for many years after the Treaty of 
Rome  of 1957 was reasonably clear; its rules were of no standing in relation to bodies 476
which regulated sport on the grounds that EU laws were designed for economic life and 
thus did not apply in sporting contexts. 
Perhaps the genesis of the sporting interest is to be found in the Walrave case of 1974  477
in which the ECJ stated that Ôthe practice of sport is subject to Community law only 
insofar as it constitutes an economic activity within Art 2 of the Treaty.Õ  Hence the 478
Court seemed to be signalling that sport may have different characteristics which set it 
apart from the norm and which merited different treatment from that norm ... a special 
case, so to speak. Such an idea, of course, was always likely to be positively received in 
sporting governance circles such as the football authorities as it seemed to offer the 
prospect of increased self-regulation and freedom to establish their own rules and to 
follow their own traditions. Whilst the Court placed heavy emphasis on the detailed 
knowledge and experience possessed by sporting authorities, it was not clear as to why 
Sport was singled out as requiring this extraordinary degree of autonomy. 
 Often referred to as Ôthe sporting interestÕ475
 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 1957 and subsequent consolidations  ..  476
aka The Treaty of Rome.
 Walrave and Koch Case 36/74) [1974] ECR 1405 477
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (1957) 478
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Other commentators  have suggested that the ECJÕs judgement took into account 479
matters such as ... 
➢ The development of young and emerging talent in terms of recruitment and 
training. 
➢ The requirement for league competitions to be credibly balanced and 
unpredictable. 
➢ The mutual dependence of competitors in ensuring that league programmes get 
completed. 
All of the above connect back to the central exploration of this thesis. The first 
nudges  rich clubs away from constantly buying high-priced experienced talented 480
players whose wages might ultimately contribute to financial distress. The second 
echoes the first and answers a need to maintain audience /crowd interest in the various 
competitions, without which the vital media funding would be lost ... again jeopardising 
the financial stability of the participant teams. The final point is arguably even more 
significant in the context of the Football Creditors Rule alluded to above  in that it 481
emphasises the crucial requirement for seasonal fixture lists to be completed in their 
entirety. This point was made much of in the Football AuthoritiesÕ arguments, albeit 
without direct reference to European jurisprudence in relation to the Sporting 
Specificity. 
Legislative evolution 
Following the Bosman case  in 1995, there followed a period of development both of 482
legislative interest in the field of sport and of judicial action in attempting to clarify an 
increasingly complex field. It was felt by some that the absence of any mention of sport 
in the founding treaty made matters difficult to deal with in a predictable way. Thus, 
 Infantino, G. (2006). ÔMeca-Medina: a step backwards for the European Sports Model and the 479
Specificity of Sport?Õ UEFA Report.
 In a way reminiscent of Sunstein and Thaler (see Fn 174).480
 See discussion re FCR in Chapter 6.481
 Union Royale Belge des Socits de Football Association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman (1995) 482
C-415/93.
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over time, action was taken in the form of a non-binding annexe  to the Amsterdam 483
Treaty in 1997 and the Helsinki Report on Sport of 1999 recommended a Ônew approach 
frameworkÕ  for the application of EU rules to sport. The Nice Declaration of 2000 484
saw the first official usage of the Ôspecificity of sportÕ phrase. This seemed to 
acknowledge the claims of sporting bodies to operate autonomously  and was 485
followed by the EUÕs 2007 White Paper on Sport.  This latter document distinguished 486
the Õspecificity of sporting activities and rulesÕ from Ôthe specificity of sport structureÕ ... 
both ideas relevant to the discussion here. The list of suggested and actual amendments 
to EU law in this context culminates with the Lisbon Treaty of late 2007  which made 487
a substantial attempt to remove the confusions built up over the prior years. This 
appears endorse the specific nature of sport ... and hence, admittedly at long distance, 
lend some support for the stance of English footballing authorities in respect of their 
insolvency policy. 
Judicial evolution 
The efforts of judicial action during this period as applied to issues relating to football 
in particular and sport in general also merit some mention here. The case of Bosman  488
is often perceived to be the catalyst for subsequent cases. Bosman argued that the then 
prevailing transfer system placed unreasonable restrictions on a football playerÕs ability 
to change employers.  Whilst the verdict went for Bosman, the court indicated that it 489
was prepared to accept that sporting bodies did have a legitimate right to have rules on 
 Which called on the various EU entities to heed the representations of sporting authorities in the 483
context of sporting issues.
 Which aimed to maintain sportÕs traditional values and customs in the face of legal and economic 484
change.
 Albeit with provisions as transparency and democracy.485
 Which examined the themes of the White Paper on the societal role of sport, the economic dimension 486
of sport, and the organisation of sport, and provided an overview of the follow-up actions planned by the 
Commission. 
 Which, inter alia, recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental 487
Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000
 Union Royale Belge des Socits de Football Association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman (1995) 488
EU:C-415/93
 And in direct conflict with Article 45 TFEU489
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restriction of movement as long as these were Ôproportionate,Õ  regrettably the court 490
felt no need to clarify the term! A further significant case was that of Lehtonen  in 491
2001which also looked at issues of transfer periods as well as restrictions on alternative 
employment. Here the court stated that É 
"a transfer period is characteristic of organized competitive sports and is 'inherent' to 
the sports organization and thereby, in principle, immune from competition law"   
and that transfer deadlines were acceptable as they É 
"ensured the regularity of sporting competitions"  
and so they can be justified on É 
"non-economic grounds concerning only sport as such".  
Thus, it emerged that the ECJ was comfortable with the notion of the sporting exception 
if the sports authorities in question developed regulations which were Ôjustifiable, 
functional, necessary and proportional Ô. Perhaps the final landmark case to be 
mentioned here is that of Meca-Medina,  which involved a doping issue. The detail is 492
not in focus here but the judgement is: viz É 
Òthe mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of 
removing from the scope of the Treaty". 
Prior to this case, any sporting specific regulation carrying an economic connection was 
deemed to be outwith the scope of EU law in the economic and competition areas solely 
because it was related to sport. The judgement appears to call this into question and, 
since issues in this area are decided on a case by case basis, this ruling seems to add to 
 Although it was conceded that, in the case of Bosman, they were NOT proportionate.490
 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine ASBL v Fdration royale belge des socits de 491
basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB) EU:C:2000:201
 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities 492
 EU:C:2006:492
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complexity rather than reduce it. It should be noted, however, that if the sporting 
authorities were able to show that their regulations met the legitimacy and 
proportionacy requirements referred to above then the Meca-Medina ruling might have 
little effect. Nevertheless, the current situation remains opaque. 
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Chapter 8 : Concluding Discussion  
A Summary, Analysis and Some Conclusions. 
One of the key features of modern law is the furnishing of an architecture within which 
acceptable behaviour is displayed; running a professional football club should be no 
more exempt from that feature than other businesses. Yet it has been demonstrated in 
this dissertation that this is not the case. The thought thus occurs that unenforced or 
unenforceable law may not be worth having.  
The issue then turns to questions as to what might be done to enforce that law or to 
make it more enforceable ... which significant parts of this thesis have addressed. That 
is why we have examined the balance of power and control between the key actors in 
the system pertaining to dealing with insolvency in English professional football. We 
have noted the ways in which the actor relationships in relation to power and control are 
affected by the ebb and flow of professional knowledge, of moral authority and of 
managerial expertise. 
Chapter 2 concluded with the provocative and somewhat simplistic suggestion that rule-
following is likely to be a question of self-interest, with obedience being more probable 
if it brings advantages which outweigh any disadvantages. However, matters rarely stay 
still for long and that chapter also drew attention to the flux of the environment which 
may alter the balance of what is seen to be advantageous and what is not. Exploration of 
the values and beliefs held by actors permitted an enlargement of the analysis in terms 
of what might be seen to be an advantage (not to mention consideration of the moral 
and ethical issues related to using that advantage). Acceptance of the fact that actors 
within the systems studied differed both within subsystems and across subsystems 
sensitised readers to avoid over-simple suggestions such as the one mentioned. The 
chapter closed by indicating the prevalence of contestation and conflict between those 
different actors. 
Thus, applying the Law of Unintended Consequences in the context of the discussion, 
there might certainly have delivered a series of unexpected drawbacks and which just 
!  137
possibly may lead to perverse results. Amongst the drawbacks may lie the lawÕs 
difficulty in keeping its regulations consistent with changing economic and social 
environments; its awkwardness with dealing with subsystems with wholly different 
backgrounds in knowledge and expertise; and its struggle when dealing with conflict-
inducing topics. The perverse results hinted at above might include having regulations 
which are out of date; are irrelevant to achieving their original purpose; and which are 
openly flouted. Whether the causes of these are due to poor or incomplete analysis or to 
the laziness of following old habits which seem to deliver successful regulation in the 
past is not easy to say. 
When reviewing the relevant literature here, one is struck by the continuing emphasis 
on resource presence or absence yet there is virtually nothing which examines the 
presence or absence of a capability to utilise this resource. In the context of professional 
football this might refer to the presence of sufficient financial resource to purchase (and 
to pay) expensive footballing talent yet fail to perform successfully on the pitch due to 
an absence of ability to integrate this expensive resource into the playing style of the 
team. Or, in a different part of the system, the presence of sufficient resource to advise 
on insolvency manoeuvres does not guarantee that the advice will be accomplished. 
In the third chapter, concerns regarding the translation of theory into real world practice 
were pointed out. Notable among these disquiets were the assumptions that sufficient 
resource of the appropriate type would be available; that the exercise of regulatory 
discretion would not give rise to sundry problems, particularly with respect to 
accountability; and that the environmental context would present few issues for the 
regulator. Above all, perhaps, was the realisation that decentred systems of the type we 
study in this thesis result in fragmentation of the regulatorÕs power to ensure that 
regulation occurs in the anticipated manner. 
This chapter examined some causes of regulatory failure with detection (of 
inappropriate behaviour) difficulties; with enforcement problems; and with operational 
assessment issues being prominent. Commentary was also offered on the possibility that 
the regulatee response to activity by regulators might well be conditioned by their 
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adoption of one or more of the futility, jeopardy or perversity positions in respect of any 
particular regulation. 
The discussion of regulatory failure then progressed away from a focus on individual 
actors towards a more pronounced focus on systemic aspects contributing to lack of 
regulatory success. The notions of ineffective co-ordination between system elements; 
of inadequate systemic learning; and of a fondness for simplistic thinking (not only by 
regulators) were put forward as possible cause of regulatory failure, particularly if these 
mechanisms interacted one with another. The prospect of our complete system 
becoming progressively closed to external influence could not be entirely discounted; 
nor could the likelihood of system drift as a consequence of information asymmetry. 
This examination of informational inadequacy was associated with the very human 
propensity to filter out unwelcome communication, even to the extent of setting up 
unconscious but significant group paradigms which ultimately lead to regulatory failure. 
Analysing the synthesis of chapter 3 so far in terms of MertonÕs ideas again is wholly 
suggestive of regulatory activities in respect of our Central Puzzle which certainly yield 
unexpected drawbacks aplenty; which quite possibly deliver some perverse results É 
and, which, in terms of that chapterÕs discussion, do not seem to result in any 
unexpected benefits. Perhaps any of the Merton list of causes other than that of self-
defeating prophecy might be said to be in play here? 
Notwithstanding the above, the chapter also engages with the concept of regulatory 
deficit as a means of investigating regulatory shortfalls. Such deficits allegedly may 
derive from questionable oversight by regulators ( which may well be a factor in 
relation to the Ôrevolving doorsÕ between The Insolvency Service and the body of 
experienced IPs); or from an over-direct participative relationship between regulator 
and regulatee potentially excluding third party interaction (which almost certainly 
pertains with that obtaining between RPB and IP in respect of complaints against IPs); 
or from the intriguingly termed adaptability deficit in which regulators are slow to 
accommodate to environmental change both within and without the system here being 
explored. In defence of the regulators here, it might be observed that the terms fast and 
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slow are relative ones: the key point is surely not so much the speed of the change but 
awareness of the extent and consequences of systemic drift away from the original 
regulatory purpose. The final deficit, that of a shortfall in incentives for regulatees to 
conform to regulatory pressure is clearly relevant in our context and will be returned to 
towards the end of this chapter. Again, all of the above can be considered to a greater or 
lesser degree to be both unexpected and perverse results. 
Finally, Chapter 3 pays attention to aspects of communication. Here, in turn 
circumstances which result in misunderstanding; which highlight inadequate attempts to 
achieve understanding; and which survey hidden and indirect communication are each 
considered. As discussed above in relation to other Chapter 3 ideas, such aspects may be 
deployed on their own or in conjunction with one another. Examples of these 
communication issues, in turn, might be the direct conflict between English insolvency 
law and the rules of the football authorities; the evident disquiet felt by the Hansard 
Society about how legislation is communicated; and the hidden (and differing) moral 
stances adopted by the variety of regulators in our observed system, all of whom profess 
to working in Ôthe public interestÕ. Communication activity is of manifest significance 
when questions of obedience to a rule is expected and thus regulators might be expected 
to publicise to regulatees one or more of their claims for obedient behaviour and support 
these with some sensible support for such claims. The Mertonian analysis offered in 
previous paragraphs is also similarly relevant on these features. 
Chapter 3 concludes with this authorÕs MURDER acronym which, in part, points to 
areas in which Regulation in Practice could profitably improve upon. 
Chapter 4 looks at Accountability: who might be held responsible for what É and who 
should initiate and control motions of account. The discussion accepts that 
accountability can both be internal and external in character, thus raising questions 
about norms held by individuals and groups and also about the legitimacy of the 
regulator, the regulation itself and the mode of regulation. There are many connections 
to the discussions in previous chapters with the concepts of legitimacy, of inadequate 
decision-making and of compliance being prominent. The linkage to ideas of corrective 
or of retributive justice is a fairly easy one to make and can also be related to 
!  140
appropriate independent codes outlining desired behaviour by key system actors in a 
variety of circumstances. Such codes may not just suggest the detail of the prescribed 
action but may also help underline the duty to act in a responsible manner. 
The areas in which actors in general and IPs in particular may be held accountable can 
be usefully distinguished into five areas  É those relating to providing advice; to 493
gaining credible data; to managing the insolvent business; to acting in an intermediary 
role; and to supporting the rights of all parties concerned. In order for any 
accountabilities to succeed, the need for one or more accountability supports (reports, 
dialogue and sanctions) was acknowledged. A somewhat different direction was 
followed later in the chapter when the specific notion of accountability to ÔclientsÕ was 
explored; the difficulty here in establishing which actor constituted the client was noted 
as was the unusual position of the IP as being a gatekeeper É as well as being a 
(within-profession) competitor. 
The chapter finishes by asking whether regulation might accomplish more by shifting 
away (at least in part) from a position of social control to one of social protection. 
Chapter 5 notes, early on, that IPs may not have too strong a claim to be always acting 
in the public interest and there exist concerns that their monopoly of insolvency 
ÕappointmentsÕ offers the common opportunities for price (fee) exploitation. They also 
have choices as to their individual modus operandi É the options being nuanced 
between Ôcleaning upÕ insolvency problems; performing urgent activity aimed at Ôsaving 
corporate livesÕ; and selectively plucking Õlow growing fruitÕ to make a comfortable 
living. 
The chapter proceeds to examine the role of lenders of funds/resources to firms which 
consequently become financially distressed. The focus here is mainly on banks and a 
change in role of the lender is noted. In the time period covered by the thesis, banks 
have moved their focus from being holders of debt to being more interested in being 
originators of debt which is then sold on. This has implications for the degree of interest 
 The examples given here apply specifically to IP activity but could be generalised outside this sphere 493
with little difficulty.
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which banks, in general, are said to take in the day to day running of the debtor 
company. 
Then the chapter moves to briefly review the regulatory sanctions available against 
directors who have been involved with offences or undesirable conduct in relation to the 
insolvency of their company. There has been a recent tightening of the rules relating to 
director disqualification which supplement the practice of directors giving a 
Disqualification Undertaking in lieu of being potentially subject to a Disqualification 
Order. Of particular interest here is that directors conduct is not reviewed if their 
company exits from administration via the CVA route ... which is commonly the case 
with financially distressed football clubs.  
An exposition of the way in which insolvency is conducted for companies is then 
offered which starts with the liquidation process and administration, moves through 
discussions of the Pari Passu rule and other rules such as the Anti-deprivation rule and 
ends with outlines of the methods of exiting administration of which Pre-packs and 
CVAs are the most relevant to our discussion. The chapter finishes by succinctly 
discussing the implications for English corporate insolvency of foreign legislation and 
considering the consequences of insolvency moves for the employees of the distressed 
company. These open the way for discussion in subsequent chapters relating to the 
payment of staff and players of football clubs and to the impact of foreign regulators on 
the financial conduct of English football clubs. 
Chapter 6 saw analysis and commentary regarding the unusual instance of the Football 
CreditorsÕ Rule which seeks to interpose an industry-specific regulation between 
member clubs of English professional football and the Õlaw of the landÕ. The Judge in 
the High Court hearing left no doubt as to his view in regard of the morality of this 
regulation but nevertheless his judgement did not alter the FCR in any way. It was left 
to later self-adjustment by footballÕs authorities to attempt some ameliorisation of the 
effects of the rule. Even then, that changes could not be viewed as being radical ... and 
the requirement to pay football creditors in full, with unsecured creditors being paid a 
small fraction of that, remains the case. 
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The last of the discussion chapters  surveyed attempts, initially from outside English 494
football though eventually imitated within, to address what was perceived to be a cause 
if not the cause of financial distress in professional football ... that of financial 
profligacy. It was thought that clubs just spent too much in the pursuit of sporting 
success and paid insufficient heed to financial prudence whilst running their businesses. 
Thus was launched a series of regulations collectively entitled The Financial Fair Play 
rules. Arguably, these have been more sound than fury so far É with little evidence of 
sanctioning to date. Concurrently with the FPP notions, it was mentioned that the 
concept of The Sporting Interest gained traction in legal thinking, based as it was on the 
premise that sport is not a normal line of business and thus it should not be subject to 
normal laws, particularly of an economic character. This approach was seen to be 
fundamentally European at root and, presently, after the Medina case, not easy to 
predict in application. The UKÕs expected exit from the EU will render the sporting 
interest notion even more problematic. 
If judged by the Corkian standard of Business Rescue, then the English professional 
football sector must be rated an outstanding success. Only one club going into 
liquidation  out of more than a hundred over a period of 30 years or so seems to 495
indicate that English Insolvency law has achieved its purpose very well indeed. 
Compared with the insolvency rate of companies in the High Street Retail sector, one 
might well wonder why this has been so. 
If, however, a more focused view is taken of this success, it is not difficult to discern a 
different story; one in which the Public Interest approach to regulation seems thwarted 
both deliberately and accidentally and in which Private Interest forces appear dominant. 
That MertonÕs comments regarding unexpected consequences seem apposite in relation 
to football insolvency regulation is held to be justified. 
Despite recent changes to the industryÕs own private rules, the position of footballÕs 
unsecured creditors remains weak as compared with creditors from within footballÕs 
 Chapter 7 ... Pan-European Developments494
 Maidstone Utd in 1992495
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own system. The rescue of clubs and their ability to then survive is mainly a function of 
their ability to reap a harvest of debt owed to the state (in the guise of HMRC) with 
further contributions from relatively powerless small, unsecured industry suppliers. That 
this continues appears to be a considerable anomaly in public policy. 
The apparent injustice, here, is compounded firstly, by inadequate communication to 
and from participant clubs and appointment-holding IPs  and secondly, by the 496
difficulties of holding individual IPs to account in any individual insolvency case. 
Again, as previous discussion has shown, these inadequacies are well enough known 
but appropriate remedial action has yet to be taken. 
Based on the analysis provided above it is hard to forcefully refute the overall 
assessment of this sector/system as being one in which some of the more significant 
entities/actors seem to be, if not outside the control of the law then outside the current 
interest of the state to bring them under the lawÕs control. The proposition that the 
Sporting Interest is, in practical terms, above the law (at least vis-a-vis Corporate 
Insolvency) seems a strong case to make. 
Put differently ...ÓMatters are not quite as expectedÓ ! 
 Usually acting as Administrators496
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Epilogue 
This piece started with an anecdote about the authorÕs youth in Scotland. It may apt to 
book-end it with another reference from that youthÕs schooling. 
Robert Burns is often quoted as saying in his poem, ÒTo a MouseÓ,  497
Ò... the best laid schemes oÕ mice and men gang aft agley ...Ó 
Here, Burns pithily draws attention to the disconnect between plan and outcome. This 
dissertation provides evidence that this is true in certain applications of Insolvency Law. 
But that evidence relates to the process of executing the plan and not the overall 
result ... after all, practically no professional football clubs are ever liquidated.  
Perhaps it is to the complete verse from that poem which we should refer É   
ÒBut Mouse, you are not alone, 
In proving foresight may be vain: 
The best laid schemes of mice and men 
Go often askew, 
And leave us nothing but grief and pain, 
For promised joy!Ó  498
The final two lines are key in the circumstances of BurnsÕ lifelong support for the 
struggles faced by the underdog. In the context of this thesis these lines highlight the 
unfortunate exchange É grief and pain instead of promised joy  É  which for footballÕs 
unsecured creditors, sum up the lawÕs pursuit of a rescue culture driven approach to 
corporate insolvency in respect of English professional football clubs. Those able to 
control the content of regulation and those carrying out the regulation do seem to have 
the joy; those who are powerless to affect the course of the regulation are left with the 
grief and pain. 
 Burns, R.  ÒTo a Mouse, on Turning up her Nest with the PloughÓ, 1785497
 This Anglicised version is taken from Wikipedia.498
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But, as a regulatory agent himself in later life, Burns became perfectly aware that the 
connection between Regulation and Justice is neither clear nor tidy. And so it is now 
with this author. 
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Appendices and References 
Appendix 1: 
Modified Ayers and Braithwaite ÔResponsive Regulation PyramidÕ for Risk 
Differentiation. 
Regulatory risk differentiation is the process used by a regulatory authority (the regulator) to 
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An Australian exemplification of the connection between enforcement, motivation, 
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